Contracting out of Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit) by Byrne, James E.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
11-1-2006
Contracting out of Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters
of Credit)
James E. Byrne
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
James E. Byrne, Contracting out of Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 297 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol40/iss1/10
CONTRACTING OUT OF REVISED UCC
ARTICLE 5 (LETTERS OF CREDIT)
James E. Byrne*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 299
II. THE MYTH THAT "No LETTER OF CREDIT LAW IS
N ECESSARY" .................................. ......................................... 303
III. ANOTHER LEGAL REGIME ........................................................ 306
A. The Ability to Choose Another Legal Regime
Under Revised UCC Article 5 ....................................... 306
B. Prior UCC Article 5 ...................................................... 308
C. Case Law Without a Statute in a United States
Jurisdiction .................................................................... 3 10
D. Other State Versions of Revised UCC Article 5
(The D ifferences) ........................................................... 311
E. The Law ofAnother Country ......................................... 314
1. Codified Letter of Credit Law ................................ 315
2. The Law of Jurisdictions Without Codified
Letter of Credit Law ............................................... 320
IV. VARYING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF REVISED UCC
A R TICLE 5 ................................................................................ 322
A . G enerally ....................................................................... 323
1. Explicit Non-Variability: Revised UCC
Article 5 Approach to Variation ............................. 323
Professor Byrne teaches law at George Mason University School of Law and directs the
Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, Inc. He has played important roles in
connection with the reform of letter of credit law and practice on national and international levels,
including the revision of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 5, the International Standby
Practices, and the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of
Credit. He gratefully acknowledges the support and advice of James G. Barnes, who practices
law with Baker & McKenzie LLP in Chicago, Illinois, chaired the ABA Subcommittee on Letters
of Credit from 1991 to 1996, collaborated on all of the significant letters of credit projects of the
last 20 years, and, most notably, is primarily responsible for the depth and alignment of Revised
UCC Article 5 with sound letter of credit practice. The conclusions expressed here, however, are
the author's own, as are any errors or omissions. He also gratefully acknowledges the support of
George Mason University School of Law and its Law and Economics Center in the research for
this article and the active collaboration of attorney Lee H. Davis, Senior Legal Associate of the
Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, and the research assistance of Mr. Tyler J.
Balding, George Mason J.D. Candidate, 2008.
298 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:297
2. Other Features of Revised UCC Section 5-
103(c)'s Approach to Variation ............................. 325
B. Non- Variable Provisions in Revised UCC Article 5 ..... 327
1. Revised Section 5-103 ........................................... 328
2. Revised Section 5-102 (Definitions) (a)(9)
("Issuer") and (10) ("Letter of Credit") ................. 332
3. Revised UCC Section 5-106(d) (Perpetual
Letters of Credit) ................................................... 338
4. Revised Section 5-114(d) (Assignment of
Proceeds) ................................................................ 340
5. Except to the Extent Prohibited by Revised
UCC Section 1-302 (Variation by
A greem ent) ............................................................. 342
6. Except to the Extent Prohibited by Section
5-117(d) (Subrogation of Issuer, Applicant,
and Nominated Person) ......................................... 352
7. Disclaimers of Liability or Remedies for
Failure to Perform Obligations .............................. 353
8. Exceptions in Addition to Those Listed in
Revised UCC Section 5-103(c) .............................. 355
9. Some Reflections on Listing Variable
Provisions in Revised UCC Article 5 .................... 364
C. Variation of Other Laws Affecting Revised UCC
Article 5 Letters of Credit .............................................. 365
1. Where Other Legal Regimes Are Involved
in Letter of Credit Disputes .................................... 366
2. Relationship Between Revised UCC
Article 5 and Other Statutes and Case Law ........... 369
3. Can Non-UCC Provisions Be Varied? ......... . . . . . . .. . 370
D. Variation by Adopting Rules of Practice ....................... 372
1. True Conflicts Between Revised UCC
Article 5 and Rules of Practice ............................... 373
2. Variable Provisions of Revised UCC Article
5 That Are Varied by the Issuance of a
Letter of Credit Subject to Rules of Practice ......... 377
3. Variation by Application of Rules of
Practice as Usage of Trade .................................... 385
E. Contracting Out Via Discrete Provisions in LCs ........... 389
V. POLICING LETTER OF CREDIT LAW AND PRACTICE:
ETHICAL LIMITATIONS TO FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ................ 391
V I. C ON CLUSION ............................................................................ 397
FaIl 2006] CONTRACTING OUT OF REVISED ARTICLE 5 299
As is appropriate for a statute governing an undertaking that is
international in its scope, Revised Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
Article 5,1 concerning Letters of Credit, liberally accommodates
departures from its specific provisions. Fully embracing and even
surpassing the UCC ideal offreedom to contract in its approach, UCC
Article 5 eschews any limitation on the choice of an alternative system
of law governing letters of credit to which it applies. It also permits
variation of its provisions to the greatest extent consistent with the
integrity of the letter of credit undertaking. Indeed, UCC Article 5
employs a novel approach of delineating those provisions that cannot be
freely varied as exceptional. While limited non-variability of other
provisions may be inferred from these provisions, statutory analysis
should be grounded in principles of letter of credit law and practice as
codified by Revised UCC Article 5; analysis grounded in common law
principles of conflicts of law or public policy arguments is therefore less
useful.
I. INTRODUCTION
Working with Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit) is an
undertaking that is quintessentially international in both its genesis
and use.2 When combined with the statute's unique and extensive
1. In this article, the 1957 version of the Model Code is referred to as "Prior UCC Article
5" and the 1995 version (including Article 9 amendments) as "Revised UCC Article 5." Unless
otherwise indicated, a reference to either version signifies the Model Code. See JAMES G.
BARNES, JAMES E. BYRNE & AMELIA H. BOSS, THE ABCS OF THE UCC: ARTICLE 5: LETTERS OF
CREDIT (Am. Bar Ass'n 1998); JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT (A.S. Pratt &
Sons rev. ed. 2003); James E. Byrne, Fundamental Issues in the Unification and Harmonization
of Letter of Credit Law, 37 LOY. L. REV. 1 (1991) (materials on the Revised UCC Article 5);
James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Revision of UCC Article 5, 50 BUS. LAW. 1449 (1995);
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (4th ed. West Publ'g
Co. 1995); James J. White, The Influence of International Practice on the Revision of Article 5 of
the UCC, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 189 (1995); James G. Barnes, Internalization of Revised
UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 16 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 215 (1995); Joseph D. Gustavus,
Letter of Credit Compliance Under Revised UCC Article 5 and UCP 500, 114 BANKING L.J. 55
(1997); Milton R. Schroeder, The 1995 Revision to UCC Article 5, Letters of Credit, 29 U.C.C.
L.J. 331 (1997).
2. UCC Section 5-102(a)(10) defines a letter of credit as:
A definite undertaking that satisfies the requirements of Section 5-104 by an issuer to a
beneficiary at the request or for the account of an applicant or, in the case of a financial
institution, to itself or for its own account, to honor a documentary presentation by
payment or delivery of an item of value.
U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(10) (1995).
In other words, a letter of credit is a promise to pay that is conditioned on the
presentation of specified documentary representations. Id. While there is no formal basis for a
distinction, where the documentary representations relate to a current transaction for goods and
services, the transaction is regarded as a "commercial letter of credit." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 923-24 (8th ed. 2004).
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A commercial letter of credit is a contractual agreement between a bank, known as the
issuing bank, on behalf of one of its customers, authorizing another bank, known as the
advising or confirming bank, to make payment to the beneficiary. The issuing bank,
on the request of its customer, opens the letter of credit. The issuing bank makes a
commitment to honor drawings made under the credit. The beneficiary is normally the
provider of goods and/or services. Essentially, the issuing bank replaces the bank's
customer as the payee.
CREDIT RESEARCH FOUNDATION, UNDERSTANDING AND USING LETTERS OF CREDIT, PART I,
http://www.crfonline.org/orc/cro/cro-9-1.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2006). This term stems from
an older usage that is retained in the United States. WILBERT WARD, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL
CREDIT 3 (1922). In Europe and other parts of the world, the term most commonly used is
"documentary credit," which also has historical roots in letter of credit usage, but is inapt for
describing a particular subcategory of letters of credit since all letters of credit are
"documentary." RICHARD KING, GUTTERIDGE & MEGRAH'S LAW OF BANKERS' COMMERCIAL
CREDITS 1 (8th ed. 2001). The term "commercial" more closely captures the unique feature of
this subcategory, namely its use to pay the purchase price in a "live" commercial transaction. See
id.
Letters of credit that are not so used can be generally classified as "standby" letters of
credit. Id. As used here, standby letters of credit would include so-called independent guarantees
that are also known as first demand or bank guarantees. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law
[UNCITRAL], United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of
Credit, Art. 2, U.N. DOC. A/RES/50/48 (Dec. 11, 1995) [hereinafter UN LC Convention],
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/payments/1995Convention_
guarantees credit.html; see also LIN LC Convention, supra, Explanatory Note, para. 2-3,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/guarantees/guarantees.pdf.
These undertakings derive from English and European usage and, at the abstract level of law, are
the equivalent of standby letters of credit. The preferred term is "standby letter of credit" or
"standby," not only because it is more familiar to American readers, but also because it avoids
"guarantee" language. An "independent guarantee" is not a true guarantee (which is essentially a
suretyship or accessory undertaking). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURSHIP & GUAR. § 4 cmt. c
(1995); James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Revision of U.C.C. Article 5, 50 BUS. LAW. 1449,
1451 (1995). The uses of standby letters of credit are as varied as the plethora of human
enterprises that require dependable money-like promises. Types of standby letters of credit
include: (1) clean standbys (requiring only presentation of a draft or simple demand); (2)
performance or bid bond standbys (available in the event that a contract is awarded and not
signed or performed); (3) reinsurance standbys (supporting reinsurance undertakings); (4)
commercial standbys (providing back up payment in the event that the seller is not paid in the
ordinary course of business); (5) advance payment standbys (supporting an obligation to account
for an advance payment made by the beneficiary to the applicant); (6) counter standbys
(supporting the issuance of a separate standby or other undertaking by the beneficiary of the
counter standby); (7) financial standbys (supporting an obligation to pay money); (8) including
any instrument evidencing an obligation to repay borrowed money); (9) and direct pay standbys
(supporting payment when due of an underlying payment obligation typically in connection with
a financial standby without regard to a default). See Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What is a
Letter of Credit Under UCC § 5-102, 5-103, 44 A.L.R.4th 172 (1986). They can also generally
be distinguished as financial or performance standbys. These categories are not precise and, more
importantly, have no bearing on the essential character of the undertaking.
As of the end of the first quarter of 2006, the top three hundred United States banks
reported outstanding standby obligations of over $382.7 billion and more than $24.6 billion in
commercial letters of credit. Statistics: U.S. Banks, DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD July-Aug
2006, at 40, 45. While figures for outstanding amounts are published only for the United States, a
conservative estimate would place the global volume of letters of credit at $1.2 billion. For at
least a decade, the use of amounts outstanding in standby letters of credit has been growing, while
that of commercial letters of credit has been declining. Id.
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body of codified practice rules, Revised UCC Article 5 reaches a
level of complexity and nuance that presents both users and their
attorneys with a considerable array of challenges and opportunities.3
Following the demise of the hegemony of the London Clearing
Banks in this field during World War I, the banking industry
reestablished order by promulgating rules, first at the national level
and then internationally, through the medium of the Commission on
Banking Technique and Practice of the International Chamber of
Commerce ("ICC"). 4 The current version of the rules designed for
commercial letters of credit is the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits ("UCP").5 Special rules have been drafted for
standby letters of credit-the International Standby Practices
("ISP98").6
The enactment of positive statutory law that followed the earlier
codification of practice by several decades is limited. Apart from
UCC Article 5's treatment of letters of credit, the only other
contemporary statutory scheme is the United Nations Convention on
Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit ("UN LC
3. The original Model UCC, which was approved in 1952, contained the UCC Article 5. In
1957, Model UCC Article 5 was revised extensively as a result of comments by the New York
Law Revision Commission. See STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT
RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 44-46 (1956). Although all fifty states
eventually adopted this version, a non-conforming amendment, styled section 5-102(4), was
adopted by Alabama, Arizona, Missouri, and New York. ALA. CODE § 7-5-102 (1966); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-5102 (1984); MO. REV. STAT. § 400.5-102 (1965); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 5-
102 (McKinney 1962). This amendment displaced UCC Article 5 where the letter of credit was
determined to be subject to the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits
("UCP"), published by the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"). A joint American Bar
Association and Banking Industry Task Force recommended the revision of Prior UCC Article 5
in 1990. See The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, et al., An Examination of UCC
Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 45 BUs. LAW. 1527 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force]. All fifty states,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico adopted this version of UCC Article 5, which was
completed in October 1995. See LC RULES AND LAWS: CRITICAL TEXTS 151 (James E. Byrne
ed., Inst. of Int'l. Banking Law & Practice, 2d. ed. 2002) (providing an exhaustive table of dates
of adoption, effective dates, and state citations).
4. See WILBERT WARD, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL CREDITS, 3 (1922) (providing a history
of the American Commercial Credit market).
5. See generally infra note 233. The current version of the rules designed for commercial
letters of credit is ICC Publication No. 500. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993) (ICC Publication No. 500)
[hereinafter UCP500]. The UCP revision, which becomes effective July 1, 2007, will be the 2007
Revision, ICC Publication No. 600. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (2007) (ICC Publication No. 600) [hereinafter
UCP600].
6. See generally infra note 251.
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Convention").7  Nevertheless, judicial pronouncements by the
Supreme People's Court of China8 and rules promulgated by some
central banks9 embody many of the principles espoused by the UCC
and the UN LC Convention.
In light of the dynamic nature of the developing codification of
letter of credit laws and regulations, the drafters of Revised UCC
Article 5 faced challenging policy questions vis-d-vis the extent to
which one might contract out of the statute.10 The drafters have
responded with a remarkably broad endorsement of both the
principles of party autonomy and freedom of contract. Although
limited exceptions to these liberal policies do exist, the net outcome
is to give parties a wide variety of choices of alternative regimes. I
Indeed, the Official Comment to section 5-101 indicates that the
statute seeks to accommodate "further development of the efficient
use of letters of credit by preserving flexibility through variation by
agreement in order to respond to and accommodate developments in
custom and usage that are not inconsistent with the essential
definitions and substantive mandates of the statute." 12 The extent to
which Revised UCC Article 5 has fulfilled this goal will become
7. See generally discussion, infra Part III. E. l.a.
8. See generally discussion, infra Part III.E. I .b.
9. The Central Bank of Indonesia is currently considering regulations for letters of credit in
a manner similar to that of the Chinese Supreme People's Court. In the United States, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") has played a leading role in addressing safety and
soundness concerns through its interpretative rulings. Specifically, the OCC has promulgated
rules to insure that banks would prudently consider the importance of limits to the time frame of
their exposure avoiding the vagaries of non-documentary conditions. In their present form, the
OCC's rulings are the most current approach to letter of credit regulation now in place and would
serve well as a model for enlightened regulation in this field. See U.S. Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency: Interpretive Rulings, 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1016, 7.1017 (2006), reprinted in LC
RULES AND LAWS: CRITICAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 189.
10. Professor Bunn highlights the challenge faced by the UCC drafters:
The Uniform Commercial Code is not a "regulatory" law. Its central purpose is not to
restrict free contract by imposing required terms (as e.g., usury laws, hour and wage
laws or public utility laws necessarily do) but to facilitate commercial transactions by
making the governing law simpler, clearer, more modem, and more uniform.
Nevertheless, like any law at all concerning business, it must consider in some detail
what bargains, in what circumstances, have to be permitted, forbidden, or denied
effect.
Charles Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 59, 59 (1961).
11. As pointed out by Professor Bunn, the critical element of freedom of contract is "not
simply freedom to sign papers or write letters to each other, but freedom to make agreements
which the legal system will enforce." Id.
12. U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (1995).
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apparent by examining how the statute treats the ability of parties to
contract out of its provisions: (1) with respect to choosing an
altogether different regime than the otherwise applicable version of
Revised UCC Article 5 and (2) modifying a discrete provision of
Revised UCC Article 5.
This article focuses on a letter of credit obligation that falls
within the purview of Revised UCC Article 5.13 The First Part of
this Article considers the notion common in some letter of credit
banking circles that there is no need to select letter of credit law in an
undertaking that selects appropriate practice rules. Part Two
considers the possibility of selecting a different legal regime, while
Part Three considers varying the effect of discrete provisions of
Revised UCC Article 5. Part Four then addresses ethical
considerations related to opting out of Revised UCC Article 5 and
Part Five concludes with some observations regarding variations in
Revised UCC Article 5.
II. THE MYTH THAT "No LETTER OF CREDIT LAW IS NECESSARY"
Due partly to the international and virtually universal use of the
UCP for commercial letters of credit and to the widespread belief
that the UCP displaces the need for "law," 14 many bankers regard
statutes dealing with letters of credit as incompatible with the UCP.15
13. The fundamental choice of law principle is that unless otherwise provided, a letter of
credit obligation is subject to the law applicable to the issuer at the indicated place of issuance or,
in the case of a confirmer, the stated place of confirmation. See U.C.C. § 5-116(b) (1995)
("Failing a choice of law in accordance with article 21, the undertaking is governed by the law of
the State where the guarantor/issuer has that place of business at which the undertaking was
issued."); see also, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], United Nations Convention
on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit, Art. 22, U.N. DOC. A/RES/50/48
(Dec. 11, 1995) [hereinafter UN LC Convention], available at http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral texts/payments/1995Convention-guaranteescredit.html. For purposes of
this Article, the complexity introduced by the presence of a nominated bank is not addressed,
since the application of a bank's local law to its own undertakings does not affect the basic
proposition addressed here, should that law be a version of Revised UCC Article 5.
14. While there are many instances of this notion, one of the most colorful is that ICC
Council rules are assigned an "effective date", which is assumed to be the date after which they
may be used. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE:
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION, March 2006. However, as mere rules of practice (and
not law), an undertaking may be issued subject to the rules of practice at any point, even in draft
form. Id.
15. This notion was prevalent in the United States prior to the adoption of Prior UCC Article
5 and remains prevalent elsewhere throughout the world where there are no such statutes. See
James E. Byrne, The Revision of UCC Article 5: A Strategy for Success, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 13,
19 (1990) [hereinafter Byrne, Strategy for Success]. One example of this phenomenon was the
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As a result, some bankers and letter of credit users are under the
mistaken impression that displacement of law by rules of practice is
not merely an option, but in fact the norm, and that issuing a letter of
credit subject to rules of practice such as the UCP effects such a
displacement. While this notion may be correct insofar as the parties
to a dispute believed it and did not seek legal redress, it would
quickly be unmasked upon review by a judicial or arbitral tribunal.
Reference to a court or arbitral tribunal would result in the
application of "law" (although the source of part of that law may
prove to be the UCP). In the United States, this notion was further
fueled by nonconforming amendments to Prior UCC Article 5 in four
states, including the commercially significant state of New York,
which, in effect, ousted or displaced Prior UCC Article 5 whenever a
letter of credit was deemed "by its terms or by agreement, course of
dealing or usage of trade" to be subject to the UCp. 16 This provision
resulted from the New York-centered banking community's hostility
to the enactment of a domestic letter of credit statute on the grounds
that it was incompatible with the international rules of practice
embodied in the UCP.
17
Thus, one of the principal purposes of revising UCC Article 5
was to resolve the concerns of the banking community and to
harmonize letter of credit law with international letter of credit
practice.18 Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals revealed the
fallacy of the commonly held notion that the UCP could stand alone
as law in the hallmark case of United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge
resistance of many members of the ICC Banking Commission to the endorsement by the ICC of
the UN LC Convention. Specifically, the commission objected on grounds that such a statute was
unnecessary (arguable), noting that it was a mistake to endorse a positive law whose effect would
be to weaken the value of the UCP. In light of both the UN LC Convention's express deference
to rules of practice and the experience in the United States with its statute, these objections are
not defensible. Cf id. at 20.
16. New York's UCC Section 5-103(4) states, in relevant part:
Unless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a letter of credit or a credit if
by its terms or by agreement, course of dealing or usage of trade such letter of credit or
credit is subject in whole or in part to the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Commercial Documentary Credits fixed by the Thirteenth or by any subsequent
Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce.
N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-103(4) (McKinney 1962). This provision was also enacted by Alabama,
Arizona, and Missouri, which followed New York's lead. See ALA. CODE § 7-5-102(4) (West
2002); ARtZ. REV. STAT. § 47-5102(d) (1988); MO. REV. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (1994).
17. See Byrne, Strategy for Success, supra note 15, at 13-14, 17.
18. Id.
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Sporting Goods Corp.. In United Bank the court considered whether
to enjoin a transaction resulting from letter of credit fraud where
New York's non-conforming amendment had ousted Prior UCC
Article 5. Concluding that New York common law applied in the
absence of Prior New York UCC Article 5, the New York Court of
Appeals somewhat ironically drew on the provisions of Prior UCC
Article 5 by analogy to reach a decision since it concluded that this
provision was declaratory of the common law. 19
The notion that the UCP dispenses with the need for letter of
credit law is also based on the fact that courts regularly defer to it in
stating the rule of law to resolve a dispute.2 ° Such deference
typically occurs where the letter of credit is issued subject to the
UCP, which either effectively varies local law on the matter at issue
or provides a rule where local law is silent. Since even Revised UCC
Article 5, the most detailed formulation of letter of credit law, is
silent on most issues relating to the compliance of documents with
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, it is not surprising that
courts often invoke the UCP to resolve most letter of credit disputes
regarding compliance. Where there is effectively no statute
(everywhere except the United States, China, and the countries
adopting the UN LC Convention), and, in many countries, no case
law either (even in common law jurisdictions where courts are
persuaded by prior decisions), the UCP may be the only coherent
source of law. The other alternative would be to resort either to
general principles of the law of obligations or commercial law.
However, this source of law often leads to results that are wrong for
international letter of credit practice.
Thus, although the notion that the UCP is "law" is a myth, it is
powerful, and, like all myths, an expression of a fundamental truth in
non-analytical terms.21 In subsequent parts, this article will explore
the possibility of opting out of Revised UCC Article 5 by making a
letter of credit subject to rules of practice.
19. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 360 N.E.2d 943, 947 n.2
(N.Y. 1976) ("However, even if the Uniform Customs and Practice were deemed applicable to
this case, it would not, in the absence of a conflict, abrogate the pre-code case law (now codified
in Uniform Commercial Code, § 5-114) and that authority continues to govern even where article
5 is not controlling .... ").
20. E.g., id. at 947.
21. See MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY (Ruth N. Anshen ed., Willard R. Trask trans.,
Harper & Rowe 1963).
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After more than fifty years of letter of credit statutory
experience, the relationship between rules of law and practice is
somewhat better understood in the United States. However, the
definitive analysis of this relationship has yet to be formulated.
Taking the UCP as contract terms added by incorporation, which
represents the only alternative conceptual model, does not adequately
capture the central role of the UCP or similar rules with respect to
letters of credit. To some extent, rules of practice do operate as an
alternative, but concurrent system of law, as the drafters of Revised
UCC Article 5 recognized when citing its treatment of the UCP and
similar rules in Revised UCC section 5-116(c).22
III. ANOTHER LEGAL REGIME
It is possible to contract out of Revised UCC Article 5 by the
choice of any other system of law without regard to connectivity.
This section considers the various options available and their impact.
A. The Ability to Choose Another
Legal Regime Under Revised UCC Article 5
Prior UCC Article 5 did not contain its own choice of law rules.
Instead, it was content to rely upon Prior UCC section 1-105(1),
which limited the ability of parties to choose law where that law had
a "reasonable relationship" with the forum.23
Recognizing that this limitation was ill-suited for international
22. Revised UCC Section 5-116(c) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the liability of an issuer, nominated
person, or adviser is governed by any rules of custom or practice, such as the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, to which the letter of credit,
confirmation, or other undertaking is expressly made subject. If (i) this article would
govern the liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser under subsection (a) or
(b), (ii) the relevant undertaking incorporates rules of custom or practice, and (iii) there
is conflict between this article and those rules as applied to that undertaking, those
rules govern except to the extent of any conflict with the nonvariable provisions
specified in section 5-103(c).
U.C.C. § 5-116(c) (2003).
23. Prior UCC Section 1-105(1) provided:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable
relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the
law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties. Failing such an agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to this state.
U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1952) (amended 2001).
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undertakings (such as letters of credit involving commercial entities
with multiple commercial reasons, and justifying the selection of a
neutral commercial law) the drafters of Revised UCC Article 5 made
a radical departure from the general UCC approach to choice of
law.24  For example, revised UCC section 5-116(a) provides that
"[t]he jurisdiction whose law is chosen need not bear any relation to
the transaction. ' '25 Revised UCC section 5-116 Official Comment 1
demonstrates this paradigm shift by employing the following
example:
two parties, an issuer and an applicant, both located in
Oklahoma, might choose the law of New York. Unless
they agree otherwise, the section anticipates that they wish
the substantive law of New York to apply to their
transaction and they do not intend that a New York choice
of law principle might direct a court to Oklahoma law.
26
Moreover, Revised UCC section 5-116(e) permits the choice of
any forum in which any disputes are to be litigated, a provision that
may be more significant than the choice of law provision 27  Of
course, whether a chosen forum will choose to hear the case is
another question, and the statute does not purport to confer
jurisdiction to its own courts, much less those of other jurisdictions.28
These provisions are the centerpiece of the approach to
variability in Revised UCC Article 5, which goes beyond notions
that there is liberty to provide for contractual terms to permit
complete freedom in the selection of law and forum. In fact, Revised
UCC Article 5 even surpasses the subsequent revision of UCC
24. Id.
25. U.C.C. § 5-116(a) (1995). Not all case law has been so restrictive. See, e.g., Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of Pak., 307 F. Supp. 947, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (selecting English law,
even though the transaction had no relation to England, and the application of English law led to a
result contrary to New York law), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 467 F.2d 1150 (2d
Cir. 1972).
26. U.C.C. § 5-116 cmt. 1.
27. Id. § 5-116(e) ("The forum for settling disputes arising out of an undertaking within this
article may be chosen in the manner and with the binding effect that governing law may be
chosen in accordance with subsection (a).").
28. Although Subsection (e) may have little actual effect, it could be a factor in convincing
another forum's court to exercise jurisdiction. Revised UCC Section 5-116 official comment 5
recognizes that a selected forum may elect not to exercise jurisdiction and suggests that the
selection clause be disregarded in such a case, unless another court that would otherwise have
jurisdiction accepts the case due to the clause. Id. § 5-116 cmt. 5. To illustrate, the Official
Comment compares such a situation to being in "eternal purgatory." Id.
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Article 1. It is therefore surprising that more than half of the states
that have so far adopted Revised UCC Article 5 have yet to adopt
Revised UCC Article 1 based on the fact that they prefer a more
restricted approach to choice of law.
29
As a result, under Revised UCC Article 5, letter of credit
obligations can effectively be made subject to any system of law
without regard to whether that jurisdiction is related in any manner to
the transaction. 30  The remainder of this section considers the various
choices that are available, assuming that Revised UCC section 5-116
applies to a letter of credit and its implications.
B. Prior UCC Article 5
Until recently, issuing a letter of credit subject to Prior UCC
Article 5 was relatively simple. Before all fifty states had adopted
Revised UCC Article 5, a bank might have exercised this option by
issuing a letter of credit subject to the law of a state that had not
adopted Revised UCC Article 5.3l Since this course is no longer
29. Revised UCC Article 1 (adopted by twenty-two states as of August 1, 2006) creates a
more complex matrix. Revised section 1-301(c) provides that in non-consumer "international
transactions" (ones that bear a "reasonable relationship" to a country other than the United
States), the parties can "agree" to the law of another state or another country regardless of
whether there is a "relation" to the State or country chosen. See U.C.C. § 1-301(c). In non-
consumer domestic transactions, the choice of the parties is limited to the law of another state.
See id. The Official Comment states that Revised section 1-301 "affords greater party autonomy
than former section 1-105, but with important safeguards protecting consumer interests and
fundamental policies." U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 1. However, of the twenty-two states that have
enacted Revised UCC Article 1, fourteen have retained the "reasonable relation" test of Prior
UCC section 1-105 rather than change to the less restrictive rule. These states include: Alabama,
ALA. CODE § 7-1-301 (Supp. 2006), Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-301 (Supp. 2005),
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-1-301 (Supp. 2006), Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
1-301 (2005), Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:1-301 (Supp. 2005), Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §
28-1-301 (Supp. 2006), Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 336:1-301 (Supp. 2006), Montana, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-1-301 (2005), Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 1-301 (Supp. 2005), Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. § 104.1301 (Supp. 2005), New Mexico, N.M. STAT. § 55-1-301 (2005), Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 1-301 (Supp. 2005), Texas, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301
(Vernon Supp. 2006), and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-301 (Supp. 2006). This provision is
not applicable to UCC Article 5. See U.C.C. § 1-301(g)(5).
30. As will be discussed in connection with Revised UCC section 5-103(c), Revised UCC
section 5-116(a) expands the traditional formulation from one where the "agreement" of the
parties controls to one where the terms of the letter of credit control. Here, the treatment of this
provision focuses on the law chosen in the letter of credit as between the issuer and beneficiary;
yet, the law applicable to an "issuer, nominated person, or advisor for action or omission" may be
chosen "by a provision in the person's letter of credit, confirmation, or other undertaking." See
U.C.C. § 5-116(a) (1995).
31. Wisconsin, the last state to have adopted Revised UCC Article 5, enacted it on March
27, 2006, published it on April 10, 2006, and it became effective on the first day of the third
month following publication, July 1, 2006. See WIS. STAT. § 405.116 (Supp. 2006).
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available, the question becomes significantly more complex and, in
any event, one still must assess whether such a step is desirable and
what implications it has.
If a letter of credit provided that it were issued subject to the
statutory regime governing letters of credit prior to the adoption of
Revised UCC Article 5, would such an instrument be enforceable?
32
Assuming a state's enactment of Revised UCC Article 5 does
not expressly permit or forbid selection of Prior UCC Article 5,33 the
question is whether a forum would give effect to the choice of a prior
version of UCC Article 5 that the legislature had superseded by
statute.
Although a court might be tempted to approach this question
from a public policy perspective, choice of law considerations, or
even theoretical notions of freedom of contract, it would be wise to
resist such temptations. The answer lies in Revised UCC section 5-
116. Unlike statutes in other areas of law, there exist no fundamental
public policy reasons that would have prohibited the choice of Prior
UCC Article 5 when it was in force in another state.3 4  While
Revised UCC Article 5 is a marked improvement over Prior UCC
Article 5, the latter was a viable system of law supplemented by case
law.35  It would yield a principled decision in virtually every
32. If so, it would be prudent to provide the citation of the prior version. A variation on this
approach would be to issue the letter of credit subject to the 1957 Model UCC Article 5. The
latter approach raises additional questions as to whether one can adopt a model code as the
governing law. The question is rendered more complex because this model code has been
superseded and replaced by its sponsors, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute. This approach is disfavored because of the
additional problematic issues that it raises. Were this approach used, and if the forum state
treated the prior model code as an alternative system of law, the same questions addressed in the
text would also arise in addition to those delineated here.
33. The Revised UCC Article 5 repealer provision does not contain any limitation on the
continued use of the prior statute. It states: "This [Act] [repeals] [amends] [insert citation to
existing Article 5]." U.C.C. art. 5, Transition Provisions.
34. See Sandra Stem, Varying Article 5 of the UCC by Agreement, 114 BANKING L.J. 516,
522 (1997) (explaining that revised UCC Article 5 "may be rejected en grosse in favor of a
prerevision Article 5 by an agreement that elects the law of a jurisdiction that has not adopted
Revised Article 5").
35. Whether it is prudent to issue a letter of credit subject to Prior UCC Article 5 is a
different question. On all counts, Revised UCC Article 5 attempts to, and does, capture modem
letter of credit law and align it with international letter of credit practice in a manner that Prior
UCC Article 5 was unsuccessful in accomplishing. It contains marked improvements in its
definitional approach, its treatment of non-documentary conditions, its transfer by operation of
law, and its transfer and assignment. The statute's gap-filling terms are generally consistent with
current international letter of credit practice. It expressly refers to present and future "standard
practice" as the place to look for answers, it allows complete freedom to choose applicable law
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situation, even though a court may be forced to look to case law
because the prior statute is skeletal.36 In addition, letters of credit
issued under Prior UCC Article 5 remain subject to it and courts will
be required to use it to decide any litigation that occurs into the
foreseeable future. 37  There is no reason why the universal adoption
of the revision itself should change the ability to adopt the prior
version. The policy of Revised UCC section 5-116, which favors
complete freedom in the choice of a law and forum, compels such a
conclusion.
C. Case Law Without a Statute in a United States Jurisdiction
Another option would be to issue a letter of credit that eschewed
any statutory treatment of letters of credit and was subject to case
law of a state without the statute.
Prior to the adoption of Revised UCC Article 5, this option was
available by adopting the law of one of the four states that had
adopted Prior non-conforming UCC section 5-102(4): Alabama,
and forum, and it allows nearly complete freedom to supplement and vary the effect of the
provisions of revised Article 5 by incorporating rules of practice such as UCP500. See generally
Barnes & Byrne, supra note 1, at 1449 (providing a detailed examination of the relative
advantages of Revised UCC Article 5 over Prior UCC Article 5). Indeed, it is hard to imagine
any general reason to prefer the Prior version of UCC Article 5 over Revised UCC Article 5.
There may, of course, be discrete instances where the nature of the underlying transaction
requires such an approach. In such a situation, the courts should give effect to the terms of the
letter of credit.
36. In such a situation, a court may face the question of whether to look to the revision for a
resolution of an issue addressed in the revision where Prior UCC Article 5 is silent. The answer
may turn on whether or not the specific provision of Revised UCC Article 5 is declaratory of the
common law. Where it is, it might be advisable for a court to turn to the revised statute by
analogy. Some guidance exists in decisions made under Prior UCC Article 5 during the transition
period. See, e.g., Bank of Joliet v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, No. 96CI 145, 1997 WL 619875
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1997) (using the choice of law rule of Revised section 5-116 to apply the law
of a jurisdiction where Prior UCC Article 5 was in force and governed the transaction); Studwell,
Inc. v. Korean Exch. Bank, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538 (Ct. App. 1997) (referring to Revised UCC
Article 5, not yet in force in California at the time of the decision, for a definition of letter of
credit).
37. This possibility raises another question, namely, what choice of law rule a court should
apply where the letter of credit selects Prior UCC Article 5 as enacted in a given state, either the
forum state, or a different state. The traditional rule is the law of the forum. See DOLAN, supra
note 1, at 4-15. However, in this situation it is necessary to ask whether that rule is Revised UCC
section 5-116, Prior UCC section 1-105, or general choice of law rules, (particularly a prior letter
of credit law of the forum). Given its policy of freedom of choice of law and forum, a court
should apply Revised UCC Section 5-116 unless the undertaking specifically adopted a different
choice of law rule. Should Prior UCC Section 1-105(a)(i) be applied, the forum might refuse to
permit the selection of another law where there is no "reasonable relation" to the forum.
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Arizona, Missouri, or New York,38 which ousted the statute in favor
of case law. If enforced, these provisions would have the effect of
making Prior UCC Article 5 inapplicable to most letters of credit.
Apart from the philosophical question of why a jurisdiction
might prefer the authority of case law to that of a statute, and
particularly, to Revised UCC Article 5,39 the answer should be the
same as with the adoption of any other version of Prior UCC Article
5. Under letter of credit policy, as manifested in Revised UCC
section 5-116, the parties possess complete freedom to choose any
prior version of UCC Article 5, including original 1952 version,
which was enacted only in Pennsylvania.
A variation of this option would be to make the letter of credit
"subject to the law of [state] with the exception of Revised UCC
Article 5 [citation] or any prior statutory version of letter of credit
law." For the same policy reasons that would permit adoption of a
prior version of the statute and of those versions of the prior statute
that permitted its renunciation for a given letter of credit, such a
provision should be given effect under Revised UCC Article 5.
D. Other State Versions of Revised UCC Article 5 (The Differences)
Another option is issuance of a letter of credit subject to the
version of Revised UCC Article 5 in force in another jurisdiction.
The selection of another state's version of Revised UCC Article 5
raises questions involving both the relative differences between the
various versions of Revised UCC Article 5 and the case law that has
developed in that jurisdiction.4 °
38. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1962).
39. As a result of careful drafting and accommodation with standard international letter of
credit practice, however, the conflicts (real and perceived) between law and practice that were
present in Prior UCC Article 5 are not present in Revised UCC Article 5. Consequently, this
argument has no merit. Moreover, after more than half a century under the UCC Article 5
regime, it is virtually impossible to distinguish case law from UCC Article 5. To obtain "pure"
pre-code letter of credit case law, one might need to revisit the relevant cases from the first half of
the twentieth century.
40. While there is little case law at this time on many of the issues addressed by Revised
UCC Article 5, that situation will change over time. Moreover, many of the decisions under Prior
UCC Article 5 remain applicable to Revised UCC Article 5, especially with respect to collateral
issues such as the availability of injunctive relief Indeed, in such situations, differences can exist
between federal and state courts sitting in the same jurisdiction. Compare Network Alliance
Group, LLC v. Cable & Wireless, No. CIV02-644DWFAJB, 2002 WL 1205734 (D. Minn. May
31, 2002) (denying applicant's request for a preliminary injunction because of insufficient proof
of fraud and irreparable injury), and New Orleans Brass, LLC v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 2001-2308
(La. App. 4 Cir. 5/15/02); 818 So. 2d 1057 (denying injunctive relief based on insufficient
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Compared to Prior UCC Article 5, there have been relatively
few non-conforming amendments to Revised UCC Article 5. Of
these few, only Alabama has adopted a non-conforming amendment
that affects the non-variable provisions of the Model Law, namely
the deletion of Revised UCC section 5-106(d) forbidding perpetual
letters of credit. Within this exception, there exist two principal
types of non-conforming amendments, namely (1) judicial
determination of standard practice; and (2) mandatory assessment of
attorney's fees regarding most letter of credit issues in favor of the
prevailing party.4'
Under Revised UCC section 5-116, the selection of the law of
Alabama raises significant policy questions with respect to perpetual
letters of credit, since any other state forum will inevitably have
enacted a statute that prohibits the variation of this provision. As
will be discussed, this decision represents a public policy
determination that perpetual letters of credit are contrary to
fundamental letter of credit policies and that the parties are not able
to create such undertakings. In deciding whether to enforce as
perpetual a letter of credit that selects the law of Alabama, the forum
should weigh the letter of credit policies underlying Revised UCC
section 5-116 against 5-107(d) and base its decision on these factors
rather than general choice of law or policy issues.
Four states have adopted non-conforming amendments to
variable Revised UCC section 5-108(e).42 This subsection provides
evidence of material fraud), with Intrinsic Values Corp. v. Superintendencia De Administracion
Tributaria, 806 So. 2d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (enjoining confirming banks from honoring
their confirmations over the objection of the beneficiary on the basis that the applicant met the
requirements of UCC section 5-109, and that principles of comity supported the requested relief).
41. Other significant non-conforming amendments include altering the length of the statute
of limitations (Alabama, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania), and indicating whether a security interest
under 5-118(a) is granted only in a documented collateral or also extends to "any identifiable
proceeds of the collateral" (Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina). The latter amendment is meant to clarify that security interests under
Revised UCC Article 5 apply to the proceeds of collateral as well as the collateral itself in the
same way they do in Revised UCC Article 9.
42. Revised UCC Section 5-108(e) provides: "An issuer shall observe standard practice of
financial institutions that regularly issue letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's
observance of the standard practice is a matter of interpretation for the court. The court shall
offer the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence of the standard practice." U.C.C. §
5-108(e) (2003). Alabama, New Jersey, New York, and Wyoming have made non-conforming
amendments to Revised UCC Section 5-108(e). See ALA. CODE § 7-5-108(e) (2006); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:5-108(e) (2006); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 5-108(e) (Consol. 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
34.1-5-108(e) (2006). The amendments either omit the last two sentences (New York and
Alabama), omit the second sentence (Wyoming), or omit the phrase "of the issuer's observance"
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that issuers of letters of credit shall observe the standard practice of
financial institutions and relegates interpretation of the issuer's
observance of the standard practice to the interpretation of the courts.
This provision ensures that courts will not confuse their ability under
common law to interpret the terms of a "trade code" such as
UCP500, its revision, or ISP98 with a finding of fact to be decided
by a jury.4 3  Unfortunately, in the four states listed above, this issue
was confused with the constitutional question of the right to trial by
jury." Even in those states that have not adopted the model code
text, the courts should reach the same result under common law.
45
Five states have non-conforming amendments to variable
Revised UCC section 5-111 (e), which depart from the American rule
46regarding attorney's fees and awards it to the prevailing party.
These non-conforming amendments resulted from concerns that it
would unduly discourage litigation, a concern that appears to have
been justified since the volume of letter of credit litigation related
from the second sentence (New Jersey).
43. The last sentence of Prior UCC Article 1-205(2) states that "[i]f it is established that...
a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is
for the court." U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1957). The last sentence of Revised UCC Article 1-303(3)
states that "[i]f it is established that.., a usage is embodied in a trade code or similar record the
interpretation of the record is a question of law." U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2004).
44. See Margaret L. Moses, The Impact of Revised Article 5 on Small and Mid-Sized
Exporters, 29 UCC L.J. 390 (1997) (arguing that Revised UCC Section 5-108(e) attempts to
eliminate the jury's role in determining issuer liability by assigning the fact finding function
regarding standard practice to the court); Margaret L. Moses, The Uniform Commercial Code
Meets the Seventh Amendment: The Demise of Jury Trials Under Article 5?, 72 IND. L.J. 681
(1997). But see James E. Byrne, Revised UCC Section 5-108(e): A Constitutional Nudge to the
Courts, 29 UCC L.J. 419 (1997) (explaining how Revised UCC section 5-108(e) was intended to
favor judicial resolution of matters only when judicial resolution is constitutionally permissible
and arguing that the section will withstand constitutional scrutiny).
45. Recent cases have reinforced the importance of the clarification. See, e.g., Blonder &
Co. v. Citibank, 808 N.Y.S.2d 214 (App. Div. 2006). Blonder & Co. upheld the trial court's
exclusion of expert testimony as to standard banking practice under the UCP because
where such a usage is embodied in a trade code such as the UCP or other writing, 'the
interpretation of the writing is for the court' (UCC 1-205[2]). Thus, any interpretation
of the UCP was properly made by the motion court, which properly refused to allow
the expert to usurp its function as the sole determiner of law ....
Id. at 217 (internal citation omitted).
46. U.C.C. § 5-111 (e) (1995) ("Reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation
must be awarded to the prevailing party in an action in which a remedy is sought under this
article."). The subsection does not apply to actions brought on any of the underlying contracts
related to letters of credit, but only disputes regarding the letter of credit itself. Id. The Alabama,
Connecticut, New Jersey, and Texas versions state that reasonable attorney's fees "may" (Revised
UCC section 5-111 (e) says "must") be awarded, while New York omits Revised UCC section 5-
111 (e) altogether.
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matters continues to drop in the United States.47 In part it is thought
that this decline has been fueled by the calculation in the mind of
plaintiffs, who might have otherwise filed doubtful suits for purposes
of leverage that they may have to bear additional costs in the event
that they do not prevail.
While none of these provisions go to the essence of Revised
UCC Article 5, careful thought should be given to subjecting a letter
of credit to the law of jurisdictions that have adopted non-
conforming amendments.48
Another question that arises due to these variable non-
conforming amendments is whether the forum would classify the
non-conforming amendments regarding judicial interpretation of
documents, attorney's fees, and the statute of limitations as
procedural rather than substantive and instead apply its own law.
While such an argument is possible, these nominally procedural
provisions are intended to reinforce the substantive allocations of
risks so as to protect the independent character of the letter of credit
and should be treated as integrated with the rest of the selected
statute.
E. The Law of Another Country
As indicated, under Revised UCC section 5-1 16(a), a letter of
credit can select the law of any country whether or not there is a
relation between the letter of credit and that country. 50  There are,
47. See Who's Suing Whom?, DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD (Inst. Int'l Banking Law &
Practice, Montgomery Village, Md.), February 2001-2006, available at http://iiblp.org/dcw.asp.
48. Indeed, it is likely that the previous preeminence of New York in letter of credit case law
may be considerably diminished as practitioners who work with letters of credit come to realize
the serious disadvantages of New York's unfortunate deviations from the UCC, particularly since
most letter of credit processing by major banks has moved from New York to other states.
49. For example, they prevent parties from bringing actions in the hope of leveraging
payment (e.g., the applicant seeking injunctive relief on the basis that it has nothing to lose or the
beneficiary bringing an action for wrongful honor since the applicant must indemnify the issuer).
The provisions regarding interpretation were also crafted to assure uniform judicial application of
the common law rule of the interpretation of a written undertaking. The statute of limitations is
also a part of the entire package of remedies connected with the particular version of Revised
UCC Article 5 that goes with the choice of that state's law.
50. Revised UCC Section 5-116(a) states:
the liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser for action or omission is
governed by the law of the jurisdiction chosen by an agreement in the form of a record
signed or otherwise authenticated by the affected parties in the manner provided in
Section 5-104 or by a provision in the person's letter of credit, confirmation, or other
undertaking. The jurisdiction whose law is chosen need not bear any relation to the
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however, issues where the forum may look to its own law (including
its case law) notwithstanding the selection of another law. 5 1 Such a
situation may arise where the law chosen does not address discrete
issues in the case before it, where the issue is deemed to be
procedural, or where public policy issues are involved.52 While it is
not possible to address here the issues that may arise, one should
consider whether the selected letter of credit law is systematic. In
weighing the approach to take in such a situation, letter of credit
policies should be given more weight than other more general
policies, regardless of the forum or law selected.
While there are many ways in which other countries could be
classified for purposes of discussing the effect and desirability of
applying their laws to a letter of credit, the most obvious distinction
is that between countries that codify letter of credit law and those
that do not. This article will adopt such a distinction. The remainder
of this section considers the various available legal options along
those lines.
1. Codified Letter of Credit Law
The United States is the only country that has enacted a
comprehensive statutory regime that addresses letters of credit on a
national basis. Although some foreign codes make a passing
reference to letters of credit, none have implemented a systematic
formulation of letter of credit law.53 Nevertheless, there exist two
important formulations that codify letter of credit law, namely the
transaction.
U.C.C. § 5-116(a) (1995); see also Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of Pak., 307 F. Supp. 947
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (applying English law, even though it led to a contrary result in American law,
where parties to a contract had selected English law), alT'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 467 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt.
c (1971).
51. U.C.C.§5-116cmt. 1.
52. The forum court is also likely to require proof of the applicable law (where it differs
from the law of the forum) and operate under the presumption that it is the same as the law of the
forum unless proven otherwise.
53. During the formulation of the UN LC Convention, the delegates were informed of
certain references in national commercial laws that mentioned letters of credit. See The
Commercial Code: Corporate Structures and Business Contracts (amended version) of the Czech
Republic and Slovak Republic, Act No. 513/1991 Coll., §§ 682-691 (Letters of Credit) (Trade
Links trans., 1994). In addition, there are some regulatory provisions containing requirements
about letters of credit. See LC RULES AND LAWS: CRITICAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 195.
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UN LC Convention and the Chinese Letter of Credit Rules.54
a. The UNLC Convention
The United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and
Standby Letters of Credit has been adopted by eight countries.55 It is
a systematic codification of letter of credit law.
56
54. The Justice Committee of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of
China, in the court's 1368th session, adopted rules concerning Letter of Credit Cases on October
24, 2005, which were promulgated on November 14, 2005, and effective as of January 1, 2006.
Rules of the Sup. People's Ct. Concerning Several Issues in Hearing Letter of Credit Cases, Fa
Shi [2005] No.13 [hereinafter Chinese Letter of Credit Rules], translated in INST. OF INT'L
BANKING LAW & PRACTICE, RECENT LC RULES OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PRC
(2006).
55. Letter of credit law and practice had long been a matter of interest to the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). See generally The Secretary-General,
Standby Letters of Credit and Guarantees: Report of the Secretary-General, 1, 8-12, delivered
to the commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/301 (Mar. 21, 1988) (detailing
the history of UNCITRAL's involvement from its first session in 1968). It was not until 1988
that the Commission formally turned its attention to the area, asking the Working Group on
International Contract Practices to consider whether an international codification on letters of
credit and bank guarantees was feasible and/or desirable. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law,
Report on the Work of its Twenty-First Session, 22, U.N. Doc. A/43/17 (June 27, 1988)
[hereinafter UN Int'l Trade Law]. After answering both questions in the affirmative as a result of
the deliberations of its twelfth session in November 1988, the Commission decided to proceed
with the formulation of an international statute. Working Group on Int'l Contract Practices,
Report on the Work of its Twelfth Session, 174, U.N. DOC. A/CN.9/316 (Nov. 21-30, 1988). It
was adopted and opened for signature by the General Assembly by its resolution on December
11, 1995. UN LC Convention, supra note 13. It was ratifed by seven nations, including the
United States, which signed it on December 11, 1997. It has been adopted by Belarus, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Gabon, Kuwait, Liberia, Panama, and Tunisia and came into force on January 1,
2000. As of August 2006, the United States had not yet ratified the convention. See U.N.
Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Report on the Work of Its Twenty-second Session, 236-44, U.N.
Doc. A/44/17 (July 27, 1989); U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Report of the Working Group
on International Contract Practices on the Work of its Twelfth Session, 174, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/316 (Nov. 21-30, 1988). The deliberations of UNCITRAL on the draft Convention are
reflected in the report on the work of its twenty-eighth session in 1995. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l
Trade Law, Report on the Work of its Twenty-Eighth Session, 11-201, U.N. Doc. A/50/17
(May 2-26, 1995). UN LC Convention, supra note 13 (for the text of the International
Guarantees Convention); see Explanatory Note by the U.N. Secretariat, U.N. Convention on
Indep. Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.9/431 (July 4, 1996)
(reviewing the International Guarantees Convention) [hereinafter Explanatory Note], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/guarantees/guarantees.pdf.
56. There are a variety of considerations that should be taken into account in deciding
whether or not to use the UN LC Convention. Where literature on the Convention lists its relative
advantages and disadvantages, its two primary advantages are: (1) sound rules on letter of credit
fraud and injunctive relief and (2) deference to standard international letter of credit practice. N.J.
LAW REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVISED ARTICLE 5-
LETTERS OF CREDIT 4-5 (1996). While United States bankers and lawyers will prefer a version
of Revised UCC Article 5 because it is more comprehensive, and is supported by a body of case
law, the UN LC Convention has a significant advantage over the law of a nation that does not
have any codification of letter of credit law in situations where the luxury of choosing one's own
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A letter of credit can be issued subject to the UN LC Convention
by selecting the law of a country that has adopted it. In such a
situation, this choice would be given effect under Revised UCC
section 5-116(a) even though the United States has not as of August
1, 2006 adopted the UN LC Convention. 57 Since the legal systems of
these countries are not well-known, there may be some discomfort in
adopting their law apart from the UN LC Convention, especially
since this may incorporate additional and unanticipated aspects of
these legal systems.
To subject a letter of credit to the UN LC Convention, two
possible courses of action, designed to address this concern, must be
considered. One involves limiting the scope of the choice of law to
the UN LC Convention and, with respect to matters not covered by
the Convention, making another alternative choice of applicable law
or deferring to the law of the forum. Such a multifaceted selection
would be enforceable under Revised UCC Article 5.
An alternative course would be to make the undertaking
expressly subject to the UN LC Convention without any reference to
a national law. Under general conflicts principles, such an approach
would be given effect as incorporation of contractual terms by
reference. 58 The difficulty with such a provision would be whether
law is not available. It provides courts with a legal framework within which to resolve letter of
credit problems that are aligned with standard international letter of credit practice and modem
letter of credit law. Absent such a framework, courts are adrift even in a common law system,
where decisions are reported and easily accessible. It also has the considerable advantage of
providing a neutral set of rules that were drafted simultaneously in all the languages of the United
Nations. Thus, versions of the UN LC Convention in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian,
and Spanish are readily available. UN LC Convention, supra note 13, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/payments/I 995Convention.guarantees_credit.h
tml (the language of the text can be changed by clicking the appropriate hyperlink near the top
frame of the page).
57. U.C.C. § 5-115(a) (1995). In countries that have adopted the Convention a different
question exists: namely, how to opt out of the UN LC Convention. This question is necessary for
standby and independent guarantees that are issued to beneficiaries in countries that have adopted
the Convention, since UN LC Convention Article 1 makes its terms applicable "unless the
undertaking excludes the application of the Convention." Therefore, it is necessary to expressly
exclude the Convention rather than make it affirmatively subject to local law. As is, the
Convention is local law for a standby or independent guarantee that is within its scope according
to United Nations Convention Article 1 subsections 1(a) and (b) and 3 (referencing Articles 21
and 22). According to United Nations Convention Article 1 subsection 2, the UN LC Convention
does not apply to commercial letters of credit unless they expressly invoke its terms. UN LC
Convention, supra note 13, art. 1.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. c (1971) ("[Parties] may
incorporate into the contract by reference extrinsic material which may, among other things, be
the provisions of some foreign law. In such instances, the forum will apply the applicable
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the UN LC Convention's variability would be determined by
Revised UCC section 5-103 or not. Since the UN LC Convention
does not address variability expressly, a court applying the UN LC
Convention as law would be compelled to articulate rules regarding
its variability. In applying the UN LC Convention as a contract, the
forum would certainly defer to the limitations of Revised UCC
section 5-103(c). 59
Since the UN LC Convention could be chosen as another system
of law by selecting it under Revised section 5-116(a), and since both
the Convention and the Revised UCC Article 5 were drafted in
coordination, its application raises no policy issues.60  Its selection in
the abstract should be given effect as law and not just as contractual
provisions, an approach that is more consistent with the liberal
treatment of choice of law in the Revised section 5-116.
b. Chinese rules
Chinese letter of credit law has emerged over the last twenty-
provisions of the law .... ").
59. U.C.C. § 5-103(c).
60. UN LC Convention Article 1 generally provides for expansive application based on the
place of issuance, the rules of private international law, and, by reference to article 21, party
choice. UN LC Convention, supra note 13, art. 1. UN LC Convention Article 1 subsection 2,
which was intended to expressly permit application of the Convention to commercial letters of
credit, can be interpreted to provide for the application of its rules to commercial letters of credit
regardless of whether or not they have a nexus to a contracting state. Id. Subsection 2 states
"[t]his Convention applies also to an international letter of credit not falling within article 2 if it
expressly states that it is subject to this Convention." Id. UN LC Convention Article 4
subsection 1 defines "international letter of credit" by stating "[a]n undertaking is international if
the places of business, as specified in the undertaking, of any two of the following persons are in
different States: guarantor/issuer, beneficiary, principal/applicant, instructing party, confirmer."
Id. art. 4. The reference to "not falling within article 2" refers to United Nations Convention
Article 2 subsection (1), which describes undertakings covered by the Convention, namely
independent guarantees or standby letters of credit. Id. art. 2. Letters of credit "not falling within
article 2" are therefore commercial letters of credit. Id. Thus, according to UN LC Convention
Article I subsection 2, a commercial letter of credit that "expressly states that it is subject to" the
United Nations Convention regardless of the presence of any of the parties in a contracting state
will be, so long as it qualifies as an "international letter of credit." Qualification as an
international letter of credit is necessary because that subsection does not make any requirements
regarding Contracting States as does Article 1 subsection 1. Id. art. 1. Further, the Explanatory
Note by the UN Secretariat states that "the Convention does recognize a right of parties to
international letters of credit other than stand-by letters of credit to 'opt into' the Convention
(article 1(2))." See Explanatory Note, supra note 55, at 16-17 (referring to choice of law rules
worldwide and the general principle of choice of law). Of course, were this interpretation
accepted, the decision as to whether or not the Convention could be applied is one that must be
made under the choice of law rules of the forum.
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five years.6 1  Over the past twenty years, China has experienced a
remarkable revolution in its approach to letter of credit law and
practice that in many ways parallels its economic emergence.
Although there is no system of binding case law, 62 pursuant to
the Chinese Constitution, the Supreme People's Court has
promulgated Rules of the Supreme People's Court Concerning
Several Issues in Hearing Letter of Credit Cases effective January 1,
2006.63 They are, in effect, the letter of credit law of China since,
they are binding on all Chinese courts and there is no statute or other
legislative provision of the Chinese National People's Congress.
64
In considering whether to select the Chinese Letter of Credit
Rules in a Revised UCC Article 5 jurisdiction, there are several
questions to consider. Indeed, the Chinese Letter of Credit Rules are
likely to evolve. Unlike a statute, which is only likely to apply to
letters of credit issued after the effective date of the statute, the
Chinese Letter of Credit Rules would be applicable to any letter of
61. Twenty-five years ago, Chinese commercial law was in a very basic formative stage,
with arbitration as the normal means of settling civil disputes, due in large part to concerns about
the judicial system. Chinese letter of credit law did not exist. Beginning with the important work
of the Supreme People's Court, in recent years Chinese courts have rendered a series of decisions
that reflect a maturing letter of credit jurisprudence. Such progress may be attributed to the
Chinese government's willingness to provide its judges with opportunities for both education and
interaction with legal colleagues in other legal systems. Nonetheless, many of the Chinese
decisions were both contradictory and confusing. The texts of Chinese letter of credit decisions
have also been widely circulated in China. Although the Chinese legal system is based on the
civil law model, in which even the decisions of the Supreme People's Court are not binding on
other courts in different cases, the opinions of the Supreme People's Court and certain
intermediate appellate courts in letter of credit matters have been widely distributed and are of
considerable guidance to trial and appellate courts. This work has largely been undertaken by Mr.
Jin Saibo of the Beijing Zhonglun law firm, a leading member of the Chinese commercial bar. In
addition to conducting seminars for judges throughout China, he has written three influential
books on Chinese letter of credit law. See, e.g., Provisions of the PRC Supreme People's Court
Concerning Jurisdiction over Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Cases, translated in Jin
Saibo, Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, (2006) www.iiblp.org.
62. See id.
63. See supra note 54.
64. The Chinese Letter of Credit Rules address a number of important issues, including the
independence of the letter of credit undertaking, the standard of compliance, deference to
standard international letter of credit practice (permitting their application where the undertaking
is issued subject to them and providing for their application as appropriate even where they are
not expressly made applicable), the discretion of the issuer to approach the applicant for a waiver,
the implications of a decision to waive discrepancies, what constitutes letter of credit fraud, and
the criteria for issuance of orders freezing payment. The Chinese Letter of Credit Rules reflect
the influence of the UN LC Convention and Revised UCC Article 5, providing a useful skeletal
framework for the evolution of Chinese letter of credit law that should be the envy of most other
legal systems, which must rely on erratic judicial decisions.
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credit regardless of when the instrument was issued.
Furthermore, one must ask whether there is an intention to
render the letter of credit subject to Chinese Letter of Credit law or
merely make the Chinese Letter of Credit Rules applicable. The
Chinese Letter of Credit Rules are linked to the application of
Chinese law, and, apart from Chinese Law, they would operate as
contractual rules under Revised UCC Article 5.65 Under Revised
UCC section 5-116, an undertaking can select Chinese law, and, by
doing so, make the Chinese Letter of Credit Rules applicable. An
undertaking could also be made subject to the Chinese Letter of
Credit Rules in the same manner as rules of practice.
66
2. The Law of Jurisdictions Without Codified Letter of Credit Law
As indicated, most countries do not have a codified system of
letter of credit law. 67  In considering whether to issue a letter of
credit subject to such a legal system, there exist a variety of factors
that one should consider. One major question is whether or not the
jurisdiction follows the civil or common law. Another question is
what type of letter of credit undertaking it is, whether it is subject to
a rule of practice and, if so, which one. A third question is the extent
to which courts have considered letter of credit cases, and what the
treatment of letter of credit issues has been-to the extent that it can
be determined. A fourth question is whether treatises or other
materials are available in a language that is accessible to the courts.
A fifth question is whether local statutes that could affect the
undertaking exist. As is often the case, the choice of forum may
have greater impact on the outcome than the choice of applicable
law.
As a general proposition, case law is not ideal for the
65. It should also be noted that the Chinese courts have been fairly aggressive in exercising
jurisdiction over letter of credit cases with any nexus to China. See INST. OF INT'L BANKING
LAW & PRACTICE, 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LETTER OF CREDIT LAW & PRACTICE 440-43
(2006) [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY] (abstracting Sichuan Emeishan Imp. & Exp. Co. v.
Korea Shinho Corp., MIN SI ZHONG Zi No.28 (SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAz., Sept. 28, 2004)
(overturning an injunction in favor of a Chinese applicant against reimbursement by a Chinese
issuer to a Korean negotiating bank)); Litigation Digest, DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD, Sept.
2006, at 11 (abstracting Indus. Bank of Korea (Seoul) v. Lianyungang Kuchifuku Foods Co., Su
MIN SAN ZHONG Zi No. 052 (JIANGSU PEOPLE'S HIGH CT_ -,. 2003) (upholding judgment
against a Korean issuer in favor of a Chinese beneficiary for wrongful dishonor
66. See U.C.C. § 5-116(a) (2003).
67. See id. § 5-116(e).
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development of sound letter of credit law. By the end of the
nineteenth century, it was clear that complex promises embodying
commercial paper required a statutory framework, since case law
was inadequate to address the various nuances involved without
producing confusion and uncertainty. 68  It should therefore not be
surprising that the same lesson applies even more pointedly to letters
of credit.
The most apparent example of the inadequacy of the case law
approach exists in English Letter of Credit law, a highly
sophisticated commercial law system. Unlike the situation in many
countries, there are a number of English Letter of Credit cases. The
precedent embodied in English cases has proved to be problematic,
since the courts have been compelled to build upon prior decisions,
including dicta. In the past decade, the English courts have produced
several decisions that not only disrupted letter of credit practice
internationally, but also continue to represent a source of
considerable confusion to this day.69 The issues include: (1) whether
a document must be marked as an original; (2) whether a confirming
bank can be reimbursed where it discounts its deferred payment
undertaking; (3)consequential damage remedies against transferring
banks handling documents drawn under a letter of credit; and an
abiding distortion of the law of letter of credit fraud and the
protection of nominated banks.70 Underlying much of this distortion
is a serious misunderstanding of the role of law in interpreting letter
68. WILLIAM E. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 214 (West
Publishing Co. 1943).
69. See, e.g., Adam Johnson, Letters of Credit and Original Documents-Again, J. INT'L.
BANKING L., Sept. 1999, at 287,passim.
70. See, e.g., Glencore Int'l A.G. v. Bank of China, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 135 (A.C.) (Eng.)
(ruling that a wet ink signed document was not an original because it was not marked original);
Kredietbank v. Midland Bank, PLC, [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 801 (A.C.) (Eng.) (ruling that an
issuer was not entitled to reject a document that was clearly an original despite the fact that it was
not marked as original); Credit Industriel et Commercial v. China Merchants Bank, [2002] 2 All
E.R. (Comm.) 427 (Q.B.) (declining to apply the decision of the intermediate appellate Glencore
court); Banco Santander v. Banque Paribas [2000] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 776 (A.C.) (Eng.)
(holding that issuer did not have to reimburse confirming bank that discounted because UCP 500
does not authorize discounting of deferred payment obligations, and legal protection for
discounting of acceptances does not apply to deferred payment obligations); Jackson v. Royal
Bank of Scot., [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 366 (H.L.) (Eng.) (holding that an issuer is liable for breach
of an obligation of confidence where the issuer forwards a transferee beneficiary's pricing
information to applicant instead of substituting the beneficiary's documents under a transferable
credit); see also JAMES E. BYRNE, THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS CONTROVERSY, FROM
GLENCORE TO THE ICC DECISION (1999).
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of credit practice and in assessing the testimony of experts.7'
Another specific issue that may escape notice is the presence of
statutes in a jurisdiction that may impact the independence of
guarantees or similar undertakings. While such provisions should
not be applicable to commercial letters of credit or, hopefully,
standby letters of credit, there is a possibility of confusion between
dependent (suretyship or accessory) guarantees and independent
ones. This confusion can be compounded by the name given to the
undertaking and its terms. In such situations, it is ideal to issue the
undertaking subject to rules of practice that establish its independent
72character. Revised UCC Article 5 contemplates its application to
independent guarantees.73
In any event, Revised UCC section 5-116(a) permits selection of
the law of countries that have no statutory system of letter of credit
law. Where there is no indication of that law, however, the forum is
likely to presume that its version of Revised UCC Article 5 states the
applicable law. If the intent is to avoid the application of a specific
provision of Revised UCC Article 5 and the applicable law does not
provide an alternative rule, the issue should be expressly addressed
in the undertaking.
IV. VARYING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF REVISED UCC ARTICLE 5
Apart from opting out of Revised UCC Article 5 by the choice
of another law, it is also possible to modify or exclude the effect of
discrete provisions by the terms of the letter of credit.74 This section
examines how variation is treated in Revised section 5-103(c), listed
exceptions to variation, additional qualifications, and the use of rules
71. On the whole, the English courts tend to treat rules of practice as if lawyers drafted them
instead of seeking to understand and effectuate their purposes. They also treat expert testimony
as if it represents the individual and personal experience of the expert instead of using it to
determine the purpose and system behind the practices involved. See generally Louis Blom-
Cooper, Experts and Assessors: Past, Present and Future, 21 C.J.Q. 341 (2002).
72. See TTI Team Telecom Int'l Ltd. v. Hutchison 3G UK Ltd., [2003] 1 All E.R. (Comm.)
914 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (denying application for an interim injunction on a drawing where bond was an
independent guarantee, because applicant failed to establish by clear evidence that it is likely to
be able to prove fraud, abuse, or bad faith, or that the call is a nullity).
73. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1016-1017 (2006).
74. The term "vary" is retained as applicable to all categories. The term "modify" and its
variations is used to describe changes in the application of a provision in Revised Article 5
without excluding it. The term "exclude" is used to describe a provision in a letter of credit that
would make a provision of Revised UCC Article 5 non-applicable to that letter of credit.
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75of practice and letter of credit terms to vary its provisions.
A. Generally
1. Explicit Non-Variability:
Revised UCC Article 5 Approach to Variation
The general approach of the UCC to variation of its rules, as
reflected in Revised UCC section 1-302 and its Official Comments,
is to affirm the principle of freedom of contract.76  Revised UCC
section 5-103(c), however, does not offer freedom of contract as its
rationale. The foundation of this provision is germane to the entire
Revised UCC Article 5: that the primary source of interpretation of
letter of credit law is letter of credit practice.77  Under that practice,
the limits to variability are, in effect, the limits of the undertaking
operating as a letter of credit. Where the terms contained in various
obligations are no longer those of a letter of credit, the response
under letter of credit practice is not to "forbid" the variation, but
instead to treat the undertaking as something other than a letter of
credit. It may be enforceable as something else, but it is not a letter
of credit. To a considerable extent, Revised UCC Article 5's
approach to variability reflects this theory.
The novelty of this approach is magnified because Revised UCC
Article 5 was the first UCC Article to attempt to delineate provisions
whose effect cannot be varied. Subsequently, the 1998 revision of
UCC Article 9 took a somewhat similar, but more traditional
approach. 78  The 1998 Version of UCC Article 9, adopted after
75. See generally Stem, supra note 34, at 524-26 (explaining that parties modifying specific
provisions by agreement must comply with revised UCC Section 5-103(c)).
76. Effects of UCC provisions may be varied by agreement "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
in subsection (b) or elsewhere in [the Uniform Commercial Code]." U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (2003).
This section "states affirmatively at the outset that freedom of contract is a principle of the
Uniform Commercial Code." Id. cmt. 1; see also U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1952) (amended 2001); id.
§ 1-102 cmt. 2.
77. See U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 2 (1995).
78. The treatment of variation by UCC Article 9 has been complex. The original 1952 text
provided that its provisions could not be varied unless expressly permitted. Section 9-501(3)
(1952) provided: "(3) The enumeration of rights in subsections (1) and (2) does not purport to be
exhaustive. The rules stated in this Part which give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the
secured party may be waived or varied only as provided in this Part." U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1952)
(amended 2003). Its Official Comment 4 stated:
In the area of rights after default our legal system has traditionally looked with
suspicion on agreements designed to cut down the debtor's rights and free the secured
party of his duties: no mortgage clause has ever been allowed to clog the equity of
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Revised UCC Article 5 was drafted, states that those 13 specific
provisions may not be modified and explains the policies underlying
these limitations in its Official Comments.79
The other Articles of the UCC rely on a loose combination of
specific limitations in various provisions,"° the application of general
principles of reasonableness with respect to obligations, 81 and the
application of common law rules and principles of statutory
construction. Section 1-302 Official Comment 1 notes that "specific
exceptions vary in explicitness: the statute of frauds found in section
2-201, for example, does not explicitly preclude oral waiver of the
requirement of a writing, but a fair reading denies enforcement to
such a waiver as part of the 'contract' made unenforceable .... 82
This approach is consistent with the principle enunciated in Revised
UCC section 1-103(b) that its provisions are to be supplemented by
principles of law and equity "[u]nless displaced by the particular
provisions .... ,,83
This approach is not surprising since the common law does not
have a rigorous theoretical approach to mandatory and non-
mandatory provisions. Unlike the civil law, its approach has been
redemption. The default situation offers great scope for overreaching; the suspicious
attitude of the courts has been grounded in common sense. Subsection (3) of this
Section contains a codification of this longstanding and deeply rooted attitude: despite
the provisions of Section 1-102 the rules of this Part which give rights to the debtor and
impose duties on the secured party may be varied only as provided in this Part.
Id. § 9-501 cmt. 4. With lengthy adjustments allowing standards that were not manifestly
unreasonable to be formulated for specific sections, this attitude continued through the 1972
Version. See U.C.C. § 9-501(3) & cmt. 4 (1972) (amended 2003) (restating the comments in the
1952 version).
79. See U.C.C. § 9-602 cmts. 2, 3 (1998) (amended 2003).
80. See U.C.C. § 4A-202(f) (1989) ("Except as provided in this section and in section 4A-
203(a)(1), rights and obligations arising under this section or section 4A-203 may not be varied
by agreement.").
81. Revised UCC Section 1-302(b) limits the variability of the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness, care, and reasonable time requirements, providing that they may not be
disclaimed and requiring that any alternative standard be not manifestly unreasonable. See
U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2003); U.C.C. § 1-102 (1957) (amended 2003).
82. U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2003).
83. Revised UCC Section 1-103(b) provides in full "[u]nless displaced by the particular
provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating
cause supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2003); see also U.C.C. § 1-103 (1957)
(amended 2003).
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pragmatic but nonetheless workable.
84
On the other hand, Revised UCC section 5-103(c) does not rely
on this general approach. Instead, it states that the effect of all its
provisions can be varied with the exception of those provisions
listed. While it requires some interpretation, this approach is
intended to retain the focus on letter of credit issues when it comes to
variability, and not to digress into general issues of commercial or
common law. The result is a statute that is highly flexible and
responsive to developments with basic minimal features necessary to
preserve its integrity. Outside of the listed exceptions, common law
courts applying letter of credit law are to police what is and is not a
letter of credit, instead of worrying about public policy issues. With
few exceptions, this innovative approach is effective. Even in those
few areas where its application is not altogether smooth, it produces
a result that is consistent with international letter of credit practice.
2. Other Features of Revised UCC
Section 5-103(c)'s Approach to Variation
This section will study the features of Revised UCC section 5-
103, its approach to variation, the specific items listed, and
application of its approach to other provisions of Revised UCC
Article 5.
a. "Agreement"
Revised UCC section 1-302 speaks of variation "by
agreement." 85 While this notion is apt for bilateral undertakings, it is
inapt for undertakings such as letters of credit and obligations that
are unilateral and whose terms do not represent an "agreement" in
any usual sense of the word. Where a letter of credit's terms vary
provisions of the UCC, it is because the terms are stated or contained
in rules of practice to which the letter of credit is subject.
84. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2004). One commentator explained:
Lawyers on the continent of Europe have been more clear than we have on this issue.
They have known for a long time the general distinction betweenjus dispositivum, the
rule that applies unless the parties agree otherwise, and jus cogens, the binding rule
which the parties cannot set aside by contract. And they have sought, by provisions in
their Codes and otherwise, to make clear whichjus was which.
Bunn, supra note 10, at 62.
85. U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001); see also U.C.C. § 1-102 (1952) (amended 2001) (similar to
revised section 1-302).
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Recognizing this reality, Revised UCC section 5-103(c) (Scope)
provides that the effect of the article "may be varied by agreement or




The term "varied" is not defined in the UCC, and the common
law does not have a sophisticated jurisprudence with respect to
mandatory and non-mandatory provisions. While "vary" might be
interpreted to mean "opting out" or "contracting out" of Revised
UCC Article 5 by the choice of another law, it is not so used in
Revised UCC Article 5. Rather, it is used to refer to an adjustment to
the statute by modification or exclusion of a discrete portion,
assuming that the statute otherwise applies. As used in this paper,
where such variations are total, they are said to be "excluded," and
where they change the effect of the provision by deleting a portion
while leaving it in effect or adding something, they are said to
"modify" it.87
c. What may be varied: the effect of the article
Both Revised UCC Articles 1 and 5 do not admit variation of a
statutory provision as such. Instead, they speak of variation of its
effects. This approach reflects the technical reality that only a
legislative amendment can "vary" the statute itself. Absent such an
88action, it remains as adopted. Where permissible, what is varied is
the effect that otherwise would have resulted from the application of
the statute.89
86. U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1995). Revised UCC Section 5-116(a) reflects a similar approach,
looking to the undertaking as an alternative to an agreement. Id. § 5-116(a); see supra note 25.
87. This distinction is of significance at least with respect to those obligations of good faith,
reasonableness, care, and diligence that cannot be disclaimed (or excluded), but as to which
standards of performance that are not manifestly unreasonable can be provided under Revised
UCC Section 1-302(b). While the term disclaimed is used, an exclusion would be equally
unwelcome and the latter term is broader than disclaimer but encompasses it. Moreover, there is
no such precision in practice or in the cases and the precise sense in which the term is used must
be determined from its context where this distinction would produce a different result.
88. U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2001) ("[T]he meaning of the statute itself must be found in its
text, including its definitions, and in appropriate extrinsic aids; it cannot be varied by
agreement."); see also U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (1952) (amended 2001) (making an identical
statement).
89. According to Hawkland and Miller:
Thus private parties cannot make an instrument negotiable within the meaning of
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d. "Stated"
Another question not fully addressed in Revised section 5-
103(c) (Scope) is the degree to which an attempted variation of the
effect of a variable provision of Revised Article 5 must be explicit.
According to Revised section 5-103(c), the provision must be
"stated" unless a contrary agreement or rule of practice, that has the
effect of varying a provision of Revised UCC Article 5, is
incorporated by reference.
90
There is no requirement, however, that there be an express
reference to the variation of the statute in the letter of credit or other
document where a provision is stated that differs from that of a
variable provision in Revised UCC Article 5. On the other hand,
there may be some situations where the careful drafter will want to
leave no possibility of doubt that the effect of the statute is to be
varied.
B. Non-Variable Provisions in Revised UCC Article 5
Revised UCC Article 5 does not use one term or phrase for its
provisions that may not be varied. Revised UCC section 5-103(c)
lists them as exceptions to the general rule of variability. The term
"exception" requires additional words in order to give it context. 91
Revised UCC section 5-116(c)(iii) refers to the exceptions of
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) as "nonvariable provisions," a term
also used in its Official Comment 3.92 Other Official Comments use
the term "invariable" or the phrase provisions "where variation is
Article 3 except as provided in Section 3-104; nor can they change the meaning of such
terms as "bona fide purchaser," "holder in due course," or "due negotiation," as used in
the Uniform Commercial Code. But an agreement can change the legal consequences
that would otherwise flow from the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
"Agreement" here includes the effect given to course of dealing, usage of trade and
course of performance by Sections 1-201 and 1-303; the effect of an agreement on the
rights of third parties is left to specific provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
and to supplementary principles applicable under Section 1-103. The rights of third
parties under Section 9-317 when a security interest is unperfected, for example,
cannot be destroyed by a clause in the security agreement.
1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & FREDERICK H. MILLER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 1-
302 (West 2002).
90. See U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1995).
91. See id.
92. See id. § 5-116(c)(iii); see also id. § 5-116 cmt. 3 (referring to exceptions as "non-
variable terms").
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prohibited.,
93
The starting point in assessing the extent to which Revised UCC
Article 5 permits the effect of its provisions to be varied is the list of
exceptions in Revised UCC section 5-103(c).
94
Two questions must be asked of each of these provisions: (1)
what is the scope of the exception, and (2) where applicable, what
are the limits to the standards that may be set. Following this
analysis, it will be asked whether or not there are implicit limitations
of the variability of the effect of other provisions of Revised UCC
Article 5 based on the nonvariable provisions.
1. Revised Section 5-103
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) provides that Subsections (a), (c),
and (d) are exceptions to the rule that the effect of the provisions of
Revised UCC Article 5 may be varied. 95
a. Revised UCC section 5-103 (a)"(scope of application)
Revised section 5-103(a) states the scope of Revised UCC
Article 5, limiting it to letters of credit96 and transactions arising out
of letters of credit.
97
b. Revised UCC section 5-103(c) (variation of the statute)
Section 5-103(c) quite properly provides that the effect of the
scope provision cannot be varied.98 Since the statute represents the
law applicable to independent and related undertakings, its
application cannot be expanded or contracted by private agreement.
If an undertaking is independent, then it falls under Revised UCC
Article 5 unless another law is chosen.
These statements, however, disguise an important aspect of
93. See id. § 5-103 cmt. 2. "Invariable" references section 1-102(3) and "where variation is
prohibited" references variation by issuing a credit subject to the UCP. See id.
94. Id. These exceptions are 5-103 (a) and (d): "Sections 5-102(a)(9) and (10), 5-106(d),
and 5-114(d), and except to the extent prohibited in Sections 1-102(3) and 5-117(d) .... Id.
95. See id.
96. "Letters of Credit" are defined in Revised UCC Section 5-102(a)(10) and include all
letter of credit type undertakings, however described. Id. § 5-102(a)(10).
97. Transactions arising out of letters of credit would include those transactions covered by
the Article such as advices, confirmations, and assignments as well as certain aspects of
reimbursement undertakings. "This article applies to letters of credit and to certain rights and
obligations arising out of transactions involving letters of credit." Id. § 5-103(a).
98. See id. § 5-103(c).
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party choice, namely whether or not the undertaking is structured as
independent. 99 In most cases, the status of the undertaking will be
apparent. There are, however, a significant group of undertakings
whose classification requires consideration and judgment. There are
a variety of factors that affect this determination, none of which by
themselves are decisive. They include the name used for the
undertaking, 00 the presence and significance of non-documentary
requirements, the form or format used, and whether the undertaking
is issued subject to letter of credit rules of practice or statute.
Because these factors are affected by the drafting of the undertaking
and influence its classification, its formulation can, in effect,
significantly affect whether or not it falls within the scope of Revised
UCC Article 5.
For example, an undertaking labeled a "bond" that is issued
subject to ISP98, but contains non-essential non-documentary
conditions and recitals, would properly be treated as an independent
undertaking.' 0l Likewise, a statement in a so-called "guarantee" that
it is subject to Revised UCC Article 5 would not be decisive but
could be very influential. While the undertaking cannot effectively
render itself subject to Revised UCC Article 5, doing so may signal
that it was intended to be independent.
As a result, the effect of this limitation is retroactive. An
undertaking cannot be rendered subject to Revised UCC Article 5 if
it is decided that it is not subject to it. However, being issued subject
to Revised UCC Article 5, or having other attributes that signal that
it is intended to be, and is, independent may tip the scales in favor of
(or against) its application.
To some extent, what falls within the definition of a letter of
credit will also affect the question of scope. Although this definition
99. Revised UCC Section 5-103 Official Comment 1 distinguishes dependent undertakings
such as suretyship or accessory guarantees as a type of undertaking to which Revised Article 5
was not intended to be applied. See id. § 5-103 cmt. 1.
100. Id. § 5-102 cmt. 6 (observing that "[t]he label on a document is not conclusive").
101. While such cases are more common in European courts because of the confusion there
between suretyship (accessory) and independent guarantees that prevails in law and practice, they
also occur in the United States on occasion. See, e.g., Hataway v. Estate of Nicholls, 893 So. 2d
1054 (Miss. 2005) (concluding that a letter of guarantee was not a bid for cash because a
condition that clear title be delivered could not be met); J.P. Doumak, Inc. v. Westgate Fin. Corp.,
776 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that the undertaking involved in the transaction was a
standby letter of credit, notwithstanding its label, "guaranty", and was subject to Revised UCC
Article 5).
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is listed as an exception to the provisions whose effects can be
varied, it is subject to many of the same considerations as the scope
provision. There is constant pressure to create letter of credit-like
undertakings or to reduce the letter of credit qualities of those
undertakings. Here, too, what is stated in the undertaking can
influence this decision.
10 2
c. Revised UCC section 5-103(c) (variation of the statute)
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) excepts itself from the provisions
whose effect can be varied. 103  Given the internal logic that flows
from its approach of listing section, such a provision makes sense
although it ought to be obvious on consideration of its meaning and
purpose.
d. Revised UCC section 5-103(d) (independence)
Section 5-103(d) is Revised UCC Article 5's clearest
formulation of the independence principle, which is central to the
notion of what constitutes a letter of credit.'0 4  The effects of the
102. It may, for example, be asked what difference exists between a straight revocable letter
of credit and an undertaking that provides the applicant with the ability to revoke the authority of
the bank to pay with notice to the beneficiary or to do so for stated reasons. Similarly, it may be
asked whether a pre-advice or an irrevocable reimbursement undertaking is a letter of credit-type
undertaking under this provision although UCP500 Article 11 (c) treats it as such, as do UCP600
Article 1 1(b) and URR525 Article 2(g). Does this provision render it a UCC Article 5
instrument? Or does the provision in UCP500 Article 9(b) render a so-called "silent
confirmation" not a letter of credit undertaking because the UCP teaches us that it is not a
confirmation? UCP500 Article 9(b) states:
A confirmation of an irrevocable Credit by another bank (the "Confirming Bank")
upon the authorisation or request of the Issuing Bank, constitutes a definite undertaking
of the Confirming Bank, in addition to that of the Issuing Bank, provided that the
stipulated documents are presented to the Confirming Bank or to any other Nominated
Bank and that the terms and conditions of the Credit are complied with ....
UPC500, supra note 5; see also Dibrell Bros. Int'l v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571,
1578 (11th Cir. 1994) ("The UCC does not preclude common law recovery for breach of a
contract to silently confirm a UCC-governed letter of credit."); Evans v. Beogradska Banka, 46
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1083, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that an issuer is obligated to
reimburse when it authorizes a bank to confirm and that bank honors or when it undertakes to
reimburse on receipt of documents).
103. U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1995).
104. UCC Section 5-103(d) states:
Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary or a nominated person under a letter
of credit are independent of the existence, performance, or nonperformance of a
contract or arrangement out of which the letter of credit arises or which underlies it,
including contracts or arrangements between the issuer and the applicant and between
the applicant and the beneficiary.
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independence of the issuer's obligations under a letter of credit to a
beneficiary or nominated bank cannot be varied.
While the limitation on variability does not expressly apply to a
transferee beneficiary, its application may be inferred since
"[b]eneficiary includes a person to whom drawing rights have been
transferred under a transferable letter of credit" under Revised UCC
section 5-102(a)(3).105
Although the formulation of the independence doctrine does not
mention the documentary character of the letter of credit
undertaking, this aspect of independence is also encompassed
because it is so central. The provision of Revised UCC section 5-
108(g), which provides that non-documentary conditions are to be
disregarded, can be varied up to a point.'0 6  However, the core
concept of the documentary character cannot be varied without also
varying the independence doctrine. To provide that the obligation of
the issuer turns on whether or not there is performance of a non-
documentary condition makes the issuer dependent on an underlying
obligation.
There are, however, other aspects of the reach of the of the
independence doctrine's nonvariability that are less apparent. They
include whether it can be inferred to apply to a confirmer, and the
extent to which the fraud exception to the independence doctrine
(codified in Revised UCC section 5-109) can be varied. These
questions are considered in connection with the nonvariability of the
term "letter of credit," and under the treatment of fraud and forgery
below.
It should be noted that, as with other nonvariable provisions, the
formulation of the obligations can itself affect whether it is
Id. § 5-103(d).
105. Id. § 5-102(a)(3).
106. See id. § 5-108(g). For example, the issuer could obligate itself to pay against a
document that fulfilled that condition. This option was an alternative proposed by the Joint
United States Council on International Banking, Inc./American Bar Association (USCIB/ABA)
Task Force Report. See Task Force, supra note 3, at 1546. Likewise, an issuer could obligate
itself to go to a website and view data or even ascertain a fact. Such a step is possible under the
Electronic Uniform Customs and Practice ("eUCP"), which contains rules formulated by the ICC
to supplement the UCP to accommodate electronic presentations. INT'L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, SUPP. TO THE UNIF. CUSTOMS & PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS FOR
ELEC. PRESENTATION (EUCP) (2002) (ICC Pub. No. 500/3) [hereinafter EUCP], reprinted in LC
RULES AND LAWS: CRITICAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 25; see also JAMES E. BYRNE & DAN
TAYLOR, ICC GUIDE TO THE EUCP (2002) (explaining the implications for independence of
reference to an external source on the internet).
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categorized as a letter of credit. Thus, an undertaking whose core
obligations are dependent would not be classified as a letter of credit.
2. Revised Section 5-102 (Definitions)
(a)(9) ("Issuer") and (10) ("Letter of Credit")
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) provides that subsections 5-
109(a)(9) and (10) are exceptions to the rule that the effect of
Revised UCC Article 5's provisions may be varied.
0 7
The inclusion of some but not all the definitions in Revised
UCC section 5-102 as exceptions suggests that the effect of the other
definitions can be varied. While discouraged, section 5-103 Official
Comment 3 concedes as much. 10 8  The variability of the effect of
definitions in Revised UCC Article 5 is discussed later.
a. Revised UCC section 5-102 (definitions) (a) (9) ("issuer")
Revised UCC section 5-102 (a)(9) defines "issuer" as a person
who issues a letter of credit, excluding consumers.l°9
The reason for excepting the definition of "issuer" is apparent.
This definition is the mechanism that prevents letters of credit from
becoming tools, used against consumers to create letter of credit
obligations (with their independence from defenses related to the
underlying transaction), running from consumers for consumer
purchases and thereby enmeshing letter of credit law in consumer
credit issues. 11° For these strategic letter of credit policy reasons, a
107. See U.C.C. § 5-103(c).
108. According to UCC Section 5-103, comment 3:
Parties should generally avoid modifying the definitions in Section 5-102. The effect
of such an agreement is almost inevitably unclear. To say that something is a
"guarantee" in the typical domestic transaction is to say that the parties intend that
particular legal rules apply to it. By acknowledging that something is a guarantee, but
asserting that it is to be treated as a "letter of credit," the parties leave a court uncertain
about where the rules on guarantees stop and those concerning letters of credit begin.
Id. § 5-103 cmt. 3.
109. "'Issuer' means a bank or other person that issues a letter of credit, but does not include
an individual who makes an engagement for personal, family, or household purposes." Id. § 5-
102(a)(9).
110. According to UCC Section 5-102, comment 5:
The exclusion of consumers from the definition of "issuer" is to keep creditors from
using a letter of credit in consumer transactions in which the consumer might be made
the issuer and the creditor would be the beneficiary. If that transaction were
recognized under Article 5, the effect would be to leave the consumer without defenses
against the creditor. That outcome would violate the policy behind the Federal Trade
Commission Rule in 16 CFR Part 433. In a consumer transaction, an individual cannot
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firm line had to be drawn against such a practice, and in view of the
open approach to Revised UCC Article 5's variability, it had to be
made nonvariable.
Inevitable questions that arise as to what constitutes a
"consumer purpose" are left for judicial interpretation."' As with
the scope provisions, recitals in the text of the letter of credit or
related undertakings may influence how the transaction is classified
and may indirectly affect its application."
2
Does this limitation also apply to the situation where a consumer
is a said to be a confirmer? 1 3 As indicated, Revised section 5-107(a)
provides that a confirmer "has the rights and obligations of an issuer
to the extent of its confirmation," 114 and its Official Comment 1
states that "unless the context otherwise requires, the terms
'confirmer' and 'confirmation' should be read into this article
wherever the terms issuer' and 'letter of credit' appear." ' 1 5 In view
of the strong letter of credit policy underlying the exclusion of
consumers from those who undertake letter of credit obligations, it
must be inferred that the limitation against variation of the provision
restricting confirmers from issuance must also be applied to
confirmers. 16 Otherwise, the policy decision reflected in the listing
be an issuer where that person would otherwise be either the principal debtor or a
guarantor.
Id. § 5-102 cmt. 5.
111. Revised UCC Section 1-201 (b)(l 1) defines the term "Consumer" to mean "an individual
who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." U.C.C. § 1-
201(b)(1 1) (2003). This term was not defined in Prior UCC section 1-201. See U.C.C. § 1-201
(1957) (amended 2003). However, this definition is so commonly accepted that it would surely
be applied whether or not a jurisdiction had enacted Revised UCC Article 1.
112. Would a deferred payment letter of credit issued by a purchaser of an airplane for
business and recreational use that attempts to define these terms in light of Revised UCC section
1-201(b)(1 1) with an emphasis on "primary" be given effect? It is possible that the courts would
take this term in a letter of credit into account but would not be bound by it. It would, however,
be unfortunate if a court were to rely on the list in section 5-103(c) to exclude such a transaction
from the classification of letter of credit without considering whether or not it was primarily (or
something analogous) for such a consumer purpose.
113. For example, it is possible that a sale of a new Bentley for consumer use could be
structured by setting up a solo corporation controlled by the consumer which issued a deferred
payment letter of credit that was confirmed by the consumer in a personal capacity. This
hypothetical, which also raises the question of the prohibition of the issuance of a letter of credit
by a non-financial institution for its own account, also applies to a confirmation.
114. U.C.C. § 5-107(a) (2003).
115. Id. § 5-107 cmt. 1.
116. The same policy would also apply to a situation where the consumer was conscripted to
act as a "paying bank" although it is unlikely that such a situation would ever arise because it
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of "issuer" is defeated and Revised UCC Article 5 would become
ensnared in consumer law issues.
b. Revised UCC section 5-102
(definitions) (a) (10) ("letter of credit')
Revised section 5-103(c) provides that the effects of the
definition of "letter of credit" cannot be varied. 1 7 Revised UCC
section 5-102 (a)(10), containing the definition of letters of credit, is
the keystone of Revised UCC Article 5, impacting its scope."' If the
undertaking is not a "letter of credit" as defined, Revised UCC
Article 5 does not apply to it.
Because the definition of "letter of credit" is so central, it must
be asked whether the definition's components of are nonvariable.
The answer must be affirmative to the extent that they are related to
this doorkeeper function.
The term "documentary" is related to a concept already
discussed in connection with the nonvariable formulation of the
independence doctrine in Revised UCC section 5-103(d). While the
application of this concept in the examination of documents can be
varied (determining the manner in which objectivity in the data
presented is obtained), the core concept (that the decision is to be
based on objective data representing facts rather than the facts
themselves) cannot be varied, as was explained with respect to non-
documentary conditions.
The term "definite" purports to exclude undertakings that are so
vague that they require investigation of the underlying transaction to
determine basic terms of the obligation. Where an undertaking is not
definite, it is not a letter of credit. What constitutes definiteness,
however, will be influenced by the standard letter of credit practice
and commercial reasonableness within the practice. Some flexibility
in this concept permits the letter of credit to evolve to meet new
market needs and changes while preserving the central core of the
entails other difficulties.
117. See U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1995).
118. A letter of credit is:
a definite undertaking that satisfies the requirements of Section 5-104 by an issuer to a
beneficiary at the request or for the account of an applicant or, in the case of a financial
institution, to itself or for its own account, to honor a documentary presentation by
payment or delivery of an item of value.
Id. § 5-102(a)(10).
Fall 2006] CONTRACTING OUT OF REVISED ARTICLE 5 335
concept, a mechanism that the static and sterile definition of
"negotiable instrument" did not possess under UCC Article 3
(Negotiable Instruments). 119
Other terms and phrases in the definition are also important.
The term "financial institution" is not defined in the UCC. Can the
effect of the term's meaning be varied? Because it is not a defined
term, there is some flexibility in interpreting its meaning. In such
circumstances, a provision in the undertaking that suggested, for
example, that an insurance company was a financial institution
should be persuasive to a common law court. On the other hand, a
provision that brought a consumer within the definition of "financial
institution" so that it could issue a letter of credit for its own account
should not be given effect. 120 The same practical approach should be
taken for other terms and phrases in the definition, whether defined
or not, such as "for its own account," "honor," "delivery," and "an
item of value."
Some of the provisions in the definition of "letter of credit" go
beyond definitions. To be a letter of credit, an undertaking must
satisfy the formality requirements of Revised UCC section 5-104.121
This section is not included in the list of untouchables but it is
generally thought that a statute of frauds cannot be varied. 122  Its
inclusion avoids any need to resort to general principles of
interpretation about the fundamental notion that an oral undertaking,
or one that is not authenticated, is not a "letter of credit.
1 23
119. A classic example of this definition includes Prior UCC section 3-106 where a fixed sum
could not be stretched to encompass variable interest rates because the rates were not a "sum
certain." See U.C.C. § 3-106 (1957) (amended 2003); Taylor v. Roeder, 360 S.E.2d 191, 194
(Va. 1987). Conversely, in the letter of credit sphere, letters of credit have been construed to
accommodate wild fluctuations in commodities such as oil through the mechanism of an oil
fluctuation clause under which there is no final amount of the issuer's obligation which must be
calculated against an objective market average. See infra note 294.
120. The attempt to ensnare a consumer would also run afoul of the nonvariable definition of
"Issuer" in Revised UCC section 5-102(a)(9) discussed above. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
121. U.C.C. § 5-104 (setting forth formal requirements of the Revised UCC).
122. According to UCC Section 1-302, comment 1:
This principle of freedom of contract is subject to specific exceptions found elsewhere
in the Uniform Commercial Code and to the general exception stated here. The
specific exceptions vary in explicitness: the statute of frauds found in Section 2-201,
for example, does not explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a writing,
but a fair reading denies enforcement to such a waiver as part of the "contract" made
unenforceable ....
U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2004).
123. Since the formality requirements of UCC Section 5-104 are so flexible, there is little
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Underlying Revised UCC Article 5's approach to variability is a
certain duality that becomes apparent in its definition of "letter of
credit." On the one hand, it adopts the conventional approach of
making certain limited provisions nonvariable. On the whole, the
reason for the selection is one of scope. An undertaking that fails to
meet the definition is not a UCC Article 5 "letter of credit." In this
sense, drafting of the undertaking can operate on the nonvariable
provisions to "shift" the undertaking from a letter of credit into
another type of undertaking.
But this possibility is not limited to the nonvariable terms. In
this sense, there are definite limits to the variability of the variable
provisions of Revised UCC Article 5. While there is considerable
flexibility with respect to the variable provisions, there is a point
beyond which the undertaking, whatever it is, is not a letter of credit.
This point is to be determined, not by a mechanical listing of
nonvariable provisions or by traditional policy analysis based on
general common law and commercial law principles, but on
principles centered in letter of credit law and practice.
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) attempts to capture this dualistic
approach through its limited use of nonvariable provisions. 1 4 While
not perfect, it provides flexibility without sacrificing certainty.
An apt illustration is its operation on the obligation of a
confirmer. Is the obligation of a confirmer a "letter of credit" that
cannot be varied? The provision in section 5-107(a), that a confirmer
has the obligations of an issuer, is variable. 1
25
In light of the variability of the obligation of a confirmer, can an
undertaking that is called a "confirmation" provide that the confirmer
difference between bringing the basic requirements of some manner of authentication and a non-
oral manifestation under the definition of "letter of credit" and making Revised UCC section 5-
104 nonvariable. U.C.C. § 5-104 (2003). The approach taken removes any doubt about the
ability of the letter of credit to prescribe a means of authentication that is not in accord with
standard international letter of credit practice. It does, however, leave the somewhat awkward
question of whether the fundamental formality requirements for undertakings listed in Revised
UCC section 5-104 in addition to "letter of credit" (namely confirmation, advice, transfer,
amendment, or cancellation) can be varied. For example, can there be an oral confirmation? The
answer must be negative. For purposes of the meaning of the term "letter of credit," the
minimum formality requirement would apply to all letter of credit-like undertakings. While this
extension is somewhat of a stretch, it is one that flows from letter of credit practice and is
consistent with the spirit of Revised UCC Article 5. This approach is superior to one that resorts
to vague principles of public policy apart from letter of credit policy for such a rule.
124. See U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1995).
125. See id. § 5-107(a).
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has no obligation to the beneficiary unless it is first reimbursed by
the issuer? Can the undertaking be a "letter of credit" if a non-
financial confirmer confirms for its own account? Can a confirmer
provide itself with a right of recourse against the beneficiary?
Unlike the obligation of an issuer on a letter of credit, there is a
certain amount of flexibility in the obligation of a confirmer on a
confirmation. 126 Once it is determined that the undertaking is a letter
of credit, certain consequences follow. In the case of a letter of
credit, the question is one of scope. In the case of a confirmer or
confirmation, the question is the obligation. 12 7  Whatever the
undertaking of the confirmer (it might, for example, be an accessory
guarantee or a contractual promise, and not a letter of credit-type
promise), there is a letter of credit.
With the exception of the distortion of the meaning of the term
"confirmer" to circumvent a nonvariable provision regarding non-
financial institutions, the question is not one of permissible or
impermissible variation, but of determining the scope and character
of the obligation. What is important is that the process be centered in
letter of credit policy. Courts should base their analysis on these
grounds rather than making a decision and justifying it on procedural
or evidentiary grounds in the manner that common law courts are
supremely able. While this general approach may work individual
justice, it distorts the legal regime that is meant to be ordered by a
statute. There are a variety of tools at the disposal of the courts in
making this determination, most of which hopefully will be drawn
from letter of credit law and practice. In so doing, the courts should
be able to draw on the nonvariable and unvaried provisions of
Revised UCC Article 5 in fashioning a principled answer that is
consistent with the reasonable commercial practices of the
international letter of credit community.
The classification of the definition of "letter of credit" also poses
some tests for what constitutes nonvariability. Embedded in the
definition is the reference to it being issued at the request of, or for
the account of, someone. 12 8 Is an undertaking a "letter of credit" if it
does not state on its face the person for whose account it is issued?
126. See id.
127. See id. § 5-107.
128. See id. § 5-102(10).
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Can a court go beyond the face of the letter of credit to determine
that the undertaking was issued by a non-financial institution on its
own behalf or is a recital of the undertaking on its face binding?
These questions touch not only on the nonvariable definition of letter
of credit, but on the nonvariable doctrine of independence in Revised
UCC Section 5-103(d) as well.
The answers to these questions can be readily found in the
statute itself, and in letter of credit policy as reflected in Revised
UCC Article 5 and in standard international letter of credit practice.
While it is common that letters of credit be issued stating the name of
the account party, the failure to do so in an undertaking that
otherwise meets the definition of letter of credit would not change its
status. The definition does not require that the name of the account
party or applicant be stated in the instrument, and it goes without
saying that the undertaking was issued at someone's request.
29
As to whether a court can look beyond the face of the instrument
to determine for whose account it is issued, the answer must also be
in the affirmative. Whatever a "financial institution" is, the name of
the applicant will not necessarily reveal that it is a financial
institution. Because an undertaking of a non-financial institution for
its own account is not a "letter of credit," a question of the scope of
application of Revised UCC Article 5, a court must be able to act on
evidence external to the letter of credit undertaking.' 
30
3. Revised UCC Section 5-106(d) (Perpetual Letters of Credit)
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) provides that subsection 5-106(d)
is an exception to the rule that the effect of the provisions of Revised
UCC Article 5 may be varied. 13 1 Revised UCC section 5-106(d)
provides that "[a] letter of credit that states that it is perpetual expires
five years after its stated date of issuance, or if none is stated, after
the date on which it is issued."'
132
129. See id.
130. Of course, common law courts have tools by which a just result can be achieved outside
of Revised UCC Article 5 without distorting its operation. For example the doctrine of estoppel
might operate to protect a beneficiary that reasonably relied on an undertaking issued by a non-
financial institution on its own behalf as if it were a letter of credit. A relevant question, but one
that is beyond the scope of this paper, is whether there remains a common law concerning letters
of credit after the enactment of Revised UCC Article 5.
131. SeeU.C.C. § 5-103(c).
132. Id. § 5-106(d).
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This provision is included in the list of nonvariable provisions to
prevent any alteration of the policy manifested in Revised UCC
Article 5 against commercial obligations that expressly provide that
they are not to terminate or are perpetual.
133
In the interpretation of Revised UCC section 5-106(d), much
turns on the meaning to be given to the term "perpetual." It should
be apparent that the policy underlying the provision was not fixed on
a magic word, but rather on an undertaking that had no finite
duration. Otherwise, this policy could be defeated and the subsection
varied by the use of a different term that had the same meaning (for
example, "eternal"), or a provision that the undertaking does not
expire.
Although the non-expiration provision cannot be varied, it is
possible to accommodate a beneficiary's interest in an obligation that
runs until it is needed. This concern can best be met by a properly
structured letter of credit with a clause providing for the issuance of a
notice of non-renewal and permitting a beneficiary to draw on receipt
of that notice.
134
Where a provision for termination is included, such as a
provision empowering the issuer to terminate its obligation by
making payment on its own initiative, that undertaking should not be
regarded as being "perpetual" (even if, by its terms, it includes
terminology that would be so regarded were it not otherwise
qualified). Because its obligation can be terminated upon the
issuer's notice, there is no variation of this rule against perpetual
letters of credit. 135 Likewise, an undertaking that has no expiration
date but provides that the issuer can, at its discretion, pay the
proceeds meets the same policy concerns. Of course, a letter of
credit could be issued for a lengthy period should an issuer be
133. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1016 (b)(1)(iii) (2006). The United States Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency has promulgated regulations regarding the safety and soundness of the banks that
issue letters of credit. Id. at §§ 7.1016-1017. In this regard, the United States office of the
comptroller of the currency has played a leading role through these interpretative rulings by
assuring that banks would prudently consider the importance of limits to the time frame of their
exposure and not be exposed to the vagaries of non-documentary conditions. In their current
form, the rulings are the most current approach to letter of credit regulation now in place and
would serve well as a model for enlightened regulation of this field.
134. Such so-called evergreen letters of credit, while complex, serve an important need.
135. U.C.C. § 5-106 cmt. 4 (1995) (noting that "a letter of credit that may be revoked or
terminated at the discretion of the issuer by notice to the beneficiary is not 'perpetual"').
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prepared to give it, and should a beneficiary be prepared to take it.136
Because this distinction may be lost where there is no
appreciation of the policy concerns underlying the exception, namely
the need for a mechanism that effectively limits the obligation, it is
vital that its interpretation be based on principles rather than a
mechanical or formal approach. The exception, however, is
straightforward and its policy basis is relatively apparent.
4. Revised Section 5-114(d) (Assignment of Proceeds)
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) provides that subsection 5-114(d)
is an exception to the rule that the effect of the provisions of Revised
UCC Article 5 may be varied. 137  Revised UCC section 5-114(d)
provides that while an issuer or nominated person is not obligated to
give or withhold its consent to an assignment of proceeds, "consent
may not be unreasonably withheld if the assignee possesses and
exhibits the letter of credit and presentation of the letter of credit is a
condition to honor."
' 138
This subsection must be understood in the context of letter of
credit practice which requires the consent of a bank to obligate it to
pay any proceeds that may be available to the assignee. As such, it is
contrary to bilateral assignment law.' 39 Revised UCC section 5-114
upheld this deviation from the general law of assignment because of
the justified need for banks nominated under a letter of credit to
control the process of assignment so as to reduce the risk of double
payment. 140  This risk exists where payment is to be made against
representations which can easily be forged or altered by a stranger.
Controlling the process of assignment also avoids serious disruption
to international practice, which would occur if banks-that may
come under United States law-were forced to check various
registries before being able to pay on their obligations in order to
136. There are a host of practical considerations that discourage the issuance of long term
obligations that cannot be ended, making them quite rare. While a "999 year" letter of credit may
be indistinguishable from a perpetual one, there are supervisory controls with respect to safety
and soundness that make such an undertaking unlikely.
137. U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1995).
138. Id. § 5-114(d).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 (defenses against an assignee). In a
signal victory for letter of credit practice, Revised Article 9 recognizes the unique nature of an
assignment of LC proceeds. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-107 (2001).
140. See U.C.C. § 5-114 (1995).
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avoid the possibility that the beneficiary had assigned the same
proceeds to more than one person.
With respect to a letter of credit that required presentation of the
operative letter of credit instrument, however, it was concluded that
this risk is "minimized."' 14 1 Therefore, in the limited situation where
the operative letter of credit instrument is required and exhibited, the
statute has taken the policy position that a bank ought not to refuse to
acknowledge an assignment of proceeds unreasonably.
The statement in Revised UCC section 5-103 that this provision
cannot be varied without any qualification, however, is somewhat of
an overstatement. Like the provisions on limitations of obligations
and reasonable time, nonvariability is tied to an assessment of
reasonableness. To say that this provision cannot be varied can only
mean that an issuer or nominated person cannot absolutely refuse to
acknowledge an assignment of proceeds under these circumstances,
but can impose qualifications on any consent, provided that the
qualifications are reasonable. 142 In effect, this limitation on variance
is only a limitation on its exclusion and unreasonable refusal, similar
to the approach taken in Revised UCC section 1-302(b), which is
141. Comment 3 to UCC Section 5-114 provides:
Where the letter of credit must be presented as a condition to honor and the assignee
holds and exhibits the letter of credit to the issuer or nominated person, the risk to the
issuer or nominated person of having to pay twice is minimized. In such a situation,
subsection (d) provides that the issuer or nominated person may not unreasonably
withhold its consent to the assignment.
Id. § 5-114 cmt. 3.
142. An example of qualifications that should be deemed reasonable is contained in ISP98
Rule 6.03, which provides:
An issuer of a transferable standby or a nominated person need not effect a transfer
unless:
a. it is satisfied as to the existence and authenticity of the original standby; and
b. the beneficiary submits or fulfills:
i. a request in a form acceptable to the issuer or nominated person including the
effective date of the transfer and the name and address of the transferee;
ii. the original standby;
iii. verification of the signature of the person signing for the beneficiary;
iv. verification of the authority of the person signing for the beneficiary;
v. payment of the transfer fee; and
vi. any other reasonable requirements.
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE INT'L STANDBY PRACTICES (1998) (ICC Pub. No. 590)
[hereinafter ISP98].
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also nonvariable in Revised UCC Article 5.143
5. Except to the Extent Prohibited by
Revised UCC Section 1-302 (Variation by Agreement)
a. Generally
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) provides that qualifications on
variability contained in Revised UCC section 1-302 constitute a
further limited exception to the general rule that the effect of the
provisions of Revised UCC Article 5 may be varied. Variation is
permitted "except to the extent prohibited" by this section.'
44
Revised UCC section 1-302 contains a bifurcated approach to
variation, prohibiting disclaimer of "[t]he obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the UCC].'
145
However, it provides that "[t]he parties, by agreement, may
determine the standards by which the performance of those
obligations is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly
unreasonable."' 146 It also contains a similar rule where an action is
required to be performed within a reasonable time.
147
Prohibited by the phrase "to the extent prohibited," are (1)
disclaimer of statutory obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness, care, and reasonable time, and (2) formulations of
standards by which those obligations are to be measured that are
manifestly unreasonable.
To determine the application of this limitation to Revised UCC
Article 5, it is necessary to determine the "obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness, and care," the extent to which they are
143. U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 2 (1995) ("Neither the obligation of an issuer under section 5-108
nor that of an adviser under section 5-107 is an obligation of the kind that is invariable under
section 1-102(3)." (emphasis added)).
144. U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (2001).
145. U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2003).
146. Id.
147. UCC Section 1-302(b) provides:
[t]he obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the
Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement. The parties, by
agreement, may determine the standards by which the performance of those obligations
is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable. Whenever [the
Uniform Commercial Code] requires an action to be taken within a reasonable time, a
time that is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
Id. § 1-302(b) (alterations in original).
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"prescribed," what constitutes their disclaimer, and what standards
are not manifestly unreasonable for these obligations and the
requirements that action be undertaken within a reasonable time.
The definitive treatment of Revised UCC section 1-302 and its
predecessor, Prior section 1-102(3), has yet to be written, and the
impact of this section on Revised UCC Article 5 has scarcely been
considered. In more than fifty years of applicability to the current
and prior version of UCC Article 5, a case has yet to arise. Their
practical import is most likely to arise in connection with general
disclaimers and the terms contained in applications or reimbursement
agreements. Consequently, these observations are tentative.
b. Disclaimer or standardization
While the distinction between disclaiming or excluding an
obligation and determining its application by standards is readily
stated, the application of this distinction to a given situation is not
always apparent. At some point, a standard that renders the
obligation unenforceable or the enforcement meaningless essentially
disclaims it. Whether any obligation for a misrepresentation is
excluded, damages for it are so limited as to be meaningless, or the
burden of proof is raised so high as to make achievement virtually
impossible. This is a nominal rather than a real difference.
Consequently, the notion of manifest unreasonableness is an
important tool for policing the outer limits of variability, whether
under the rubric of disclaimer or ineffectiveness.
c. The meaning of the terms
"good faith, " "diligence," "reasonableness, " and "care"
i. Generally
There is some literature on the general meaning of the concepts
of "good faith," "diligence," "reasonableness," and "care," most of
which is irrelevant to their application to letter of credit obligations
because that application must be informed by letter of credit policy
considerations. Including this subsection in the list of nonvariables
conveys an indirect message, namely that its nonvariability stems not
from general assumptions that operate in other UCC Articles but
from Revised UCC Article 5.
Only some of these terms are defined. Where there is no
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definition in Revised UCC Article 5, meaning should be derived
from the context of Revised UCC Article 5. Reasonableness, for
example, with respect to a letter of credit is not necessarily
reasonable with respect to a contract for the sale of goods. In any
event, there is considerable latitude for interpretation.
It should be noted that these notions do not exist as precise and
distinct operations separate from one another. As will be seen, they
overlap in many respects. It is difficult to distinguish precisely
between an obligation of diligence and one of care. It is predicted
that the courts will choose which approach to take depending on the
issues before it. For example, the requirement of diligence may not
be applied except where there is a requirement of action within a
given time, whereas that of reasonableness may be applied in a
liberal manner to every duty. Moreover, because we are dealing with
obligations and not terms, there need be no mention of these or
similar words.
Because the application of these terms is somewhat fluid, there
is potential for abuse in unduly broadening the scope of the
nonvariable provisions of Revised UCC Article 5. For that reason,
they must be viewed as a secondary check on variability with respect
to otherwise variable obligations, only in extreme situations, and
then only in accord with letter of credit policy.
As a practical matter, a court has two options when faced with a
provision that runs afoul of these provisions. It can rule that the
attempt to vary the effect is unsuccessful because the standard is
manifestly unreasonable. In that case, the standard will revert to that
set by applicable rules of practice or by Revised UCC Article 5.
Alternatively, it can decide that the attempt to vary the effect of the
standard is so vital to the nature of the undertaking that the
undertaking is no longer a letter of credit-type undertaking and
should be treated under some other system of law (although it is not
entirely clear whether such a transaction will render it enforceable
under general principles of law even if it is swept outside the reach
of the UCC). Which of these approaches is more appropriate
depends on factors such as the terms of the undertaking, its form, any
rules or references to standardization contained in it, and whether it
would be understood or accepted as a letter of credit under standard
international letter of credit practice.
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ii. The Revised UCC Article 5 Obligation of Good Faith
Revised UCC section 1-304 (Obligation of Good Faith) states
that "[e]very... duty... imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and enforcement."1 48 Revised UCC section 5-109(a)(2)
expressly prescribes the duty of good faith. 1
49
This duty of good faith applies not only where the duty of good
faith is expressly prescribed but "applies generally."'' 50  Thus, the
obligation of good faith cannot be disclaimed for any duty appearing
in Revised UCC Article 5. The duties include the duty of an
issuer, 151 a confirmer, 52 an adviser, 53 a nominated person,' 54 an
applicant, 155 a beneficiary,' 56 and a successor beneficiary.' 57  A
transferee beneficiary would also have the good faith obligations of a
beneficiary. Official Comment 1 to Revised UCC section 1-304
states that the obligation of good faith "is further implemented by
section 1-303 on course of dealing, course of performance, and usage
of trade."' 158 It is unclear whether it applies to obligations that arise
under rules of practice to which the letter of credit is subject.
Contrasted with the sweeping application of the obligation of
good faith throughout Revised UCC Article 5, the actual duty of
good faith is minimal. Revised UCC section 5-102(a)(7) provides
that good faith "means honesty in fact and in the conduct or
transaction concerned."' 159  Official Comment 3 to this section
148. Id. § 1-304 ("Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.").
149. See U.C.C. § 5-109(a)(2) (1995).
150. See U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1 (2003) ("While this duty is explicitly stated in some
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the applicability of the duty is broader than merely
these situations and applies generally, as stated in this section, to the performance or enforcement
of every contract or duty within this Act.").
151. See U.C.C. §§ 5-106, 5-108, 5-109(a)(1), 5-113(b), 5-114(d) (1995).
152. See id. § 5-107.
153. See id.
154. See id.; see also id. § 5-114(d).
155. See id. § 5-108(i).
156. It is unclear, but arguable, that the implied warranties given by the beneficiary under
Revised UCC Section 5-110 are a "contract" within the meaning of Revised UCC section 1-304.
See id. § 5-110 (1995); U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003).
157. See U.C.C. § 5-113 (1995) (transfer by operation of law).
158. U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1 (2003).
159. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(7) (1995). As noted in Official Comment 3 to Revised UCC Section
5-102, "'[o]bservance of reasonable standards of fair dealing' has not been added to the
definition." Id. § 5-102 cmt. 3. Actually, this addition had not been made to the UCC Article 1
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suggests the scope of the definition:
The narrower definition of "honesty in fact" reinforces the
"independence principle" in the treatment of "fraud," "strict
compliance," "preclusion," and other tests affecting the
performance of obligations that are unique to letters of
credit. This narrower definition-which does not include
"fair dealing"-is appropriate to the decision to honor or
dishonor a presentation of documents specified in a letter of
credit. The narrower definition is also appropriate for other
parts of revised Article 5 where greater certainty of
obligations is necessary and is consistent with the goals of
speed and low cost.
160
iii. The Revised UCC Article 5
Obligations of Diligence, Reasonableness, and Care
Unlike "good faith," the obligations of diligence,
reasonableness, and care are not made generally applicable to all
duties. Therefore, it is necessary to determine where they are
"prescribed" in Revised UCC Article 5.
(a.) The Revised UCC Article 5 obligation of diligence
"Diligence" is not defined in the UCC nor is there any indication
of its meaning in the Official Comments. In general usage,
"diligence" means a determined and sustained effort. 16' In legal
usage, it can also signify care or the degree of care required in a
given situation.162 Since the term "care" is already used in the list of
obligations, it is reasonable to think that courts would draw on the
former definition in applying UCC section 3-302(b). Under this
approach, it is reasonable to conclude that with respect to an
definition of "good faith" when Revised UCC Article 5 was drafted. It had, however, been added
to Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4, and the limited definition was inserted in Revised UCC Article
5 in anticipation of the broader definition being inserted into the revision of UCC Article 1.
160. U.C.C. § 5-102 cmt. 3.
161. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 665 (James A.H. Murray et al. eds., Oxford University
Press 1989) (defining diligence as "constant and earnest effort to accomplish what is
undertaken"); WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 511 (2d ed. Collins World 1978) (defining
diligence as "constant effort to accomplish what is undertaken").
162. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (7th ed. 1999) (defining diligence as "[a] continual
effort to accomplish something"); WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 511 (2nd ed. Collins
World 1978) (defining legal diligence as "the degree of care and caution required by the
circumstances of a person").
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obligation, diligence means that the person obligated to perform will
be required to do so in a persistent manner without delay or
diminution of effort. If this approach is incorrect, the comments
made below with respect to the obligation to exercise care would
also apply to diligence.
There is no place in Revised UCC Article 5 where the obligation
of diligence is expressly prescribed. There are, however, a number
of situations in which a duty is prescribed. Should a court imply an
obligation to perform these duties diligently, the requirement would
apply to the obligation of an adviser to notify the beneficiary of the
issuance or transfer of the credit; 63 to the obligation of an issuer or
confirmer to examine a presentation and determine whether or not to
honor it; 164 to the obligation of an issuer, confirmer, or nominated
paying bank to give notice of a decision to refuse a presentation;' 65 to
the obligation of the issuer and confirmer to observe standard
practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of
credit; 166 to the obligation of the issuer and confirmer to return
dishonored documents or otherwise appropriately dispose of them,
giving due notice;' 67 to the obligation of the applicant to reimburse
the issuer or confirmer that has honored a complying presentation;'
68
to the obligation of an issuer to honor a presentation by a protected
person notwithstanding the presence of letter of credit fraud; 169 to the
obligation of an issuer or confirmer to recognize a disclosed
successor by operation of law of the beneficiary;17 0 and to the
obligation of an issuer or nominated person to not unreasonably
withhold consent to an assignment of proceeds where the assignee
possesses the operative letter of credit instrument and it is required
for compliance.171
To the extent that rules of practice reflect course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, the obligations of
163. See U.C.C. § 5-107(c), (d).
164. See id. § 5-108(a).
165. See id. § 5-108(b).
166. See id. § 5-108(b)(2).
167. See id. § 5-108(h).
168. See id. § 5-108(i)(1).
169. See id.; see also id. § 5-109(a)(1).
170. Seeid. § 5-113(b).
171. Seeid. § 5-114(d).
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diligence that they prescribe also cannot be disclaimed. 172 It is
unclear whether this limitation also affects rules of practice to which
the letter of credit may be subject, but it could readily be applied to
duties not already detailed in Revised UCC Article 5.
Given the fact that no duty of diligence is prescribed as such, if
at all, courts should only apply this limitation on variability in
extreme situations where there is no commercial justification for a
restriction on diligence.
(b.) The Revised UCC Article 5 obligation of reasonableness
Reasonableness is not defined or explained in Revised UCC
Article 5. In general usage, reasonableness indicates moderateness
under the circumstances, or a lack of excessiveness. 173  In applying
an obligation of reasonableness at law, reasonableness necessarily
entails a context. With respect to letters of credit, Revised UCC
Article 5 makes it clear that reasonableness is to be understood in the
context of standard international letter of credit practice. 174  Under
general common law principles, the determination of reasonableness
is the responsibility of the trier of fact.
Revised UCC Article 5 does not explicitly require
reasonableness. There are, however, a number of duties imposed by
Revised UCC Article 5 which could readily be said to imply an
obligation of reasonableness in the sense that it cannot be disclaimed
and that any standard by which it is to be measured cannot be
manifestly unreasonable. 175 These duties would encompass all of the
172. In this context, it may be asked whether provisions in UCP500 that are mandatory but
which are not accompanied by a sanction, such as Article 10(a), are subject to this duty. See
UCP500, supra note 5, art. 10(a) ("All Credits must clearly indicate whether they are available by
sight payment, by deferred payment, by acceptance or by negotiation.").
173. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (7th ed. 1999) (defining reasonable as "[flair, proper,
or moderate under the circumstances").
174. Not only does Revised UCC Article 5 expressly exclude the possibility of its application
in consumer finance, but it is also drafted in the context of and to accommodate standard
international letter of credit practice and with express deference to that practice where a letter of
credit is subject to rules of practice. U.C.C. § 5-116(c). Even where deference exists, the letter of
credit is not subject to rules of practice. See id. § 5-108(e); U.C.C. § 1-303 (2003).
175. Whether a court should imply such a standard is debatable. There are a number of
provisions in letter of credit law and practice that appear unreasonable from the perspective of
bilateral contracts or general principles of commercial law. The best example is the rule of
preclusion by which a bank is precluded from asserting that the documents are not in compliance
with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. See, e.g., Phila. Gear Corp. v. Central Bank,
717 F.2d 230, 234 (1983). Requiring an issuer to pay where this rule applies, even where the
beneficiary could not have cured the discrepancy and did not reasonably rely on the absence of
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obligations detailed above with respect to good faith and diligence. 176
The obligation of reasonableness, however, does not reach the terms
and conditions of the letter of credit or any provision of Revised
UCC Article 5 other than those linked to obligations prescribed by
the statute.
(c.) The Revised UCC Article 5 obligation of care
Care is not defined in Revised UCC Articles 1 or 5. Revised
UCC section 3-103(a)(9) defines "ordinary care" as the "observance
of reasonable commercial standards."'177 To the extent that there is
an obligation of care prescribed, that definition is adequate.
As with the other obligations, Revised UCC Article 5 does not
prescribe an obligation of care, but such an obligation could be
implied with respect to the duties discussed with regard to the other
obligations.'
78
iv. Revised UCC Article 5 requirements of reasonable time
Revised UCC section 1-204(2) provides that "[w]hat is a
reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose
and circumstances of such action."'
' 79
Within Revised UCC Article 5, the only reference to
''reasonable time," and the only stated time frame within which an
action must take place, appears in Revised UCC section 5-108(b) and
Official Comment 2 with respect to the time within which documents
must be examined and notice of refusal given (which cannot exceed
seven business days after the issuer's receipt of the documents).
180
timely notice, could be held unreasonable unless the rule is considered from the perspective of
reinforcing the integrity of the letter of credit and its procedures. It is, however, unlikely that a
common law court will enforce a provision that it deems to be unreasonable. The task then, is to
show that the various duties are not manifestly unreasonable, something which can be done for all
aspects of letter of credit practice which is, almost without exception, founded on its own internal
logic.
176. See discussion supra Part III E. l.a.
177. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1995) ("'Ordinary care' in the case of a person engaged in
business means observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which
the person is located, with respect to the business in which the person is engaged.").
178. See discussion supra Part III.E.l.a.
179. U.C.C. § 1-204(2) (2001).
180. UCC Section 5-108(b) provides:
An issuer has a reasonable time after presentation, but not beyond the end of the
seventh business day of the issuer after the day of its receipt of documents:
(1) to honor,
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Under Revised UCC section 5-103(c), this requirement that the
action be done within a reasonable time cannot be varied, but the
time given (seven banking days) can be adjusted, provided that the
time given is not manifestly unreasonable.181 Since the time stated
operates against the issuer, a court would not be likely to consider a
claim that a lesser time is unreasonable. These inquiries would be
reserved for attempts at lengthening the time.' 82 The test would be
whether a time was so long as to be unfair to the beneficiary given
the circumstances of the letter of credit transaction.
v. Scope of application; manifestly
unreasonable; commercial reasonableness
Due to the lack of precision used with the terms "scope of
applications," "manifestly unreasonable," and "commercial reasona-
bleness" and the uncertainty of the extent of their application to
obligations in Revised UCC Article 5, there is considerable scope for
discretion in the application of the limitations. There are three
possible approaches to the exercise of this discretion that might
immediately commend themselves: (1) minimalist, i.e., only where
an express obligation is mandated using these terms; (2) strict, i.e.,
only where there is a duty that, strictly construed, imposes an
obligation to act reasonably, diligently, or with care; and (3) liberal,
i.e., wherever there is any duty unless it is apparent that the
requirements of diligence, reasonableness, or care do not apply.
The danger of these formulae is that they can be too broad or too
narrow, depending on the issue and circumstances. This issue is not
one that can be solved readily by a simple formula. While there is a
certain comfort in this overall approach, it misses an important
(2) if the letter of credit provides for honor to be completed more than seven business
days after presentation, to accept a draft or incur a deferred obligation, or
(3) to give notice to the presenter of discrepancies in the presentation.
U.C.C. § 5-108(b) (1995).
181. Id. § 5-103(c).
182. Comment I to Revised Section 1-302 provides:
Subsection (b) also recognizes that nothing is stronger evidence of a reasonable time
than the fixing of such time by a fair agreement between the parties. However,
provision is made for disregarding a clause which whether by inadvertance or
overreaching fixes a time so unreasonable that it amounts to eliminating all remedy
under the contract. The parties are not required to fix the most reasonable time but
may fix any time which is not obviously unfair as judged by the time of contracting.
U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2003).
350
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dimension of the problem, namely, the purpose of these limitations.
Since we are working with a commercial setting absent consumer
issues, the proper test is one of commercial reasonableness (or lack
thereof) for letters of credit.
A standard for an obligation is not manifestly unreasonable if it
is commercially reasonable. Thus, for example, a provision in a
letter of credit that eschews any examination of documents would be
commercially reasonable under circumstances where there were
virtually no documents and an undertaking to make payment within a
matter of hours. Such a provision may also be commercially
reasonable where the applicant requested a lower level of processing
and intended to sort out difficulties with the documents directly with
the beneficiary. On the other hand, a provision that exonerates a
bank from misrepresenting facts about the time when documents
were received would be commercially unreasonable.
Thus, even if these obligations are deemed to be at issue, a court
will not err by asking whether the provision is commercially
reasonable, taking into account all of the factors involved. Under
this approach, the scope of the limitation will be restricted to those
provisions that so depart from the minimum of what is acceptable as
to warrant reaction. The complex operation of these provisions as
limitations on variability can be seen in several illustrations.
An attempted limitation by the issuer of its undertaking to the
beneficiary to pay only if the issuer was reimbursed by the applicant
would be a prime candidate for reaction on several grounds. The
undertaking might not be considered a letter of credit because it is
not an undertaking to honor (as defined in Revised UCC section 5-
102(a)(8),' 83 or it might be regarded as a manifestly unreasonable
limitation on the issuer's obligations of reasonableness pursuant to
Revised UCC section 5-108.184 In either case, the court could, in
effect, reform the obligation by excising the offensive provision.
This result could also be achieved indirectly by the use of common
law rules such as estoppel. On the other hand, the court could
conclude that the undertaking was a collection and not a letter of
credit. Because the result is so fact-intense, a general rule cannot be
laid down.
183. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(8) (1995).
184. See id. § 5-108.
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On the other hand, an undertaking to pay five banking days
following presentation or receipt of funds from the applicant-
whichever comes first-is not a manifestly unreasonable standard of
performance of the issuer's obligation or adjustment of the meaning
of "honor."
A similar attempted limitation by the confirmer, of its
undertaking to the beneficiary to pay only if it is reimbursed by the
issuer, would produce a different result. The overall undertaking
would be regarded as a letter of credit, but the obligation of the so-
called confirmer could either be regarded as a non-letter of credit
dependent guarantee (where the limitation could be excised as a
manifestly unreasonable limitation on the obligation of
reasonableness in Revised UCC section 5-107(a)) or the confirmer
could be estopped from asserting the limitation. On the other hand,
less drastic limitations on the beneficiary's right of recourse (e.g.,
currency risk) would neither alter the character of the undertaking
nor be manifestly unreasonable.
6. Except to the Extent Prohibited by Section 5-117(d)
(Subrogation of Issuer, Applicant, and Nominated Person)
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) provides that variability is
limited "to the extent prohibited" in section 5-117(d). 185 Revised
UCC section 5-117(d) limits rights of subrogation to post-honor
situations. 186  This provision results from a public policy
determination that, while post-honor subrogation is appropriate in
some circumstances, to the extent that it would otherwise be
permitted under applicable rules of equity and should not be refused
due to an overly nice appreciation of the doctrine of independence
when it is no longer applicable. The principle of finality of payment
and independence operates with respect to the letter of credit
obligation and that the issuer, confirmer, or a nominated paying bank
cannot recover proceeds mistakenly paid based on rights founded in
the obligations of those banks as such.
187
185. See id. § 5-103(c).
186. See id. § 5-117(d).
187. The provision is intended to reverse the results in pre-revision cases where the courts
have mistakenly refused to permit subrogation where there were no conflicting equities on the
ground that to do so would contradict the independence principle. See, e.g., Carol Ruth, Inc. v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 683 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision);
Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper Co., 907 P.2d 1179 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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It should be noted that the limitation is not on the right of
subrogation itself. Being, in effect, an "equitable assignment" where
the parties have not otherwise assigned rights, subrogation is a right
that can be disclaimed by agreement. Revised UCC section 5-117(d)
does not change that rule. Rather, it prevents the expansion of the
right of subrogation to a pre-honor situation. An issuer or confirmer
that has not honored, and a nominated bank that has not acted
pursuant to its nomination, is not entitled to be subrogated to the
rights of another. Furthermore, in no case can these parties assert
rights to reimbursement based on their own claims because, as to
them, payment is final (with the exception of a nominated
negotiating bank that does not give up its right of recourse).
Presumably, one might have reached this conclusion on the basis of a
public policy analysis, taking into account fundamental principles of
letter of credit law; however, given the record of the courts with the
basic principle of subrogation, the drafters obviously thought it
prudent to make the limitation express.
7. Disclaimers of Liability or
Remedies for Failure to Perform Obligations
In addition to identifying specific provisions that are exceptions
to the rule that Revised UCC Article 5's effects may be varied,
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) states that "[a] term in an agreement
or undertaking generally excusing liability or generally limiting
remedies for failure to perform obligations is not sufficient to vary
obligations prescribed by this article."
'1 88
Revised UCC Article 5 covers the obligations of the issuer,
1 89
the confirmer, 19°  the adviser, 19 1 the transferring bank, 192  the
applicant, 193 and, to a lesser extent, other nominated persons.
194
188. U.C.C. § 5-103(c).
189. See id. § 5-108; see also id. §§ 5-106, 5-109.
190. These provisions are contained in Revised UCC Section 5-107(a) but, since the
confirmer has the "obligations of an issuer to the extent of its confirmation," it is also necessary
to consider the obligations of an issuer. Id. § 5-107(a).
191. See id. §§ 5-107(c), 5-111, 5-116.
192. See id. § 5-107(c), (d). The obligation of a transferring bank is addressed in Revised
UCC Section 5-107(d), but since the transferring bank's obligation is that of an adviser, it is also
necessary to take into account Revised UCC section 5-107(c). Id. § 5-107(c).
193. Id. § 5-108(i)(1). The applicant is required to reimburse the issuer according to Revised
UCC section 5-108(i) which states: "[a]n issuer that has honored a presentation as permitted or
required by this article: (1) is entitled to be reimbursed by the applicant in immediately available
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Warranties are addressed in Revised UCC section 5-110.195
Remedies and damages are addressed in Revised UCC section 5-
111.196
The limitation in Revised UCC section 5-103(c), addressing
general excuses or limitations, captures generic disclaimers but
permits specific limitations, such as a qualification of a confirmer's
liability to situations where the documents are presented at its
counters, or a disclaimer of the accuracy of a given advise of a letter
of credit where the adviser is unable to check its apparent
authenticity. The limitation should not encompass general
statements about liability that are based on, or reflect, the provisions
of Revised UCC Article 5 or standard rules of letter of credit
practice. Such statements are helpful to those affected by them and
should not be discouraged.
This impression is reinforced by the examples given in Official
Comment 2 to Revised UCC section 5-103(c). 197  The test is
"whether the disclaimer or limitation is sufficiently clear and explicit
in reallocating a liability or risk that is allocated differently under a
variable Article 5 provision."' 198 Reinforcing this impression is the
statement that the basis of the provision goes to the procedural rather
than substantive unfairness, which means that a variation is
funds not later than the date of its payment of funds .... Id.
194. See id. § 5-107(b) (providing that a nominated person who has not added its confirmation
has no obligation on the undertaking; as a result, any liability or remedies that arise, result from
action by the nominated bank pursuant to its nomination).
195. Seeid. § 5-110.
196. See id. § 5-111.
197. Id. § 5-103 cmt. 2.
198. Comment 2 to Revised Section 5-103 provides:
What the issuer could achieve by an explicit agreement with its applicant or by a term
that explicitly defines its duty, it cannot accomplish by a general disclaimer. The
restriction on disclaimers in the last sentence of subsection (c) is based more on
procedural than on substantive unfairness. Where, for example, the reimbursement
agreement provides explicitly that the issuer need not examine any documents, the
applicant understands the risk it has undertaken. A term in a reimbursement agreement
which states generally that an issuer will not be liable unless it has acted in "bad faith"
or committed "gross negligence" is ineffective under section 5-103(c). On the other
hand, less general terms such as terms that permit issuer reliance on an oral or
electronic message believed in good faith to have been received from the applicant or
terms that entitle an issuer to reimbursement when it honors a "substantially" though
not "strictly" complying presentation, are effective. In each case the question is
whether the disclaimer or limitation is sufficiently clear and explicit in reallocating a
liability or risk that is allocated differently under a variable Article 5 provision.
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acceptable if it is sufficiently explicit. In this perspective, a general
disclaimer by the issuer of liability for beneficiary fraud would not
run afoul of this prohibition because it does not reallocate liabilities.
Another sentence in Official Comment 2 to Revised UCC
section 5-103(c), however, seems to add another factor to the scope
of this limitation. It states that it "limits the power of the issuer to
achieve [adjustment of the obligations of the issuer] by a non-
negotiated disclaimer or limitation of remedy."' 199 As indicated,
Revised UCC Article 5, and section 5-103 in particular, has been
nuanced in its recognition that the terms and conditions of a letter of
credit are not negotiated in any normal sense of the term. They
represent the unilateral terms of the issuer's undertaking which the
beneficiary has not negotiated, and as to which it bears no obligation
to the issuer to perform.
The notion of a negotiated term as opposed to a unilateral term
not only raises the specter of substantive unfairness as a criteria, but
does so in a manner that is out of sync with the letter of credit itself.
If there is to be a test based on substantive unfairness, it should be
expressly stated in the text of the UCC in a manner that can be
realistically applied. As it is, this editorial comment is without basis
in the text of Revised UCC Article 5.
8. Exceptions in Addition to Those
Listed in Revised UCC Section 5-103(c)
In view of the novel approach of Revised UCC Article 5 to
variability, it is necessary to ask whether it is fully successful or
whether additional inferences have to be made for certain aspects not
included in the list. There are three prime candidates for such
consideration: (1) other definitions besides "Letter of Credit" and
"Issuer," fraud and forgery; (2) the statute of limitations; and (3)
security interests in letters of credit.
a. Other definitions in Revised section 5-102
(definitions) besides "letter of credit" and "issuer"
Since Revised UCC section 5-103(c) only prohibits variation of
the effects of the definitions of the terms "issuer" and "letter of
credit, ' '2°° it is apparent that the drafters believed that the effects of
199. Id.
200. See id. § 5-103(c).
356 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol.40:297
the other definitions could be varied. What is unusual here is that the
approach is more restrictive than that taken in Revised UCC Article
1.
Official Comment 1 to Revised section 1-302 suggests that the
meaning of the phrase "the effect of provisions of [the Uniform
Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement" is that the "effect"
of the statute may be varied and not the meaning of its provisions
themselves which "must be found in its text, including its
definitions ... .,,201 It is suggested that the effect of negotiability and
"bona fide purchaser" and "holder in due course" as used in the UCC
cannot be changed, but that "an agreement can change the legal
consequences that would otherwise flow from the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code." 202 Official Comment 2 to Prior UCC
section 1-102(3) similarly states "[t]he meaning of the statute itself
must be found in its text, including its definitions.., it cannot be
varied by agreement." 20 3  Moreover, the 1998 Revision of UCC
Article 9, which also lists nonvariable provisions in a manner similar
to Revised UCC Article 5, does not suggest that the effect of its
definitions cannot be varied.20 4
In addition to considering what it means to say that the effects of
the definitions of "letter of credit" and "issuer" cannot be varied and
why such a restriction is appropriate, it is necessary to ask whether
there is any limitation on the variation of the effects of the variable
definitions of Revised UCC Article 5.
Revised section 5-103 Official Comment 3 introduces some
confusion by warning that "[p]arties should generally avoid
modifying the definitions in section 5-102" for fear that lack of
clarity that would follow. 20 5 This reference (which must be to the
variable definitions, since the effects of the nonvariable ones cannot
be varied) is either abbreviated or an error because Revised UCC
section 5-103(c) makes it apparent that only the effects of the
provisions of Revised UCC Article 5 can be varied and not its
provisions themselves. This distinction would also apply to the
variable definitions.
201. See U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2003).
202. Id.
203. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (1958) (amended 2001).
204. See U.C.C. § 9-602 (1998) (amended 2001).
205. U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 3 (1995).
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However, the example given to illustrate this warning is also
confusing. It is suggested that a provision in a letter of credit that a
true domestic guarantee (suretyship, accessory undertaking, or
dependent guarantee) is a "letter of credit" is an example of a
modification that would leave a court "uncertain about where the
rules on guarantees stop and those concerning letters of credit
begin., 20 6 This example may support inclusion of the definition of
the term "letter of credit" in the list of nonvariable provisions, but it
does not illustrate why the effects of other definitions should not be
varied.
Not only are there good reasons why the effects of the
definitions should not be varied, the question must be asked whether
limitations on their variability can be inferred. Since the definitions
do not represent prescribed obligations, the general limitations that
the effect may not be varied in a manner that is manifestly
unreasonable imported from Revised UCC section 1-302(b) are not
applicable.
For example, can an undertaking provide that effect of the term
"confirmer" is that the party undertakes only to check the accuracy
and apparent authenticity of the undertaking that it confirms? Both
the definitions of "advisor" and "confirmer" and the obligations
attributed to them in Revised UCC section 5-107 are variable.
20 7
This drastic variation is troublesome because it distorts well-
known and understood terminologies and their consequences. While
it may be possible to limit the consequences of the undertaking of an
advising bank or a confirming bank, conflation of the terms should
not be permitted.20 8 It is most unlikely that a court would give effect
to such a variation. There are a variety of grounds on which it could
base such a result. It could conclude that the effect of the provision
was not being varied but that its meaning was being changed. It
could also impute a rule that the variations may not be manifestly
unreasonable. Provided that this determination was made in light of
206. Id.
207. Seeid. § 5-107.
208. See, e.g., Apex Pool Equip. Corp. v. Lee, 419 F.2d 556, 561 n.9 (2d Cir. 1969)
("However, it is clear to us that the parties did not have the Code definition in mind ....
Attributing a different meaning to their language would be foreign to the spirit of the Code."
(citing UCC § 1-102(3))); In re Phoenix Pipe & Tube, L.P., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 28,
31 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that under Pennsylvania's version of § 1-102(3), parties were barred
"from varying the substantive definition of 'security agreement').
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letter of credit considerations, such an imputation would not be
particularly troublesome.
However, it would be inappropriate to name a general
importation of common law or commercial notions regarding what is
appropriate or the range of minimum variability, or to conclude that
Revised UCC Article 5 does not compel the conclusion that the
parties may modify the effects of its definitions simply because two
are listed as nonvariable.
b. The statute of limitations
Revised UCC section 5-115 is not included in section 5-103(c)'s
list of nonvariables. 20 9  Revised UCC section 5-115 provides for a
one year limitations period after expiration or accrual regardless of
knowledge.21 °
It is not uncommon for statutes of limitations to be expressly
downsized to a lesser period of time, and, since it is not listed as
nonvariable, a court would permit the one year period to be lessened.
It is unlikely, however, that a court would permit this period to be so
reduced as to render it meaningless. This result might be justified as
a manifestly unreasonable standard of good faith, diligence, or
reasonableness based on letter of credit principles. It might also be
based on the public policy underlying the statute of limitations.
211
209. Revised UCC Section 5-115 provides:
An action to enforce a right or obligation arising under this article must be commenced
within one year after the expiration date of the relevant letter of credit or one year after
the [claim for relief] [cause of action] accrues, whichever occurs later. A [claim for
relief] [cause of action] accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach.
U.C.C. § 5-115 (1995) (alteration in original).
210. Id.
211. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947) (finding
that parties to a contract may validly limit the statute of limitations absent a controlling statute
and provided the shorter period is reasonable); N. Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Mitsui
Sumitomo Ins. USA, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that under New
York law, "parties to a contract may designate a reasonable period of limitations within which a
claim arising out of the contract is to be commenced, even if that period is shorter than the
statutory period"); In re Global Indus. Tech., Inc., 333 BR. 251, 259 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005)
(noting that under Ohio law, "[t]he contractual limitations period will be upheld by the court as
long as its terms are reasonable"); Rumsey Elec. Co. v. Univ. of Del., 358 A.2d 712, 714 (Del.
1976) (noting that "in the absence of an express statutory provision to the contrary, a statute of
limitations does not proscribe the imposition of a shorter limitations period by contract" (citations
omitted)); Inc. Village of Saltaire v. Zagata, 720 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that
under New York law, "[p]arties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time within which
an action must be commenced to a shorter period than that provided by the applicable Statute of
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Similarly treated would be radical variations of the time from which
the period runs (e.g. issuance of the letter of credit as opposed to its
expiration).
It is also unclear whether the length of the one year limitation
can be extended. Section 5-114 evidences an interest in a relatively
short limitations period by the choice of a one year period and the
accrual of an action regardless of notice. Generally, courts have
resisted extension of the period of limitations.2 12 Given this policy, it
is likely that such an attempt will be regarded with hostility by
courts. However, since the provision is variable, the terms of
Revised UCC Article 5 should control over general policy
considerations with respect to its own statute of limitations.213
c. Letter of credit fraud
Revised UCC section 5-109 (Fraud and Forgery) reflects
Revised UCC Article 5's policy regarding letter of credit fraud, what
it is, the duties of issuers and confirmers, protected persons, and
injunctions.214  Since this section is not included in the list of
Limitations").
212. See E. L. Bums Co. v. Cashio, 302 So.2d 297, 297 (La. 1974) (holding that "parties'
stipulation that suit could be brought on performance bond within two years, in contravention of
statutory one-year prescription, constituted an anticipatory renunciation of prescription and could
not be given effect"); Burlew v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 122 S.W.2d 990, 995 (Ky. 1938)
(noting that the courts should "not be cluttered up with stale claims ... to the extent of refusing to
enforce a contract limitation fixing a longer period than that prescribed by statute"); Soviero
Bros. Contracting Corp. v. City of N.Y., 142 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1955) (noting "a waiver of
statute of limitations is illegal as against public policy, whereas an agreement containing a
reasonable limitation period is valid and enforceable").
213. Given the position taken here, it would follow that the parties can agree to toll the statute
of limitations. However, this question is more within the realm of procedural, rather than letter of
credit law, and there is no letter of credit policy that would prevent such an agreement from being
given effect. See SEC v. DiBella, 409 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2006).
214. Revised UCC Section 5-109 provides:
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms
and conditions of the letter of credit, but a required document is forged or materially
fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the
beneficiary on the issuer or applicant:
(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is demanded by (i) a
nominated person who has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery
or material fraud, (ii) a confirmer who has honored its confirmation in good faith,
(iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit which was
taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person, or (iv) an assignee of
the issuer's or nominated person's deferred obligation that was taken for value
and without notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred
by the issuer or nominated person; and
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nonvariables, the drafters intended that the effect of its provisions
could be varied.
This approach challenges longstanding notions about the
nonvariability of matters grounded in public policy. Consequently, it
must be asked how the variability of the provisions of Revised UCC
section 5-109 can be reconciled with these policy issues.
Can Revised UCC section 5-109 be excluded from an
undertaking? Because it is a fundamental matter of public policy that
courts will not allow the legal system to be used to facilitate fraud,
courts will be hostile to such a provision. Of course, they could
avoid it by means of construing it not to so provide. Assuming that it
was construed to exclude the section, courts could take one of two
fundamental approaches. On the one hand, courts could rule that
such a variation is not enforceable either as being manifestly
unreasonable, a violation of letter of credit policy, or a violation of
general principles of public policy. On the other hand, they could
simply resort to the common law remedies that predated UCC Article
5, and which are embodied in the Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder
Banking Corp. decision. 215  Since Revised UCC section 5-109 is
largely declaratory of the common law that has evolved as a result of
this case, the result would not differ much. Indeed, if the experience
of the New York courts with New York Non-Conforming Prior
section 5-102(4) is any indication, the courts may well refer to the
(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or dishonor the presentation in any
other case.
(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially fraudulent
or that honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on
the issuer or applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction may temporarily or
permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring a presentation or grant similar relief
against the issuer or other persons only if the court finds that:
(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted draft or
deferred obligation incurred by the issuer;
(2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely affected is
adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the relief is granted;
(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this State
have been met; and
(4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is more
likely than not to succeed under its claim of forgery or material fraud and the
person demanding honor does not qualify for protection under subsection (a)(1).
U.C.C. § 5-109 (1995).
215. Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (holding
that an injunction can be issued against beneficiary/seller that shipped rubbish instead of goods).
360
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statute by analogy even where the letter of credit ousts that provision
of the statute. Because matters related to letter of credit fraud are not
exclusively within the ability of private parties to affect, such a result
would be sound. It may be wondered, however, what is achieved by
this circularity.
The same considerations will apply where the undertaking
provides that payment will be made notwithstanding the existence of
letter of credit fraud or an injunction.
Less clear, however, would be the result where the terms of the
letter of credit attempted to modify provisions of Revised UCC
section 5-109. While not exhaustive, some of the candidates for such
modification are the test of letter of credit fraud, the duty of the
issuer or confirmer, the exceptions for the issuer, confirmer,
transferee beneficiary, a non-confirming nominated bank, and a non-
nominated bank, and the requirements for injunctive or other
extraordinary relief.
While no definitive analysis has been made of the variability of
these provisions, and the issue has not been addressed in any
reported case, several observations are in order:
1) Courts will be reluctant to give effect to any modification
that impacts public policy without providing equal or better
protection for the public policy concerns affected. It would
be more consistent with the scope of the variability rule if
courts based their decisions on letter of credit policy and
recognize that the parties may have had another enforceable
non-letter of credit obligation in mind.
2) It is unlikely that an attempt to expand the definition of
letter of credit fraud to include matters such as
misrepresentation would be given effect because it would
change the nature of the letter of credit transaction from an
independent to a dependent one. Also, it is unlikely that it
could be contracted effectively. 216 There are a variety of
bases on which refusal could be based, including its impact
on the definition of a letter of credit (which is nonvariable),
general public policy concerns, or the scope of Revised
216. One possible exception might be to exclude from letter of credit fraud a situation where
the beneficiary did not have knowledge of the forged or fraudulent document. While not a sound
rule, there is no fundamental reason that the parties could not shift this risk, particularly since it
operates against the issuer.
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UCC Article 5. On the other hand, an explanatory
statement in a letter of credit that reflects the provisions of
Revised UCC section 5-109 would probably be referenced
in a decision to the extent that it stated accepted law.
3) A readjustment of allocations of the risk of letter of
credit fraud, on the other hand, would be allowed provided
that it does not have the effect of distorting the balance
achieved under standard international letter of credit law
and practice. If an issuer assumed the risk of certain types
of letter of credit fraud as to the applicant, that provision
would probably be enforced. On the other hand, if the
terms of the letter of credit seek to shift that risk to the
confirmer or other nominated banks that have duly acted
pursuant to their nomination, it is unlikely that such a
provision would be enforced. It is also doubtful if a
provision shifting to the applicant the risk of letter of credit
fraud as to a nominated negotiating bank that has notice of
a claim of fraud when it negotiates would be given effect
even if it were clearly stated in the letter of credit. On the
other hand, a provision that extended such protection to
banks that were not nominated provided that they gave
value in good faith and without notice of the letter of credit
fraud might be enforced since the restriction of innocent
third party protections to nominated persons is not a
fundamental notice that cannot be expanded to other
innocent parties. It is unclear whether the extension of third
party protection to an assignee of proceeds who is also an
innocent purchaser for value would be given effect. While
arguments can be made in support of reallocation of relative
risks and losses as between nominated banks, the issuer,
and the applicant, such a serious distortion of the
fundamental alignment of parties will not be welcomed.
Apart from questions of notice, there are questions of the
rights of third persons in specific and general, and public
policy concerns. Any such attempt will meet with
considerable difficulty and resistance notwithstanding its
apparent variable statutes.
4) United States courts are likely to be very selective in
allowing private agreements to affect the standards for
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injunctive or other extraordinary relief. Strengthening or
weakening the standards would upset a very delicate
balance that operates to restrict situations in which such
relief can be granted for public policy and letter of credit
policy reasons. On the other hand, courts are likely to
enforce a provision that requires a party seeking an
injunction to post a bond covering the amount of the letter
of credit, attorney's fees, costs, and consequential damages
available under the underlying transaction.
d. Revised UCC section 5-118 security interests
Revised UCC section 5-118 is not included in Revised UCC
section 5-103(c)'s list of nonvariable provisions. 2 17  Revised UCC
section 5-118 creates a perfected security interest in a document
presented under a letter of credit in favor of an issuer or nominated
person who has honored or negotiated the presentation for value.
Therefore, the question is whether these provisions can be varied.218
The answer is complex. Certainly, the majority of its provisions
can be varied. The issuer or nominated person can surely agree to
subordinate or waive their interest and so provide in the letter of
credit or at the time of honor or negotiation. They could also obtain
a security agreement even though it is unnecessary.
217. U.C.C. § 5-103(c). See also Revised UCC Section 5-118, which provides:
(a) An issuer or nominated person has a security interest in a document presented under
a letter of credit to the extent that the issuer or nominated person honors or gives value
for the presentation.
(b) So long as and to the extent that an issuer or nominated person has not been
reimbursed or has not otherwise recovered the value given with respect to a security
interest in a document under subsection (a), the security interest continues and is
subject to Article 9, but:
(1) a security agreement is not necessary to make the security interest enforceable
under Section 9-203(b)(3);
(2) if the document is presented in a medium other than a written or other tangible
medium, the security interest is perfected; and
(3) if the document is presented in a written or other tangible medium and is not a
certificated security, chattel paper, a document of title, an instrument, or a letter
of credit, the security interest is perfected and has priority over a conflicting
security interest in the document so long as the debtor does not have possession of
the document.
Id. § 5-118.
218. None of the provisions relating to security interests in letters of credit is included in the
1998 Revision of UCC section 9-602 list of nonvariable provisions. See U.C.C. § 9-602 (1998).
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There are, however, some outer limits. It is highly doubtful that
the issuer or nominated person could effectively expand the
circumstances that give rise to a security interest by, for example,
providing that honor or due negotiation for value is not necessary for
a security interest to arise or by providing that perfection continues
even after reimbursement. One basis for this conclusion might be
that it distorts the scheme of Revised UCC Article 9. However,
Revised UCC section 5-118 is itself an exception to Revised UCC
Article 9 and Revised UCC section 5-116(d) provides that, in the
event of conflict, Revised UCC Article 5 controls.21 9  A more
compelling argument is that permitting a security interest to arise in
situations where there was no commercial situation is a violation of
public policy.
9. Some Reflections on Listing
Variable Provisions in Revised UCC Article 5.
The attempt of Revised UCC section 5-103(c) to add certainty
by an exclusive list of nonvariable provisions focuses attention on
the issues that should be considered. While not perfect, it is
reasonably successful in its attempt to do so, which is an impressive
result in light of the radical departure that it represents.
Nonetheless, an appreciation of the nonvariability of Revised
UCC Article 5 must include not only those sections listed but also
those that are implicit in it. For the reasons discussed, any
implication of nonvariability must be founded on fundamental letter
of credit policies. Revised UCC section 5-103(c) is sufficiently
crafted to permit a common law court to make such judicial
determinations where appropriate. As indicated, in the definitions,
the provisions on letter of credit fraud (section 5-109), the Statute of
Limitations (section 5-117), and the scope provisions regarding
security interests in letter of credit documents (section 5-118) must
be given careful consideration in this regard.
More explanation of this radical departure from the traditional
approach would have been helpful and desirable and would have
added to the certainty that the approach would be given judicial
effect. Nonetheless, the text of section 5-103(c) itself is sufficiently
clear once one grasps the breadth of its approach and distinguishes it
219. U.C.C. § 5-116(d) (1995).
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from the general UCC approach. Thoughtful courts will follow the
guidance of the Revised Article 5 approach, being informed in their
judgments by the principles underlying Revised UCC Article 5 and
the nature of the letter of credit, including the policy evidenced by
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) of a liberal approach in favor of
variability to the widest extent possible.
C. Variation of Other Laws Affecting
Revised UCC Article 5 Letters of Credit
Because Revised UCC Article 5 is not an exhaustive treatment
of legal issues related to letters of credit, 220  it is sometimes
necessary to refer to other statutes or case law in resolving issues that
are otherwise subject to Revised UCC Article 5. In addition, issues
that are addressed in Revised UCC Article 5 are also addressed in
other statutes and in case law that is unrelated to letter of credit law.
In such a situation, it is possible that a given provision can be
variable under one legal regime and not the other one or that neither
addresses the question of variability.
In considering the variability of these provisions, it is necessary
to identify the statutes and common law rules that are affected to
determine whether or not there is a hierarchy with respect to Revised
UCC Article 5, and if so, what it is, and to what extent these
provisions can be excluded or modified. Since the comprehensive
treatment of these questions itself warrants an independent study, this
Article only identifies the issues in general, and attempts to outline
factors that must be taken into account in any definitive approach.
220. Id. § 5-103(b) ("The statement of a rule in this article does not by itself require, imply, or
negate application of the same or a different rule to a situation not provided for, or to a person not
specified, in this article."); see also U.C.C. § 5-102(3) (1957) (amended 2003) ("The fact that this
Article states a rule does not by itself require, imply or negate application of the same or a
converse rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not specified by this article."). Official
Comment 2 to UCC Section 5-102 notes that application of then UCC Article 5 to a situation not
covered by the statute "is to follow the canon of liberal interpretation to promote underlying
purposes and policies. Since the law of letters of credit is still developing, conscious use of that
canon and attention to fundamental theory by the court are peculiarly appropriate." Id. § 5-102
cmt. 2.
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1. Where Other Legal Regimes
Are Involved in Letter of Credit Disputes
a. Other articles of the Uniform Commercial Code
The starting point for connectivity with other articles of the
Uniform Commercial Code should be Revised UCC Article 3. To
the extent that letters of credit had any historical statutory basis, it
was as a promise to accept a bill of exchange or draft that was not yet
issued or a virtual acceptance. Such undertakings were recognized
by the United States decisional law22' and embodied in section 135
of the Negotiable Instruments Law.2 22  Apart from this theoretical
commonality, letter of credit law and practice originally looked to
the draft or bill of exchange as an undertaking quite different from
other documents to be presented, and drew from the law relating to
drafts many of the principles related to protection of innocent third
parties. Prior UCC Article 5 deferred to UCC Article 3 with respect
to the entitlement to and rights of a holder in due course. 223  While
there were parallels, there were major differences as well, especially
since there was no necessary requirement for presentation of a
negotiable instrument, 224 and a non-negotiable draft or demand could
as readily be "negotiated.
' 225
221. In England in Pillans & Rose v. Van Mierop & Hopkins, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, Lord
Mansfield gave effect to a promise to accept, which was later rejected in a series of decisions and
codified by statutes. See Pierson v. Dunlap, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1246; Bills of Exchange Act,
1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61, § 17 (Eng.) (English statute following court decisions rejected giving
effect to promises to accept); Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., 97, § 6
(Eng.), repealed by Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 96, Sched. 2; accord Coolidge
v. Payson, 15 U.S. 66 (1817) (United States decision following Lord Mansfield).
222. JOSEPH BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED § 135
(Zechariah Chafee, Jr. ed., 4th ed. The W.H. Anderson Co. 1926). Section 135 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law provides "[a]n unconditional promise in writing to accept a bill before it is
drawn is deemed an actual acceptance in favor of every person who, upon the faith thereof,
receives the bill for value." Id.
223. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a) (1957) (amended 1995). Section 5-114(2)(a) affords HIDC status
"under circumstances that would make it a holder in due course (section 3-302)." Id.
224. Of course, a letter of credit, being a conditional promise, is not itself a negotiable
instrument since it is not unconditional. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2003).
225. This state of affairs is implicitly recognized in Prior UCC section 5-114 which speaks of
a "draft or demand." U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1957) (amended 1995). UCP400 Article 21(c) is the
first appearance in the UCP of the word demand in relation to negotiation. It provides "[t]he
issuing bank will be responsible to the paying, accepting or negotiating bank for any loss of
interest if reimbursement is not provided on first demand made to the reimbursing bank, or as
otherwise specified in the credit, or mutually agreed, as the case may be." INT'L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, UNIF. CUSTOMS & PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 21(c) (1984) (ICC
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Revised UCC section 5-116(d) has settled the question of the
relative hierarchy of Articles 3 and 5 with respect to letter of credit
questions, providing that Article 5 prevails in the event of any
conflict.226  But it should be recognized that where one of the
required documents is a UCC Article 3 draft, especially where it is
accepted, a person may have two separate (but not necessarily
parallel) and somewhat similar rights under the letter of credit and
the bill of exchange.
There are cross-references remaining between UCC Articles 3
and 5. Revised UCC section 5-102(b) draws on Article 3 for the
definitions of "accept" and "value.' 227 In particular, it is with respect
to an acceptance that the linkage is strongest, but it is also strong
with respect to the meaning of "value." Revised UCC Article 5 does
not directly address the issue, but a United States court would not
accord protected status to a nominated bank that had not given value
as it is understood in light of Revised UCC section 3-303 and, in
particular, would confer this status with respect to a promise to give
value only to the extent that the promise had been performed or
constituted a negotiable instrument or an independent undertaking.228
Revised UCC section 5-108(i) also refers to UCC Article 3 with
respect to recourse even though the concept in letter of credit law is
not tied to the presence of a negotiable instrument.
229
There is some connectivity between letters of credit and other
articles of the UCC. Revised UCC Article 4 is also mentioned in
Revised UCC section 5-102(b) in connection with the definition of
"value." 230 It is also relevant for issues of the rights and duties of
correspondent banks and documentary collections. The mechanism
of payment or reimbursement can overlap with UCC Article 4A
(Fund Transfers). When required documents include documents of
Pub. No. 400) [hereinafter UCP400].
226. U.C.C. § 5-116(d) (1995).
227. Id. § 5-102(b).
228. Id. Revised UCC section 5-102(b) does cross-reference Revised UCC sections 3-303
and 4-211 with respect to the meaning of "value." See U.C.C. §§ 3-303(a)(1), (4), (5). This issue
is of current interest because UCP600 Article 2 has deleted the term "value" from the definition
of "negotiation" in UCP500 Article 10 and stated that negotiation includes a promise to pay. See
UCP600, supra note 5. While making a promise to pay may be a basis for negotiation in the
sense of transferring the right to be paid under the documents, it is not "value" nor a basis for
protected status and it is likely that this issue will cause some confusion as the cases emerge.
229. See U.C.C. § 5-108(i).
230. See id. § 5-102(b).
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title or securities, Articles 7 and 8 could be involved. There are also
provisions of Revised UCC Article 9 that address obtaining and
perfecting a security interest in a letter of credit.231 To some extent,
the underlying contract could impact letter of credit issues,
particularly where terms such as "FOB" and the like are used, terms
that are defined in Prior UCC Article 2.232 In addition, the question
of what constitutes an acceptance letter of credit in the underlying
contract can involve letter of credit and sales issues.233 The notion of
warranty permeates the UCC and may well overlap with issues that
arise in connection with letters of credit.
In addition, Prior and Revised UCC Article 1 (General
Provisions) have provisions that are applicable to Revised UCC
Article 5, including definitions and general principles of commercial
law. They include the principles of construction, interpretation,
treatment of terms such as notice and receipt of notice, and
evidentiary rules. There is no provision in Revised UCC Article 5
that preempts UCC Article 1 which, by its terms, applies to a
transaction "to the extent that it is governed by another article of [the
Uniform Commercial Code]."234
b. Other statutes and case law
Since the UCC is not an exhaustive treatment of commercial
law, there are other statutes outside the UCC that could impact letter
of credit issues. Where the issue is also governed by or, to an extent,
preempted by federal law, there are also federal statutes or
international conventions that must be considered. Thus, with
respect to warehouse receipts, bills of lading, bank collections,
successors by operation of law, and securities, there are relevant
federal statutes. Many of these issues are also governed by other
state statutes as well.
Perhaps the most important non-UCC statutory scheme that
regularly intersects with letter of credit issues is that related to
231. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312(b)(2), 9-314 (2001).
232. See U.C.C. §§ 2-320 to 2-324 (1957) (amended 2003). Revised UCC Article 2 deletes
references to these terms which conflict with the approach of INCOTERMS as matters for private
rulemaking or terms of the contract and not as matters for statutory concern.
233. See id. § 2-325. This provision is modified in Revised UCC section 2-325. See U.C.C. §
2-325 (2003).
234. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2004).
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insolvency, and bankruptcy in particular. There have been numerous
turf wars between bankruptcy and letters of credit235 including the
treatment of subrogation, 2 36 and most recently, the landlord lease
cap.
237
Beyond these statutes, there are issues that are addressed by case
law, including those matters recognized in Revised UCC section 1-
103 (b) such as the law merchant, capacity, agency, estoppel, and
mistake, 23  and other general issues that are not such as restitution,
injunctive relief, damages, and remedies.
Apart from these commercial matters is the issue of illegality or
similar public policy concepts which, by virtue of statute or
administrative rule, affect letters of credit and the application of
Revised UCC Article 5.239
2. Relationship Between Revised UCC
Article 5 and Other Statutes and Case Law
The relationship between Revised UCC Article 5 and other
articles of the UCC is largely governed by Revised UCC section 5-
235. See In re Twist Cap, Inc., I B.R. 284, 285 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979) (holding that the
bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction over suit by debtor seeking to restrain bank from
honoring letters of credit and that payment amounted to "impermissible preferential treatment of
unsecured creditors"). But see In re N. Shore & Cent. Ill. Freight Co., 30 B.R. 377, 379 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Clothes, Inc., 35 B.R. 487, 489 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1983); Lower Brule Constr.
Co. v. Sheesley's Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 84 B.R. 638, 645 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1988); In re
A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 115 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
236. See Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. and Guar., 968 F.2d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1992)
(noting that a bank which was satisfying its own, rather than another's liability when it made
payment under letter of credit could not avail itself of common law remedy of equitable
subrogation). But see id. at 364-71 (Becker, J., dissenting); U.C.C. § 5-117 cmt. 1 (1995); In re
Slamans, 175 B.R. 762 (N.D. Okla. 1994).
237. Mayan Networks Corp. v. Mayan Networks Corp., 306 B.R. 295 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004)
(holding landlord's draw on letter of credit must be reduced from landlord's allowed unsecured
claim); Carter Klein, Mayan Networks: Cause for Concern for Bankruptcy Caps on Leases (and
Issuers)?, DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD, Sept. 2004, at 27.
238. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2004) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the
Uniform Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement its
provisions.").
239. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, H.R. 3763 (July
30, 2002); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (1 st
Sess. 2001) (enacted); Office of Foreign Assets Control, Interpretive Rulings, OFAC Interp.
Ruling 020416-FACRL-CU-01 (Apr. 16, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcementlofac/rulings/index.shtml (follow "computerized reser-vations systems (Cuba
Travel)" hyperlink).
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1 16(d.) which provides that, in the event of conflict, Revised UCC
Article 5 governs over Articles 3, 4, 4A, and 9.240 The possibility of
direct conflict with the other substantive articles, Article 2, 2A, 6, 7,
and 8 is minimal. Notably missing is a reference to UCC Article
241
With respect to other non-UCC statutes and case law, the
relative hierarchy is less clear. Where the issue involves a letter of
credit issue, it is likely that Revised UCC Article 5 would control as
to letter of credit implications. The issues become more complex
where there is federal law preemption although some federal statutes
are interpreted to defer to state law on commercial matters.
On the issue of illegality, there are public policy factors at issue.
However, from the perspective of letter of credit law, exceptions to
the obligations of parties to letters of credit should be statutory and
narrowly construed.
3. Can Non-UCC Provisions Be Varied?
It is not possible at this stage of Revised UCC Article 5 letter of
credit jurisprudence to give a definitive answer or even identify the
principles that should govern the answer to this question. These
questions will have to be approached on an ad hoc basis.
Some rough indication of the approach of Revised UCC Article
5 itself to these questions can be discerned from its treatment of three
discrete issues addressed in Revised UCC section 5-108(i)(3), (4),
and (5).242 Since these subsections are not listed in Revised UCC
section 5-103(c), 243 they are variable unless they can be linked to one
of the provisions listed or otherwise are determined to be
nonvariable.
Under Revised UCC section 3-414, an endorser undertakes to
pay the amount of a draft to a person entitled to enforce the
instrument or a subsequent endorser who paid.244 Where the issuer
honored a presentation that included a draft drawn on the applicant,
240. See U.C.C. § 5-116(d) (1995).
241. See id.
242. Id. § 5-108(i). Revised UCC section 5-108(i) provides "[a]n issuer that has honored a
presentation as permitted or required by this article: ... (3) is precluded from asserting a right of
recourse on a draft under sections 3-414 and 3-415 .... Id.
243. Id. § 5-103(c).
244. U.C.C. § 3-414 (2003).
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Revised UCC section 5-108(i)(3) precludes an issuer from claiming
against anyone who has endorsed the draft or the beneficiary for its
non payment under UCC Article 3. While the right to recourse can
be varied under UCC Article 3 by endorsing without recourse, the
Revised UCC Article 5 rule provides for non-recourse. To vary this
provision would significantly alter the undertaking of the issuer,
namely to entitle it to escape its obligations in contravention of the
obligations of an issuer. A court could refuse to allow it to be varied
under public policy grounds, because it contradicted what constituted
a letter of credit (nonvariable), because it was manifestly
unreasonable (or bad faith), or because it violated the independence
principle (also nonvariable). Even if the letter of credit attempts to
vary the rule under Revised UCC section 3-414 on recourse, such a
variation would not alter the letter of credit conclusion that it should
not be varied. Also, because Revised UCC Article 5 controls over
UCC Article 3, it would not trump.
The question of whether an issuer can obtain restitution from a
beneficiary where it has mistakenly honored notwithstanding the
presence of discrepancies on the face of the documents presents
similar issues. Revised UCC section 5-108(i)(4) represents a policy
determination that defeats the equitable law of mistake.245 Whether
this provision can be varied by making the law of mistake control
presents a difficult question. For similar policy reasons tied to the
nature of the letter of credit undertaking, the result would probably
be similar to that suggested for recourse.
If a letter of credit provided that the beneficiary bore the risk
that a stranger would forge documents under the letter of credit,
assuming that the provision were conspicuous, such a provision
would be more likely to be enforced. While an unusual provision
that most beneficiaries would not accept, it is a risk allocation that
could be made. The difficulty in its enforcement is that a common
law court would have several general grounds on which it could
refuse enforcement if it believed that the beneficiary had been
overtaken by surprise.
While none of these provisions are definitive, they do illustrate
issues on which Revised UCC Article 5 has spoken. How a court
would or should approach issues on which it has not spoken is not
245. U.C.C. § 5-108(i)(4) (1995).
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clear and little can be gathered from these issues.
At the most, several factors can be identified and stated in
general terms:
1) The general principle of Revised UCC Article 5 in favor
of liberal variability should apply to all provisions
regarding letters of credit. In addition, other policy
considerations underlying restrictions on variability of
Revised UCC Article 5 provisions should also be noted.
2) In addition to attending to Revised UCC Article 5's
policies towards variability, other fundamental policies of
Revised UCC Article 5 should be considered and furthered
to the extent possible, in particular the alignment of the law
with mercantile practice and the concern for the integrity of
the undertaking.
3) Where there are dual obligations, one under the law of
letter of credit and the other under another legal regime, the
variability of the letter of credit obligations should be
determined by letter of credit policy without undue regard
for whether different results are produced.
4) Whether there is a statutory restriction or statement
regarding the variability of these provisions or case law on
the question, and, if so, its policy underpinnings.
D. Variation by Adopting Rules of Practice
As indicated previously, one of the means of varying the law
under letters of credit subject to Revised UCC Article 5 is to issue a
letter of credit subject to rules of practice such as UCP500,
246
246. The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) is promulgated by
the Commission on Banking Technique and Practice of the International Chamber of Commerce
headquartered in Paris, France. It articulates standard international commercial letter of credit
practice. The current revision, ICC Publication No. 500 (UCP500), became effective January
1994. UPC500, supra note 5, reprinted in LC RULES AND LAWS: CRITICAL TEXTS, supra note 3,
at 1. Prior versions were issued in 1933 (UCP74), 1951 (UCP151), 1962 (UCP222), 1974
(UCP290), and 1983 (UCP400). Although UCP500 has been translated into virtually every
language in which international commerce is conducted, the official version is in English and care
must be taken with translations as it is reported that they are of uneven quality. See generally
JAMES E. BYRNE, ISP98 & UCP500 COMPARED (2000); Katherine A. Barski, Letters of Credit: A
Comparison of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits, 41 LoY. L. REV. 735 (1996); Ross P. Buckley, The 1993
Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits, 28 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 265 (1996); James E. Byrne, Ten Major Stages in the Evolution of Letter of
Credit Practice, DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 28; Dan Taylor, The
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UCP600, 247 or ISP98. 248  Unlike the regime in effect under Prior
non-conforming UCC section 5-102(4), under which the adoption of
rules of practice operated to oust the applicability of the statute,
249
the issuance of a letter of credit subject to rules of practice would
generally have the effect of supplementing Revised UCC Article 5,
and varying its variable provisions to an extent.
1. True Conflicts Between
Revised UCC Article 5 and Rules of Practice
Because many of the provisions of Revised UCC Article 5 are
variable and its scope of coverage is modest, particularly with
respect to issues of documentary compliance, there is limited scope
for true conflicts between rules of practice and the statute. Even
where there is an apparent conflict, the rules of practice will supplant
History of the UCP, DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD, Dec. 1999, at 11.
247. The revision of UCP500, the 2006 Revision of Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (ICC Publication No. 600) will be effective July 1, 2007. See UPC600,
supra note 5; see also John F. Dolan, Discounting Deferred Payment Obligations, DCINSIGHT,
Oct.-Dec. 2005, reprinted in 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 65, at 62; Jeremy Smith,
Documentary Credits: What Law Should Apply?, DCINSIGHT, Oct.-Dec. 2005, reprinted in 2006
ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 65, at 62; Bojan Zidar, Another Take on Negotiation, DCINSIGHT,
Oct.-Dec. 2005, reprinted in 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 65, at 62; Donald R. Smith,
Reasonable Time-A US Perspective, DCINSIGHT, Oct.-Dec. 2005, reprinted in 2006 ANNUAL
SURVEY, supra note 65, at 62; E.P. Ellinger, The UCP-500: Considering A New Revision,
LLOYD'S MAR. AND COM. L. Q., Feb. 2004, reprinted in 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 65,
at 101.
248. Rules for standby letters of credit, the International Standby Practices (ISP), were drafted
in 1997. The text was finalized and adopted by the International Financial Services Association
(formerly the United States Council on International Banking), and by the International Chamber
of Commerce in 1998, to become effective on January 1, 1999 ("ISP98"). ISP98, supra note 142.
ISP98 is published in ICC Pub. No. 590. Id.; see JAMES E. BYRNE, THE OFFICIAL COMMENTARY
ON THE INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACTICES (1998) [hereinafter BYRNE, OFFICIAL
COMMENTARY] (explaining the ISP98 rules); see also James E. Byrne, Separate Rules for
Standby Letters of Credit: Fall 1997 Draft ISP (International Standby Practices),
DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD, Dec. 1997, at 30; James E. Byrne, Standby Rulemaking: A
Glimpse at the Elements of Standardization and Harmonization of Banking Practice, in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 135 (1998).
Information on the text of the ISP98 and educational tools may be obtained from The Institute of
International Banking Law & Practice, Inc., P.O. Box 2235, Montgomery Village, MD 20886 or
at www.iiblp.org. There are also rules that have been drafted by the ICC for independent
guarantees, namely, the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees or URDG. INT'L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, ICC UNIFORM RULES FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES (1992) (ICC Publication No.
4580) [hereinafter URDG]; see also ROY GOODE, GUIDE TO THE ICC UNIFORM RULES FOR
DEMAND GUARANTEES (1992) (providing supplementary information on the URDG); Georges
Affaki, ICC UNIFORM RULES FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES: A USER'S HANDBOOK TO THE URDG
(2001).
249. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (1957) (amended 1995).
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variable provisions of the statute in most situations. Only two types
of rules of practice raise issues of this type. Section 5-116(c)(iii)
provides that applicable rules of practice "govern except to the extent
of any conflict with the nonvariable provisions specified in section 5-
103(c). ' '251 Official Comment 3 to this section states the inverse of
this proposition, namely that "incorporation of the UCP or other
practice does not override the nonvariable terms of Article 5. ' ' 251
a. Definitions
UCP500, UCP600, and ISP98 contain definitions of terms that
are also defined in Revised UCC Article 5. Most notably, UCP600
Article 2 contains definitions of the terms "issuer" and "letter of
credit," terms that are expressly stated in Revised UCC section 5-
102(c) to be an exception to the rule that the provisions of Revised
UCC Article 5 may be varied even if other definitions can be revised
by rules of practice.252
Any conflict here, however, is more apparent than real. The
"definitions" in UCP500, ISP98 Rule 1.09 (Defined Terms), and
UCP600 Article 2 (Definitions) are more often explanations of the
meaning of the term in practice rather than true definitions. Even
where they are definitions, they apply to the use of these terms in
their respective rules and not to their absolute meaning or their
meaning insofar as the terms are used in Revised UCC Article 5253
Thus, the definition of a "credit" as an "irrevocable" undertaking
in UCP600 Article 2 (Definitions) (Paragraph 8) does not mean that
a letter of credit which is issued in revocable form is not a "credit"
for purposes of Revised UCC Article 5.254 Because UCP600 is a rule
250. U.C.C. § 5-116(c)(iii) (1995).
251. Id. § 5-103 cmt. 2 ("Where the UCP are adopted but conflict with Article 5 and except
where variation is prohibited, the UCP terms are permissible contractual modifications under
sections 1-102(3) and 5-103(c)." (emphasis added)).
252. See id. § 5-102(c).
253. For example, ISP98 Rule 1.01(d) (Scope and Application) defines the term "standby" as
an undertaking that is subject to the ISP. This "definition" does not pretend to have any effect
beyond the interpretation of ISP98. ISP98, supra note 142.
254. Revised UCC Section 5-102(a)(10) provides:
"Letter of credit" means a definite undertaking that satisfies the requirements of
Section 5-104 by an issuer to a beneficiary at the request or for the account of an
applicant or, in the case of a financial institution, to itself or for its own account, to
honor a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of an item of value.
U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(10).
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of practice and not law, its scope provisions can be varied by
agreement and made applicable to any undertaking. 255  Nor does it
mean that the term "definite" in the definition of "credit" in UCP600
has the same meaning as the same term used in Revised section 5-
102(a)(10) ("Letter of Credit"). As defined in UCP600, "definite"
connotes the notion of irrevocability, 256 whereas in Revised UCC
Article 5, it means undertakings that are otherwise too vague to be
enforced as letter of credit undertakings. Thus, even where it is
irrevocable, an undertaking that was denominated a letter of credit
would not be a letter of credit were it to lack any mechanism for
determining the amount due, the identity of the beneficiary, or the
identity of the issuer.
Thus, although there may be differences in definitions, there is
no conflict between those in the statute and the rules.
b. Disclaimers
As indicated, section 5-103(c) provides that obligations
prescribed by it are not sufficient to vary by "[a] term in an
agreement or undertaking generally excusing liability or generally
limiting remedies for failure to perform obligations .... ,257
255. On a practical level, it would be preferable to use UCP500 for a revocable letter of credit
since UCP600 does not contain any practical rules that address issues raised by revocable letters
of credit, whereas UCP500 Articles 6 (Revocable v. Irrevocable Credits) and 8 (Revocation of a
Credit) do. Compare UCP500, supra note 5, with UCP600, supra note 5.
256. UCP600 Article 2 (Definitions) Paragraph 8 ("Credit") states: "[c]redit means any
arrangement, however named or described, that is irrevocable and thereby constitutes a definite
undertaking of the issuing bank to honour a complying presentation." UCP600, supra note 5.
This approach is similar to UCP500 Article 2 (Meaning of Credit) which provides:
For the purposes of these Articles, the expressions "Documentary Credit(s)" and
"Standby Letter(s) of Credit" (hereinafter referred to as "Credit(s)"), mean any
arrangement, however named or described, whereby a bank (the "Issuing Bank")
acting at the request and on the instructions of a customer (the "Applicant") or on its
own behalf,
i. is to make a payment to or to the order of a third party (the "Beneficiary"), or is
to accept and pay bills of exchange (Draft(s)) drawn by the Beneficiary, or
ii. authorises another bank to effect such payment, or to accept and pay such bills
of... exchange (Draft(s)), or
iii. authorises another bank to negotiate, against stipulated document(s), provided
that the terms and conditions of the Credit are complied with.
For the purpose of these Articles, branches of a bank in different countries are
considered another bank.
UCP500, supra note 5.
257. U.C.C. § 5-103(c).
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This provision raises the question of whether the disclaimers
appearing in UCP500, ISP98, and UCP600 are enforceable.
While the provisions contained in UCP500 Article 15, UCP600,
and ISP98 Rule 1.08 may arguably be classified as an attempt at a
general excuse of liability, they reflect the independence principle
established in Revised UCC sections 5-103(d) and 5-109 and should
be given effect as supplementing the provisions of Revised UCC
Article 5.
On the other hand, the disclaimers in UCP500 Articles 16, 17,
and 18 are general and not reflected in Revised UCC Article 5. Even
apart from the provision in Revised UCC section 5-103(c), it may be
doubted whether a court would permit a bank to excuse its liability
for the translation of a document that it undertook, particularly where
the letter of credit did not require that documents be presented in a
particular language. 258  It may also be doubted that a bank could
disclaim losses resulting from a loss, or delay resulting from its own
negligence simply based on these formulae. Under Revised UCC
section 5-103(c), it is doubtful that they could be enforced as written
without more specific provisions in the letter of credit. The question
for a UCP500 credit is whether the court would be prepared to
interpret them in order to enforce them in situations where the loss,
error, or other problem was caused by another person.
However, Force Majeure provisions, such as those contained in
UCP500 Article 17 (Force Majeure) and UCP600 Article 36 (Force
Majeure), are typically enforced where they relate to the actions of
another person since they represent a generally accepted allocation of
risk.
The disclaimer for the acts of instructed persons contained in
258. ISP98 Rule 4.04 provides "The language of all documents issued by the beneficiary is to
be that of the standby." ISP98, supra note 142. Following this provision, ISBP Paragraph 26
provides:
Under international standard banking practice, it is expected that documents issued by
the beneficiary will be in the language of the credit. When a credit states that
documents in two or more languages are acceptable, a nominated bank may, in its
advice of the credit, limit the number of acceptable languages as a condition of its
engagement in the credit or confirmation.
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BANKING PRACTICE para. 26
(2003) [hereinafter ISBP]. These provisions make it clear that a letter of credit must require that
a document be in a specific language in order to refuse to take (and translate) a document in
another language. Whether or not an issuer or confirmer translates such a document, it is
responsible for its content.
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UCP500 Article 18 and UCP600 Article 37 are probably enforceable,
with the exception of a situation where the instructing party is
directed to ask a certain person to perform an action and requests a
different person to perform the action without any compelling
reason.
UCP600 Article 35 limits the scope of the disclaimer regarding
the loss of documents. While this disclaimer could not be enforced
against a beneficiary that can prove that it has presented complying
documents in a timely manner, it should be enforceable by a bank
claiming reimbursement.
These disclaimers are significantly restricted in ISP98 Rule 1.08
(Limits to Responsibilities) 259 and 8.01 (Right to Reimbursement)
260
in a manner intended to make them enforceable under Revised UCC
section 5-103(c).
2. Variable Provisions of
Revised UCC Article 5 That Are Varied by
the Issuance of a Letter of Credit Subject to Rules of Practice
The adoption of rules of practice can affect or supplement
discrete provisions of Revised UCC Article 5. These rules include:
259. ISP98 Rule 1.08 provides:
An issuer is not responsible for:
a. performance or breach of any underlying transaction;
b. accuracy, genuineness, or effect of any document presented under the standby;
c. action or omission of others even if the other person is chosen by the issuer or
nominated person; or
d. observance of law or practice other than that chosen in the standby or applicable at
the place of issuance.
ISP98, supra note 142, R. 1.08.
260. ISP98 Rule 8.01 provides:
a. Where payment is made against a complying presentation in accordance with these
Rules, reimbursement must be made by: i. an applicant to an issuer requested to issue a
standby; and ii. an issuer to a person nominated to honour or otherwise give value.
b. An applicant must indemnify the issuer against all claims, obligations, and
responsibilities (including attorney's fees) arising out of: i. the imposition of law or
practice other than that chosen in the standby or applicable at the place of issuance; ii.
the fraud, forgery, or illegal action of others; or iii. the issuer's performance of the
obligations of a confirmer that wrongfully dishonours a confirmation.
c. This Rule supplements any applicable agreement, course of dealing, practice, custom
or usage providing for reimbursement or indemnification on lesser or other grounds.
Id. R. 8.01.
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a. Effectiveness of a letter of credit or an amendment
Revised UCC section 5-106(a) states the general rule that a letter
of credit is issued and becomes enforceable "when the issuer sends
or otherwise transmits it to the person requested to advise or to the
beneficiary." 261 Since there are situations where it is intended that a
standby letter of credit not come into effect at the time that it is
delivered, ISP98 Rule 2.03 varies this rule by providing that terms in
a standby clearly specify that "it is not then 'issued' or
'enforceable. ,, 262
b. Amendment without beneficiary consent
One of the characteristics of an irrevocable letter of credit is that
it cannot be cancelled or amended without the consent of any person
who is entitled to rely on its terms (at least insofar as his rights are
affected). This provision is stated in Revised UCC section 5-106(b)
which provides:
[a]fter a letter of credit is issued, rights and obligations of a
beneficiary, applicant, confirmer, and issuer are not affected
by an amendment or cancellation to which that person has
not consented except to the extent the letter of credit
provides that it is revocable or that the issuer may amend or
cancel the letter of credit without that consent.
263
ISP98 contains two situations where the issuer may amend
without consent: (1) where there is a transfer by operation of law and
(2) where the issuer is closed on the deadline for presentation that
falls on a banking day that it would otherwise be open. These
provisions supplement Revised UCC section 5-106(b) and should be
enforced because they provide an alternative means of presentation
that would not otherwise be available and both are expressly limited
by a rule of reasonableness.
Under ISP98 Rule 3.14, the issuer is empowered to name
another place for presentation if the place for presentation is closed
on the last business day for presentation. 264  To protect the
261. U.C.C. § 5-106(a).
262. ISP98, supra note 142, R. 2.03. This general rule stated in Revised UCC Section 5-
106(a) is also reflected in UCP600 Articles 7(b) and 8(b). UCP500 does not address this issue
but assumes and remains consistent with the provision in Revised UCC Article 5.
263. U.C.C. § 5-106(b).
264. ISP98 Rule 3.14 provides:
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beneficiary, it must have received the communication informing it of
the change, and the alternative place selected must be reasonable. In
such a situation, there are at least thirty calendar days available
within which the beneficiary can make presentation.
Under ISP98 Rule 6.12, a claimed successor to the beneficiary is
required to present a document regarding its claim in addition to
those documents required under the terms of the letter of credit.265
While this provision is similar to Revised UCC section 5-113 and
does not displace it, Rule 6.12 supplements Section 5-113 by
specifying the documents that are to be presented and that may be
required.2 6 6
UCP600 Article 10(c) also contains a provision that purports to
effect an amendment without the beneficiary's consent.267  Insofar as
a. If on the last business day for presentation the place for presentation stated in a
standby is for any reason closed and presentation is not timely made because of the
closure, then the last day for presentation is automatically extended to the day
occurring thirty calendar days after the place for presentation re-opens for business,
unless the standby otherwise provides.
b. Upon or in anticipation of closure of the place of presentation, an issuer may
authorise another reasonable place for presentation in the standby or in a
communication received by the beneficiary. If it does so, then
i. presentation must be made at that reasonable place; and
ii. if the communication is received fewer than thirty calendar days before the last
day for presentation and for that reason presentation is not timely made, the last
day for presentation is automatically extended to the day occurring thirty calendar
days after the last day for presentation.
ISP98, supra note 142, R. 3.14.
265. ISP98 Rule 6.12 provides:
A claimed successor may be treated as if it were an authorised transferee of a
beneficiary's drawing rights in their entirety if it presents an additional document or
documents which appear to be issued by a public official or representative (including a
judicial officer) and indicate:
a. that the claimed successor is the survivor of a merger, consolidation, or similar
action of a corporation, limited liability company, or other similar organization;
b. that the claimed successor is authorised or appointed to act on behalf of the
named beneficiary or its estate because of an insolvency proceeding;
c. that the claimed successor is authorized or appointed to act on behalf of the
named beneficiary because of death or incapacity; or
d. that the name of the named beneficiary has been changed to that of the claimed
successor.
Id. R. 6.12. ISP98 also entitles the issuer to require additional information and documentation
although these documents need not be presented prior to the expiration of the letter of credit. Id.
R. 6.13.
266. See U.C.C. § 5-113.
267. UCP600 Article 10(c) provides:
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this provision implies consent from an action that unambiguously
indicates acceptance of the amendment, it is unobjectionable.
Where, however, it is applied to a presentation that could operate
under the credit with or without the amendment, it seeks to imply
consent from an ambiguous situation.
If given effect, this provision would operate to amend an
irrevocable UCP600 letter of credit. 268 Accordingly, it should not be
given effect where the beneficiary's presentation is ambiguous as to
consent because the provision undermines the irrevocable character
of the letter of credit.
c. Obligation of adviser to advise accurately
Revised UCC section 5-107(c) provides that an "[a]dviser
undertakes to the issuer and to the beneficiary accurately to advise
the terms of the letter of credit .... ,, 269  While ISP98 and UCP600
also refer to the accuracy of advice, 270 UCP500 Article 7(a) only
The terms and conditions of the original credit (or a credit incorporating previously
accepted amendments) will remain in force for the beneficiary until the beneficiary
communicates its acceptance of the amendment to the bank that advised such
amendment. The beneficiary should give notification of acceptance or rejection of an
amendment. If the beneficiary fails to give such notification, a presentation that
complies with the credit and to any not yet accepted amendment will be deemed to be
notification of acceptance by the beneficiary of such amendment. As of that moment
the credit will be amended.
UCP600, supra note 5.
268. For example, if under a letter of credit for 1000 units of X product with partial shipments
permitted and a latest shipment date of July 1, an amendment is proposed altering the latest date
for shipment to July 15 to which the beneficiary does not respond, it is ambiguous whether a
shipment by the beneficiary of 500 units of X product under the credit constitutes acceptance of
the amendment. However, under UCP600 Article 10(c), as of August 2006, such a shipment
would in fact constitute acceptance of the amendment. Id.
269. Revised UCC Section 5-107(c) provides:
A person requested to advise may decline to act as an adviser. An adviser that is not a
confirmer is not obligated to honor or give value for a presentation. An adviser
undertakes to the issuer and to the beneficiary accurately to advise the terms of the
letter of credit, confirmation, amendment, or advice received by that person and
undertakes to the beneficiary to check the apparent authenticity of the request to
advise. Even if the advice is inaccurate, the letter of credit, confirmation, or
amendment is enforceable as issued.
U.C.C. § 5-107(c).
270. ISP98, supra note 142, R. 2.05. ISP98 Rule 2.05(a) provides: "Unless an advice states
otherwise, it signifies that: (i). the advisor has checked the apparent authenticity of the advised
message in accordance with standard letter of credit practice; and (ii) the advice accurately
reflects what has been received. Id. UCP600 Article 9(b) provides: By advising the credit or
amendment, the advising bank signifies that it has satisfied itself as to the apparent authenticity of
the credit or amendment and that the advice accurately reflects the terms and conditions of the
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refers to taking "reasonable care to check the apparent authenticity of
the Credit which it advises."27'
While the better interpretation of "check the apparent
authenticity" includes the accuracy of the data that is being
272communicated, it could be argued that the phrase excludes liability
for the accuracy of an advice. If this argument is given effect, it
would vary Revised UCC section 5-107(c) (Confirmer, Nominated
Person, and Adviser) and, as such, should be given effect since it is
not manifestly unreasonable even if it touches on matters of the
reasonableness, diligence, or care of an obligation.
273
d. Time within which to examine documents
Revised UCC section 5-108(b) provides for a reasonable time
within which to examine documents not beyond the seventh banking
day following the day of presentation. 274  This rule reflects that of
UCP500 Articles 13(a) and 14(d).275
credit or amendment received. UCP600, supra note 5, art. 9(b).
271. UCP500 Article 7(a) provides:
A Credit may be advised to a Beneficiary through another bank (the "Advising Bank")
without engagement on the part of the Advising Bank, but that bank, if it elects to
advise the Credit, shall take reasonable care to check the apparent authenticity of the
Credit which it advises. If the bank elects not to advise the Credit, it must so inform
the Issuing Bank without delay.
UCP500, supra note 5, art. 7(a).
272. It is a preferable argument that in its context "apparent authenticity" includes not only
the authenticity of the sender, but also that the data has been apparently transmitted without error
or disruption.
273. The outcome, however, might be even more unfavorable to the advising bank. A
common law court, for example, might impose a judicial rule to the same effect in the absence of
an express provision excluding any liability for the accuracy of an advice. More fundamentally,
the court might interpret the transmission as a letter of credit issued by the advising bank (since it
is not the letter of credit issued by the issuer), exposing the advising bank to the strict liability of
the issuer rather than liability for reasonably foreseeable damages that were caused by the
misadvice as permitted under the regime of Revised UCC section 5-107(c). See U.C.C. § 5-
107(c) (1995).
274. Revised UCC Section 5-108(b) provides
An issuer has a reasonable time after presentation, but not beyond the end of the
seventh business day of the issuer after the day of its receipt of documents:
(1) to honor,
(2) if the letter of credit provides for honor to be completed more than seven
business days after presentation, to accept a draft or incur a deferred obligation, or
(3) to give notice to the presenter of discrepancies in the presentation.
Id. § 5-108(b).
275. UCP500 Article 13(a) provides:
382 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:297
This time frame, however, is qualified and effectively varied by
ISP98 Rule 5.01(a) which provides for a three business day "safe
harbour," and the seven business day maximum. 276  It is also
qualified by ISP98 Rule 3.14 in a situation where the place for
presentation is closed on the latest business day for presentation.277
UCP600 Article 14(b), on the other hand, takes a different
approach. It provides:
[a] nominated bank acting on its nomination, a confirming
bank, if any, and the issuing bank shall each have a
maximum of five banking days following the day of
presentation to determine if a presentation is complying.
This period does not depend on any upcoming expiry date
Banks must examine all documents stipulated in the Credit with reasonable care, to
ascertain whether or not they appear, on their face, to be in compliance with the terms
and conditions of the Credit. Compliance of the stipulated documents on their face
with the terms and conditions of the Credit, shall be determined by international
standard banking practice as reflected in these Articles. Documents which appear on
their face to be inconsistent with one another will be considered as not appearing on
their face to be in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit.
500Dfocuments not stipulated in the Credit will not be examined by banks. If they
receive such documents, they shall return them to the presenter or pass them on
without responsibility.
UCP500, supra note 5, art. 13(a).
UCP500 Article 14(d) provides:
i. If the Issuing Bank and/or Confirming Bank, if any, or a Nominated Bank acting on
their behalf, decides to refuse the documents, it must give notice to that effect by
telecommunication or, if that is not possible, by other expeditious means, without delay
but no later than the close of the seventh banking day following the day of receipt of
the documents. Such notice shall be given to the bank from which it received the
documents, or to the Beneficiary, if it received the documents directly from him.
ii. Such notice must state all discrepancies in respect of which the bank refuses the
documents and must also state whether it is holding the documents at the disposal of,
or is returning them to, the presenter.
iii. The Issuing Bank and/or Confirming Bank, if any, shall then be entitled to claim
from the remitting bank refund, with interest, of any reimbursement which has been
made to that bank.
Id. art. 14(d).
276. ISP98 Rule 5.01(a) provides that a standby expressly states that it is subject to
"automatic amendment" by an increase or decrease in the amount available, an extension of the
expiration date, or the like, the amendment is effective automatically without any further
notification or consent beyond that expressly provided for in the standby. Such an amendment
may also be referred to as becoming effective "without amendment". BYRNE, OFFICIAL
COMMENTARY, supra note 248.
277. See ISP98, supra note 142. In this sense, both ISP98 Rule 3.13 and UCP500 Article 43
expand the seven day expiration date although in a more limited sense in that they carry it to the
next business day. ISP98 operates with the same effect on any deadline.
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or last day for presentation.
278
Instead of referring to a reasonable time not to exceed seven banking
(or business) days, it provides for five banking days. It also contains
no mention of the phrase "reasonable time. 279
e. Notice of refusal
Revised UCC section 5-108(b)(3) requires that there be a notice
of refusal, and provides in section 5-108(c) that the bank is precluded
"from asserting as a basis of dishonor any discrepancy if timely
notice is not given, or any discrepancy not stated in the notice if
timely notice is given." 280 A UCC Article 5 notice of refusal must
indicate that the documents are being refused, state at least one
discrepancy, and be timely.
UCP500 Article 14(d)(ii) also requires that the notice "must
state all discrepancies in respect of which the bank refuses the
documents .... 281 UCP600 Article 16 also requires that the notice
state "each discrepancy in respect of which the bank refuses to
honour or negotiate." 282  These provisions expand the scope of
Revised UCC Article 5 and, in effect, vary it.
f Standard of compliance
Revised UCC section 5-108(e) requires observance of the
"standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters
of credit."
283
UCP500, UCP600, and ISP98 all provide extensive detail on
what constitutes standard international letter of credit practice and
278. UCP600, supra note 5.
279. Id.
280. U.C.C. § 5-108(b)(3), (c), (d) (1995).
281. UCP500 Article 14(d)(ii) provides "[s]uch notice must state all discrepancies in respect
of which the bank refuses the documents and must also state whether it is holding the documents
at the disposal of, or is returning them to, the presenter." UCP500, supra note 5, art. 14(d)(ii).
282. ISP98 Rule 5.03 does not invoke the preclusion rule for failure to state the disposition of
the documents. In a sense, by not providing for a sanction, it may vary the requirement of
Revised UCC section 5-108(h) which provides "[a]n issuer that has dishonored a presentation
shall return the documents or hold them at the disposal of, and send advice to that effect to, the
presenter." Compare ISP98, supra note 142, R. 5.03, with U.C.C. § 5-108(h) (1995).
283. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (1995) ("An issuer shall observe standard practice of financial
institutions that regularly issue letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's observance of the
standard practice is a matter of interpretation for the court. The court shall offer the parties a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence of the standard practice.").
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each has or, in the case of UCP600, anticipates a system by which
standard international letter of credit practice is unfolded.284
These systems provide a detailed gloss on what constitutes
standard international letter of credit practice and, in effect, vary the
provisions of Revised UCC Article 5.
g. Fraud and forgery
The provisions in UCP500 and UCP600, and the disclaimers in
UCP500 Article 15 (Disclaimer on Effectiveness of Documents) and
UCP600 Article 34 (Disclaimer on Effectiveness of Documents) do
not exclude or vary the fraud and forgery provisions of Revised UCC
section 5-109. The latter provisions constitute a systematic statement
of letter of credit law on the issue of letter of credit fraud and
incorporate standard international letter of credit practice with
respect to protected parties. ISP98 Rule 1.05(c) expressly defers to
applicable law for these matters.
28 5
h. Other rules
This article focuses on the effects of UCP500, ISP98, and
UCP600 because these rules are the most significant rules that
impact Revised UCC Article 5. It must be noted, that other rules, not
addressed here, may also impact Revised UCC Article 5. These
include the SWIFT protocols that govern the transmission and advice
of letters of credit, amendments, and bank to bank messages.286 To
some extent, these protocols will impact bank communications
between members of SWIFT and the beneficiary. Unlike letter of
284. For UCP500, this system of standard international letter of credit practice consists of the
rules of the UCP itself, their meaning in light of prior revisions of the UCP, the International
Standard Banking Practices (ISBP), the Decisions and Opinions of the ICC Banking Commission,
DocDex opinions, and relevant court decisions. It is likely that a similar system will come into
place for UCP600. ISP98 is supported by The Official Commentary on the International Standby
Practices. BYRNE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 248. It has not been necessary to issue
any opinions interpreting it.
285. ISP98 Rule 1.05 provides: "These Rules do not define or otherwise provide for: (a)
power or authority to issue a standby; (b) formal requirements for execution of a standby (e.g. a
signed writing); or (c) defenses to honour based on fraud, abuse, or similar matters. These
matters are left to applicable law." ISP98, supra note 142, R. 1.05.
286. SWIFT is the financial industry-owned co-operative supplying secure, standardized
messaging services and interface software to 7,800 financial institutions in more than 200
countries. SWIFT's worldwide community includes banks, broker/dealers, and investment
managers, as well as their market infrastructures in payments, securities, treasury and trade. Most
letters of credit are communicated by means of SWIFT's 700 message series. See generally
SWIFT-Home, http://www.swift.com (last visited Nov. 23, 2006).
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credit rules, letters of credit are not issued subject to the SWIFT
protocols which are only binding on members of SWIFT. In most
cases, these protocols will not impact non banks but there are some
situations where they could. The Uniform Rules for Demand
Guarantees ("URDG") could also impact standbys or independent
guarantees issued subject to them and within the scope of Revised
UCC Article 5. However, virtually none have been so issued to
date.287 The eUCP also impacts Revised UCC Article 5 with respect
to electronic presentations.288
i. Observations
Even where the letter of credit is also subject to rules of standard
practice, the court should also have reference to Revised UCC
Article 5 where it more accurately reflects that standard of
289practice.
3. Variation by Application of Rules of Practice as Usage of Trade
Even where a letter of credit is not issued subject to rules of
287. Effective April 1, 1996 United States banks have been expressly authorized to issue bank
or first demand guarantees provided that they are independent. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1016-1017
(2000). The regulation suggests that the independent character of the undertaking can be made
apparent by application of "rules of practice recognized by law." The footnote to that statement
provides:
Examples of such laws or rules of practice include: The applicable version of Article 5
of the Uniform Commercial Code... or revised Article 5 of the UCC.. .; the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits...; the International Standby
Practices...; the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by
Letters of Credit...; and the Uniform Rules for Bank-to-Bank Reimbursements Under
Documentary Credits...; as any of the foregoing may be amended from time to time.
Id. § 7.1016 n.1.
288. Faced with increasing emphasis in commercial circles on the utilization of electronic
data in lieu of paper documents, the letter of credit community, acting through the Commission
on Banking Technique and Practice of the ICC, formulated a supplement to the Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) to accommodate electronic presentations. The
rules, known as the eUCP, themselves incorporate UCP500 and supplement its rules and
definitions with respect to electronic presentations under credits that are expressly issued subject
to the eUCP. EUCP, supra note 106, reprinted in LC RULES AND LAWS: CRITICAL TEXTS, supra
note 3, at 25. There are 12 numbered eUCP Articles identified with an "e" preceding them so as
to prevent confusion when citing them in contrast to the articles of UCP500. See BYRNE &
TAYLOR, supra note 106.
289. One clear example would be a question regarding assignment for a standby that is
subject to ISP98. The provisions in Prior UCC Section 5-116 are unworkable and misstate letter
of credit practice. This issue is clarified in ISP98 Rule 6.08. If a court in such a situation cannot
base its decision solely on these provisions, it should have recourse to Revised UCC section 5-
114(d) even if the standby were also subject to Prior UCC Article 5.
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practice, they may result in variation of Revised UCC Article 5
where the court draws on them to interpret the terms and conditions
of the letter of credit as usage of trade.
In UCC jurisprudence, the term "agreement" would be applied
to a letter of credit.29°  In order to determine the meaning of an
agreement, one would look not only to the agreement in fact (in the
case of a letter of credit, its express terms), but also to the context of
that agreement including the course of performance of the
agreement, prior dealings between the parties, and usages in the trade
in which the parties are involved.29' Usage of trade includes rules of
practice. Where the undertaking is expressly subject to these rules,
they are relevant as a provision of the undertaking and not by being
inferred by a rule of interpretation. In the hierarchy of Revised
section 1-303(e), the relative priority of an inferred usage of trade is
lower than course of performance and course of dealing, and all are
290. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2004) ('Agreement,' as distinguished from 'contract', means the
bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances,
including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in section 1-
303."). Prior UCC Section 1-201(3) is similar, stating:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or
course of performance as provided in this Act (sections 1-205, 2-208, and 2A-207).
Whether an agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provisions of the
Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts (section 1-103).
U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1957).
291. U.C.C. § 1-303 (2004). Revised UCC section 1-303 defines all three terms and provides
rules for their application to an undertaking. It provides the definitions in subsections a-c, which
state:
(a) A "course of performance" is a sequence of conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction that exists if:
(1) the agreement of the parties with respect to the transaction involves repeated
occasions for performance by a party; and
(2) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it, accepts the performance or acquiesces in it without
objection.
(b) A "course of dealing" is a sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions
between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct.
(c) A "usage of trade" is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be
observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a
usage must be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a
trade code or similar record, the interpretation of the record is a question of law.
Id. These provisions are similar to those of Prior UCC Sections 1-205 and 2-208.
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subject to express terms.
As a result, even where a letter of credit was not issued subject
to rules of practice, a court could look to rules of practice to interpret
its provisions, assuming that it concluded (as is reasonable) that they
represented a usage of trade. Moreover, the court could draw on
these rules as a usage of trade to vary variable provisions of Revised
UCC Article 5. The question is whether such an approach is
appropriate.
With respect to letters of credit, the answer is "not always." The
difficulty with the undiscriminating application of general rules of
interpretation to letters of credit is that, unlike many general areas of
commercial law, there is a general practice of issuing letters of
credit, particularly commercial letters of credit, subject to rules of
292practice. If the letter of credit was not issued subject to rules of
practice in order to avoid their application, reference to them in
interpreting the terms of the letter of credit would produce a
distortion especially where they operated to vary the provisions of
Revised UCC Article 5. The problem is how to identify such
situations.
Where the letter of credit indicates that it is not intended to be
subject to rules of practice, they should not be applied.293
Furthermore, if there is persuasive proof that the issuer intended that
rules of practice not be applied, they should not be applied.294
In the absence of persuasive proof of the intent of the issuer
regarding the application of rule of practice, the following
considerations should be taken into account where the applicable
rules are silent.
There is a difference between commercial letters of credit and
292. It should be noted that the absence of an agreement to that effect is not a difficulty. As
noted, the terms of a letter of credit are not themselves agreements. It has long been recognized
that when a person uses a specialized commercial instrument, it is taken subject to its specialized
practices regardless of whether the person knew of them or consented. See Mills v. Bank of the
U.S., 24 U.S. 431, 436 (1826) ("[W]hen a note is made payable or negotiable at a bank, whose
invariable usage it is to demand payment and give notice on the fourth day of grace, the parties
are bound by that usage whether they have a personal knowledge of it or not."); see also U.C.C. §
4A-501(b) (1995) (funds-transfer system rule can be effective even though it affects rights of
other parties without their consent who elect to use a funds transfer).
293. Although, notwithstanding such a provision, a particular provision of a rule of practice
may by analogy assist the court in interpreting the meaning of a term in a letter of credit.
294. In this limited respect, parol evidence, including the application, communications with
the issuer, and internal communications of the issuer, should be applicable to interpret the terms
of the letter of credit.
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standbys with respect to issuance subject to applicable rules. Since it
is virtually unheard of for a commercial letter of credit not to be
issued subject to some version of the UCP, issuance without
reference to the UCP is likely to be the result of an error. In such a
case, a court would be justified in looking to the UCP as an
applicable usage of trade to vary provisions of Revised UCC Article
5,2 95 unless application of the particular provision works an unfair
surprise to the beneficiary or transferee beneficiary who had relied
on the application of the UCC rule instead of the UCP rule.
On the other hand, the absence of a clause referring to rules of
practice in a standby may represent a deliberate choice of the issuer
since the practice of issuing standbys subject to rules of practice is
296not universal. Where a standby is expressly issued subject to the
UCC and does not refer to rules of practice, rules of practice should
not be used to vary provisions of the UCC, but may be useful to state
a standard international standby letter of credit practice.
In such a situation, the applicable rules would be ISP98 because
they were drafted for standby letters of credit and reflect
international standby practice. This is in contrast to the UCP, which
reluctantly recognizes standby letters of credit, but is actually
295. The Chinese letter of credit rules permit application of international practice to cases
involving letters of credit even where the undertaking is not issued subject to them. See supra
note 54; see also Indus. Bank of Korea (Seoul) v. Lianyungang Kuchifuku Foods Co., Civil
Judgment Su Min San Zhong Zi No. 052 (Jiangsu People's High Court [China], 2003), abstracted
at 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 247, 359; Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] June 1,
2004, 130 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] III 462 (Switz.) (taking
"into account" UCP500 although the record did not reveal whether the credit was subject to it,
since "these rules find an application in the letter of credit relationship between the two banks").
296. Prior to the development of ISP98, there was disagreement about whether standbys
should be issued subject to any rules of practice. Some letter of credit lawyers were of the
opinion that the UCP was more trouble for standbys than it was helpful. See Alan L. Bloodgood,
Janis Penton-Soshuk, & Micheal E. Avidon, Standby Letters of Credit and the UCP, LETTER OF
CREDIT UPDATE, Jan. 1993, at 9, 9. While commercial letters of credit tend to be issued by major
banks with extensive operational experience since seller/beneficiaries in other countries require
an issue of international standing (as of the 1st quarter 2006, the top ten US banks accounted for
75.8% by dollar amount of letters of credit outstanding in the United States, Jul/Aug 2006
Documentary Credit World 42.), standby letters of credit can be and are issued by small banks
and other financial institutions with little or no letter of credit experience or understanding. Some
of the recent letter of credit case law in the United States is illustrative of issuers who do not
know what they are doing. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Home Trust & Sav. Bank, No. 02-2007
LRR, 2003 WL 22697175 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 7, 2003) (issuer took seven days to give a notice of
refusal which is probably an unreasonable time, especially since the bank officer apparently made
his decision to dishonor before the presentation was even made); DBJJJ, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank,
19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904 (Ct. App. 2004) (seven banking days is not an automatically reasonable time
for notice of refusal).
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designed.for commercial letters of credit. Not only does the UCP
contain traps, but it fails to accommodate standby practices.
Where a standby is not expressly subject to rules of practice or
local law, the application of general rules of letter of credit practice
as stated in the rules is appropriate in most other cases, even where
they operate to vary Revised UCC Article 5. In such a situation, the
standby rules can be understood as articulating the commonly
understood usages of trade, unless application of the particular
provision works an unfair surprise on the beneficiary, or transferee
beneficiary, who relied on the application of the UCC rule instead of
the ISP rule.2 97
E. Contracting Out Via Discrete Provisions in LCs
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) provides that "the effect of this
article may be varied.., by a provision stated.. .in an
undertaking." 298  There are a wide variety of letter of credit terms
that effectively vary the provisions of Revised UCC Article 5, many
of which would require extensive separate treatment to discuss
adequately. They represent attempts to address concerns or needs
arising from the underlying transaction.
Some of the provisions, such as so-called silent confirmations,
do not represent variations of Revised UCC Article 5, but require
careful drafting if they are to be brought within the scope of the
statute.299  Other provisions, such as the desire for a letter of credit
297. The application of specialized ISP provisions would probably be inappropriate unless
they represent standard letter of credit or standby practice for that type of letter of credit
undertaking. An example of specific rules that might not be aptly applied without an undertaking
being issued subject to specific rules is ISP98 Rule 3.14(a). On the other hand, the rules in ISP98
Rule 6 regarding transfer, assignment, and transfer by operation of law state international letter of
credit practice. The provision regarding inconsistency in ISP98 Rule 4.03 (Examination of
Inconsistency), on the other hand, presents a more difficult and closer question. This provision
reflects the nature of standby letters of credit and the expectation of the parties that there is no
generic notion of consistency with respect to documents presented under a standby. Since it does
not operate against the beneficiary, it would probably be appropriate to apply it. See BYRNE,
OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 248.
298. Revised UCC Section 5-103(c) provides:
With the exception of this subsection, subsections (a) and (d), Sections 5-102(a)(9) and
(10), 5-106(d), and 5-114(d), and except to the extent prohibited in Sections 1-102(3)
and 5-117(d), the effect of this article may be varied by agreement or by a provision
stated or incorporated by reference in an undertaking. A term in an agreement or
undertaking generally excusing liability or generally limiting remedies for failure to
perform obligations is not sufficient to vary obligations prescribed by this article.
U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1995).
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that runs perpetually, cannot be achieved within the framework of
the statute although it is possible to attain something functionally
similar. 30 0  Some of the standards discussed above, such as the
standard of examination, or the time permitted for examination that
is varied by various rules of practice, can also be varied by terms of
the letter of credit itself.301 It is common for credit terms regarding
the transfer of drawing rights, and the forms used for transfer and
assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit, to either supplement
or vary the provisions of Revised UCC sections 5-112 and 5-114.
The terms of a letter of credit could also vary the provisions of
Revised UCC sections 5-111 and sections 5-111 regarding attorney's
fees or other provisions regarding damages.
It is also possible to vary the terms of a confirmation, advice, or
a negotiation. Although there are outer limits where the resulting
undertaking is no longer a confirmation, advice, or a negotiation, it
may nevertheless be enforceable, but not as a letter of credit.
302
Revised UCC section 5-106(a) itself invites variation of the general
rule that a letter of credit is irrevocable by expressly stating that it is
revocable. 3 3  Likewise, it may be possible to vary the rule of
Revised UCC section 5-108(g) that requires a bank to disregard
299. While there are various types of undertakings to which this name could be applied, an
undertaking to purchase documents with limited rights of recourse against the beneficiary is an
independent undertaking and a "letter of credit." While it is not a confirmation within the
meaning of UCP500 or Revised UCC Article 5, its status as a separate independent undertaking
unfortunately escaped the notice of the courts who have considered its status.
300. See U.C.C. § 5-106(c), (d). The letter of credit could, for example, run for 999 years (or
whatever time period). Were such a letter of credit to contain a so-called "evergreen" clause
permitting the bank to give notice of non-renewal and permitting a drawing in such an event, it
would be functionally similar to a perpetual undertaking.
301. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a), (b). A letter of credit could provide a different standard of
examination (i.e. that the document must literally replicate the terms and conditions of the letter
of credit) or that the documents would not be examined. It could also undertake to honor within a
shorter or longer period of time.
302. Where these limits lie is not entirely clear and there is little case law on point. The
question typically arises where a bank seeks to claim the status of a nominated bank-usually a
negotiating bank. In this context, the question is whether a bank that merely inspects the
documents gratuitously or for a nominal fee is entitled to the protections of a negotiating bank in
the face of beneficiary fraud. Even if the nominated bank were to seek to vary the terms of the
statute regarding what constitutes negotiation, it is unlikely that such a person would qualify as a
protected party.
303. U.C.C. § 5-106(a) ("A letter of credit is issued and becomes enforceable according to its
terms against the issuer when the issuer sends or otherwise transmits it to the person requested to
advise or to the beneficiary. A letter of credit is revocable only if it so provides.").
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nondocumentary conditions.30 4 For example, a letter of credit could
provide that the bank require a document to represent the condition
presented, even though not stated (although such a provision in a
letter of credit would be odd; it would be easier to turn the
nondocumentary condition into a documentary one). At some point,
however, if the condition is central to the undertaking and requires
that a non-documentary fact be ascertained, the undertaking is no
longer an independent undertaking, but a dependent one.
305
A current issue regarding variation involves letters of credit that
are issued without a final amount because their amount is linked to
an index. Such variable rate letters of credit are used to pay for
volatile commodities such as oil, in which the price can fluctuate
radically over short periods of time. 30 6 Since there is no requirement
of a fixed amount in Revised UCC Article 5, the question would be
whether such a letter of credit was sufficiently "definite" for the
purposes of Revised UCC section 5-102(a)(10), a nonvariable
307provision.
V. POLICING LETTER OF CREDIT LAW AND
PRACTICE: ETHICAL LIMITATIONS TO FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Numerous struggles have occurred regarding the shape of
limitations of "freedom of contract" in the drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and it comes as no surprise that these issues have
surfaced in Revised UCC Article 5. Notably, on the whole, the
radical character of the resolution is in favor of variability. Having
304. Id. § 5-108(g) ("If an undertaking constituting a letter of credit under section 5-
102(a)(10) contains nondocumentary conditions, an issuer shall disregard the nondocumentary
conditions and treat them as if they were not stated.").
305. Comment 9 to Revised Section 5-108(g) provides:
Where the nondocumentary conditions are central and fundamental to the issuer's
obligation (as for example a condition that would require the issuer to determine in fact
whether the beneficiary had performed the underlying contract or whether the applicant
had defaulted) their inclusion may remove the undertaking from the scope of Article 5
entirely. See section 5-102(a)(10) and Comment 6 to section 5-102.
U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 9.
306. See, e.g., Korea Exch. Bank v. Standard Chartered Bank, [2006] 1 S.L.R. 565 (Sing.) (a
claim under an oil price fluctuation clause that is linked to a published table, operates without
amendment, and controls over a specific amount and a specific tolerance stated in the appropriate
SWIFT Fields so that the amount available under the credit can be greater or lesser than that
stated in the letter of credit is not an overdrawing or underdrawing).
307. See discussion supra Part IV.B (explaining the treatment of this term in Revised UCC
Article 5).
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striven to limit variability to those provisions listed in Revised UCC
section 5-103(c), it must be asked whether this approach will restrict
common law courts with respect to issues not expressly addressed in
the text or comments, especially where courts have been prone to
police undertakings by enforcing perceived minimum standards.
Apart from the questions of public policy and illegality already
considered,3 °8 limitations in UCC jurisprudence typically revolve
around two notions: (1) fairness to those thought to deserve
protection, and (2) prevention of undue surprise. However, it is not
always apparent which policy predominates in any given case since
they sometimes overlap.
The first of these concerns focuses on classes of persons thought
to deserve special protection. It has little scope in letter of credit law
and in Revised UCC Article 5 because there are few widows and
orphans who are involved with letters of credit as obligors.
Furthermore, the nonvariable definition of "letter of credit" ensures
that this abstract device will not be used as a mechanism by which
consumers issue or confirm30 9 letters of credit. Moreover, Revised
UCC Article 5 includes a structural limitation on the issuance or
confirmation of letters of credit by nonbanks so that even merchants
have important protection against inadvertent letter of credit
308. While illegality sometimes enters into consideration in letter of credit issues (although it
can often be characterized as a public policy concern), its basis is to be in an external source, i.e.
sovereign compulsion based on either a lack of consideration of the letter-of-credit-independence
principal or the sovereign consideration of it and decision to override it. Only the latter should be
indulged and only when the sovereign's law otherwise applies. Accordingly, illegality as applied
to an letter of credit obligation should be narrowly interpreted and applied. See, e.g., J. Zeevi &
Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.E.2d 168, 174 (N.Y. 1975) ("Defendant urges
that enforcement of the letter of credit contract would violate the foreign exchange laws of
Uganda in disregard of a treaty .... Contrary to defendants' position, the agreement... fails to
bring the letter of credit within its scope, since said letter of credit is not an exchange contract.").
309. "'Issuer' means a bank or other person that issues a letter of credit, but does not include
an individual who makes an engagement for personal, family, or household purposes."). U.C.C.
§ 5-102(a)(9). The official comment to UCC Section 5-106 further states:
The exclusion of consumers from the definition of "issuer" is to keep creditors from
using a letter of credit in consumer transactions in which the consumer might be made
the issuer and the creditor would be the beneficiary. If that transaction were
recognized under Article 5, the effect would be to leave the consumer without defenses
against the creditor. That outcome would violate the policy behind the Federal Trade
Commission Rule in 16 CFR Part 433. In a consumer transaction, an individual cannot
be an issuer where that person would otherwise be either the principal debtor or a
guarantor.
Id. § 5-106 cmt. 5.
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obligations.
310
Despite the fact that letter of credit obligors are not in special
need of protection, there is often a disparity in letter of credit
transactions between the expertise available to a bank issuer and an
applicant or beneficiary. Such claims have not been particularly
successful under Prior UCC Article 5 and Revised UCC Article 5
offers no reason to suggest that its jurisprudence will differ in this
regard. If anything, its more precise treatment will lessen the areas
to which it might apply. If a beneficiary or applicant makes a
business decision to rely on letters of credit for payment without
hiring or training staff with knowledge commensurate with their
business and letter of credit needs, banks should not be indirectly
taxed with this assumed risk.
Whatever policing that is to occur under Revised UCC Article 5
is most likely to fall under the general rubric of the prevention of
surprise rather than fairness, and is likely to be impacted to some
degree by the relative familiarity of the parties with letter of credit
practice. The word "surprise" is not altogether satisfactory to
explain this phenomenon, and the notion encompasses a variety of
concerns. One of the problems in identifying the application of these
principles is that courts do not always state the underlying motive for
their decision or action, leaving one to guess at the real motive
behind their ruling.
In addition, the manner in which this policing will occur will not
primarily rely on the notion of nonvariability. Common law courts
have a variety of alternative policing tools.
Policing will (and should) occur with respect to letter of credit
terms where they are ambiguous (not where they are clear, but
impossible to perform) under the letter of credit version of the
traditional rule of construing a writing against its drafter (with
respect to letters of credit, its issuer). By giving effect to any
reasonable interpretation of a letter of credit term, issuers and
confirmers are prevented from abuse of discretion in a tight situation
and the integrity of the instrument is enhanced.
In more rare situations, policing of rules of practice will also
occur. The focus should be the neutrality of the rules. Where
310. The definition of "issuer" provides that only a financial institution can issue a letter of
credit for its own account. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(9).
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required, it will occur through construction, interpretation, or
application (or non application) of the rules.
It is a fundamental and important axiom (and one that often is a
device by which neutrality can be ensured by a court) that an
ambiguous term in a letter of credit should be construed against the
issuer.31 1 While the terms of a letter of credit could conceivably
attempt to rearrange this balance in favor of the bank, it is unlikely
that such a term would be given such effect. There are several
grounds for such a decision, most notably the principle that matters
of contract construction are within the provenance of the court.
31 2
One aspect of nonvariability that could attract policing action is
the limitation contained in Revised UCC section 1-302(a) (Variation
By Agreement) of the disclaimer of obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by Revised UCC
Article 5 (and made nonvariable by Revised section 5-103(c)).
While these obligations may not be disclaimed, the standards by
which they are to be measured should be judged in the context of an
undertaking involving relatively sophisticated businesses. Within
this constraint, the use of these concepts to prevent extreme
provisions in letters of credit, applications, or other letter of credit-
related agreements within the scope of Revised UCC Article 5 will
enhance the integrity of the letter of credit system.
One aspect of policing is primarily focused on notice. While
many, if not most, of the provisions of Revised UCC Article 5 can be
varied, a letter of credit that does so should be sufficiently clear
about the variation. The importance of clarity increases with the
degree of change caused by the variation. These changes also
determine who will ultimately be affected by the letter of credit. In
this respect, a provision that lessens the time within which
examination of documents must take place requires less exposure
than one that attempts to limit the damage available for wrongful
311. UCP500 Article 5(b) requires that conditions be stated precisely. UCP500, supra note 5,
art. 5(b). The failure to do so means that the condition may be interpreted by the beneficiary in
any commercially reasonable manner. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. WestLB, No. 02 Civ 2272
(RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6212, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2004) ("When an ambiguity exists
in a letter of credit, it is to be construed against the drafter."), reconsideration denied and claim
dismissed by Bath Iron Works Corp. v. WestLB, No. 02 Civ 2272 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19206 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004).
312. See Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. 1984); Homestate
Sav. Ass'n v. Westwind Exploration, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. App. 1985).
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dishonor to the actual damages suffered, rather than the face amount
of the letter of credit. The former provision does not, absent unusual
circumstances, adversely affect the beneficiary whereas the latter
does.
Another aspect relates to protecting the rights of third parties.
Some of these parties can rely on their own system of law, such as
parties to a bankruptcy or secured parties seeking priority with
respect to letter of credit rights or funds. Here, any conflict is in the
statutory arena and the question is the extent to which letter of credit
policies are to be respected in other commercial arenas. 313  As
already indicated, provisions in a letter of credit that attempt to
expand the rights of protected parties in the event of letter of credit
fraud are unlikely to receive favorable treatment on public policy
grounds. Another basis for rejecting such attempts is the doctrine of
surprise: it may not be thought that longstanding principles of
common law jurisprudence can be upset by a statement in a letter of
credit, even if it is acceptable to the issuer and beneficiary, and even
if it is clearly stated in the letter of credit. For the same reason,
attempts to limit these rights will likely receive little encouragement.
Another dimension of this principle is the maintenance of the
integrity of the letter of credit undertaking as an international
payment device. On this ground, provisions in a letter of credit that
unbalance the neutrality of the letter of credit should be discouraged.
One historical example is the provision in UCP400 Article 7 that
made a credit revocable unless it stated that it was irrevocable.
314
313. There have been problems with respect to both areas in the case law. One significant
issue is the willingness of bankruptcy courts to recognize the post honor right of subrogation. See
Redback Networks, Inc. v. Mayan Networks Corp. (In re Mayan Networks Corp.), 306 B.R. 295
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004). The majority held that the letter of credit was in the nature of a security
deposit and should be treated just as a cash security deposit for purposes of the cap on allowed
damages for future rent under United States Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6). Id. at 300-
01. The concurrence agreed with the result on the grounds that a letter of credit issuer should be
treated similar to a guarantor of the obligations of the tenant. Id. at 307-10 (Klein, J.,
concurring). Revised UCC section 5-117 should have sorted this matter out. Likewise, Revised
UCC section 5-118 has addressed the relative priorities between letter of credit law and that of
Secured Transactions.
314. UCP400 Article 7 provides:
a. Credits may be either
i revocable, or
ii irrevocable.
b. All credits, therefore, should clearly indicate whether they are revocable or
irrevocable.
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This provision was not neutral because banks were in a better
position than were beneficiaries to understand the importance of the
significance of the magic term "irrevocable". Because of the success
and impression attending the letter of credit, most beneficiaries
assumed that all letters of credit were irrevocable. For that reason,
there was a justifiable reluctance to give full and unstinting effect to
this provision.
3 15
A contemporary example of this phenomenon is the use of
applicant controlled provisions. Such clauses can be apparent or
hidden but they undermine the independence of the letter of credit
since they require applicant cooperation or waiver for the beneficiary
to make a complying presentation. A similar provision is one that is
impossible to perform. Examples include the requirement that the
beneficiary present a document containing the signature of the
applicant (e.g. a delivery receipt). If the letter of credit required the
signature of a named person who, unknown to the beneficiary, is
under the control of the applicant; this requirement would be hidden.
Faced with such provisions, courts have been properly reluctant to
revise the terms of the letter of credit. While such provisions are
distasteful, it is ultimately the beneficiary's responsibility to decide
whether or not to act on the letter of credit, a decision that includes
the judgment as to whether or not it can perform the conditions set
forth in the letter of credit.
316
c. In the absence of such indication the credit shall be deemed to be revocable.
UCP400, supra note 225, art. 7; see Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F.Supp. 1133
(N.D. I11. 1976) (holding that the credits securing professional football players salary payments
were revocable under the UCP which provided that in the absence of any contrary indication the
credit was revocable); James E. Byrne, The 1983 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits, 102 BANKING L.J. 151 (1985).
315. Byrne, supra note 301, at 172; HENRY HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES
231 (5th ed. 1974) (urging that the revision of UCP make letters of credit irrevocable as a
default). Florida's enactment of Prior UCC Article 5 contained a nonconforming amendment that
changed the definition of "credit" in Prior UCC section 5-103(l)(a) from stating, "[a] credit may
be either revocable or irrevocable," to, "[a] credit shall clearly state whether it is revocable or
irrevocable and in the absence of such statement shall be presumed to be irrevocable." FLA.
STAT. § 675.103(i)(9) (1966) (revised 1999).
316. These provisions are to be distinguished from ones that are ambiguous. The approach
suggested here is that taken by ISP98 Rule 4.10 which provides: "[a] standby should not specify
that a required document be issued, signed, or counter-signed by the applicant. However, if the
standby includes such a requirement, the issuer may not waive the requirement and is not
responsible for the applicant's withholding of the document or signature." ISP98, supra note
142; accord ISBP, supra note 258, para. 4. Whether this approach to business on the part of the
applicant is prudent is another question apart from whether it should be enforced. The answer is
that it does not make good long term business sense to distort a payment mechanism that is
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VI. CONCLUSION
UCC jurisprudence regarding variance is incomplete. There are
several options available with respect to variation of Articles of the
Uniform Commercial Code:
i. to articulate principles by which mandatory and non-
mandatory provisions can be determined or assessed;
ii. to exclusively identify those provisions that can be
varied;
iii. to leave the question entirely to the courts;
iv. to identify some provisions that can be varied by the text
("unless otherwise agreed") and also to identify some
unvariable provisions, leaving the balance to the judgment
of the courts with general directions in favor of freedom of
contract (the general UCC approach);
v. to make a non-exclusive list of provisions that cannot be
varied and to leave it to the courts to determine others;
vi. to list unvariable provisions coupled with principles to
be applied to the other provisions; and
vii. to provide an exclusive list.
Over its various revisions, the drafters of the UCC have
incorporated each approach into at least one UCC Article. The
problem with exclusive approaches is that while some provisions are
amenable to absolute limits, others must be configured around
minimums outside of which variation is permitted. Regardless of
what the statute says, variations that are deemed unreasonable, in bad
faith, or in violation of minimum notions of diligence or care will not
be enforced by common law courts. Public policy considerations
also must be taken into account, as well as provisions essential to the
integrity of the particular statutory scheme.
In this respect, the Revised UCC Article 5 approach is radical.
Even the 1998 Version of UCC Article 9, drafted after the 1995
revision of UCC Article 5, which lists mandatory provisions, allows
neutral by inserting hidden or "silent" conditions that can be triggered on the sole discretion of
the applicant. In most cases, it is better to negotiate different payment terms such as a collection.
Once beneficiaries have been inconvenienced or lost money due to such a clause, they tend to
require that conditions be inserted into the underlying contract that will operate against the
applicant, such as submission of a pre-signed document by the applicant. In the end, the
applicant is worse off than if they had not used the condition in the first place.
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for judicial interpretation in the text and Official Comments.317
Revised UCC Article 5 is an important tribute to and example of
the principle that variation of sophisticated commercial statutes must
be controlled by the statute itself and that any expansion of these
limitations by interpretation or reliance on general common law
principles should only occur within the policies manifested within
that statute. That consumer-related limitations are inapt makes this
approach more feasible.
However, in its attempt to identify exclusively those matters that
cannot be varied by listing specific sections, an approach previously
unknown in UCC jurisprudence, Revised UCC Article 5 may have
been overly minimalist.318  While a definitive list of mandatory
provisions adds desirable precision, it does so only if and to the
extent that the completeness of its definitive character of the list is
apparent.
The list contained in Revised UCC section 5-103(c) does
identify many of the provisions that should not be variable. Many of
the remaining provisions that are not reached by the partial limitation
on variability of obligations are swept up by the inclusion of
critically defined terms (especially "Letter of Credit"). However,
considerable interpretation, a process always fraught with the
possibility of different results, is required. This requires: (1)
inferring the inclusion of the Article 5 statute of frauds; (2) deciding
which rights and obligations have minimally variabile limits with
respect to reasonableness, good faith, diligence, and care; and (3)
deciding to what extent, and on what basis, letter of credit fraud
provisions and injunctions cannot be varied. In this process, a more
detailed explanation of the overall approach and some principled
guidance for the courts would be useful.
An optimal approach to variation in Revised UCC Article 5
would take into account the following:
1. The list in Revised UCC section 5-103(c) is intended to
be definitive and any expansive inference beyond the listed
exceptions must be severely limited.
2. Any expansive inference must be based on the letter of
317. See supra note 79.
318. See generally James J. White, The Influence of International Practice on the Revision of
Article 5 of the UCC, 16 NW J. INT'L L. & Bus. 189 (1995).
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credit polices manifested in Revised UCC Article 5.
3. Interpretation of Revised UCC section 5-103(c) must be
consistent with the policies underlying the selection of the
provisions to be limited, reinforce the integrity of the letter
of credit as a mechanism for the assurance of payment, and
enhance the certainty and uniformity of interpretation of
Revised UCC Article 5.
4. Limitations on variability should not be used to interfere
with the reasonable commercial evolution or growth of
letters of credit.
5. Scope provisions cannot be varied in any manner except
as expressly provided by the statute interpreted in light of
its purposes and drafting history.
6. In determining the scope of permissible variation,
considerable deference should be given to standard
international letter of credit practice.
7. Variations that are commercially unreasonable given the
commercial nature of the transactions involved should not
be enforced. A manifestly unreasonable variation includes
the misuse of the statute to achieve unfair surprise, as
understood in the context of the sophisticated nature of the
users of letters of credit. In considering the commercial
reasonableness of a variation or exclusion, the courts should
take into consideration international practice, the effect of
the variation, any alternative and its functional equivalency,
regulatory considerations, and the fact that a variation is not
commercially unreasonable if it has any reasonable
commercial purpose.
8. While the effect of definitions in the statute can be
expanded or restricted in a manner that is not commercially
unreasonable, the definitions themselves cannot be varied
since they indicate the meaning given to these terms in the
statute itself.
9. Public policy considerations should be narrowly
interpreted and applied to restrict the variability of the
effect of the statutory provisions only to the minimum
extent necessary to provide for the integrity of the
undertaking or the statutory scheme of regulation.
While these considerations may be overly complex, they attempt
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to capture a complex reality. There is no need for a revision of
Revised UCC section 5-103(c) in order to achieve the ends suggested
here. Although a future revision of the Official Comments might add
useful clarity, the courts are currently able to apply them.
In view of the fact that Revised UCC Article 5 is declaratory of
the common law, at least to a considerable extent, and in view of the
power of the common law courts to interpret statutes in light of their
purpose and public policy considerations, most courts would so
interpret statutes as a matter of course.
This delineation is offered to forestall the assumption that listing
nonvariable provisions is intended to be supplemented by general
principles of UCC jurisprudence, and to provide some considered
guidance as to interpretation of those few interstitial matters not
expressly addressed in Revised UCC section 5-103(c) and its Official
Comments that may cause concern. Such an appreciation and
approach enables courts to give full effect to Revised UCC Article
5's unique approach to variation while permitting limited flexibility
where necessary.
